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" But there were false prophets also among
the people, even as there shall be false teachers
among you, who privily shall bring in damnable
heresies. . . . And many shall follow their
pernicious ways ; by reason of whom the way
of truth shall be evil spoken of."

This pamphlet has not been written for purposes of
propaganda—a word I detest—but solely for etilighten-
ment. For months I read of the Spanish Civil War
in our Press, and, feeling certain that much was being
suppressed, a few weeks ago I decided to visit Nationalist
Spain. This I did, travelhng nearly 2,000 miles behind
and along General Franco\'s front.

Of my visit I can certainly say this : That my experiences
were a revelation of the power of the Press to suppress the
truth.

Here I have set down what I believe to be correct,
and though T do not ask my readers to accept ofF-hand
what I have written, I do ask them to weigh my words
against what they read in their daily newspapers;
because this Civil War is not only a Spanish conflict, hut a
war of hidden forces. In my last interview with General
Franco he said to me : " / ask nothing of England; / only
want England to understand us. .. . The strength of Com-
munism is not to he reckoned in numbers, but in its power of
contagion—even you in England may one day discover that.^"

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JN this eleventh month of the Spanish Civil War,
when steps are being taken by certain foreign
governments to mtervene with the intention of reducing
It to a stalemate, it is necessary to understand what
principles are at stake, and also what, so far, have been
the losses and gains of the contending parties. It is
essential that we should do so, for unless this war is
fought to a finish, there can be no doubt whatsoever
that It will be followed by another war as devastating
as itself, and obviously it is to the interest not only of
Spain, but of the entire world that, once the present
conflict is at an end, a contented peace is established.

It might seem that, from what we have been told,
this is quite unnecessary : Franco is a rebel and is pro-
gressing so slowly, if at all, that an eventual stalemate
is a certainty. Therefore, surely, in the name of
humanity, is not it right that this war be brought to a rapid
end ? Such things and many others we are told which
appeal to kindly and ignorant people ; yet these insinua-
tions are "blue " lies—contortions and suppressions of
the truth, and wicked ones at that, because the hidden
reasons behind them have nothing whatsoever to do with
humanity or the welfare of the Spanish people. Instead
they are hinged upon international politics : the denying
of Germany a friend on the Atlantic; Italy a friend on
the Mediterranean; France a potential enemy south of
the Pyrenees ; Russia a weakening of the Franco-Soviet
alliance, and England a straining of the Anglo-Franco-
Soviet entente. Even if all these reasons were legitimate
and of greater importance than a contented Spain,

surely it would be more honest openly to proclaim that
Franco\'s defeat is imperative, not because Spain will
benefit but because it will politically be advantageous
to the Powers concerned. No, this is not done and will
not be done, because, certainly in France and England,
there are millions of fair-minded though inarticulate
people who instinctively feel that the Nationalists are
right, and that, in spite of difficulties, the chances are
that they will win. They feel also that every gain made
by them will be minimised, every setback exaggerated,
and, as in the past so in the future, every issue will be
conifused by appealing to mass-emotionalism. So the
lie will continue until Franco wins or it crushes him
in its toils.

The roots of this Upas tree shot deep into the earth
of the international world the moment General Franco
raised his standard of revolt against the anarchy which
was rendering law and order impossible. True, he
rebelled, and with him millions of his countrymen,
and in doing so he did no more than give life to the
words of Abraham Lincoln. Once that great democrat
said : " Any people anywhere, being inclined and having
the power, have the right to rise up and shake off the
existing government, and form a new one that suits
them better. This is a most valuable, a most sacred
right—a right which we hope and believe is to liberate
the world. Nor is this right confined to cases in which
the whole people of an existing government may choose
to exercise it. Any portion of such a people, that can,
may revolutionise and make their own of so much of
the territory as they inhabit."

In other words, no true democracy is possible, or
for that, any form of government based upon the ideal
of freedom, unless what both Lincoln and Lord Bryce
called the " sacred right of revolution " is acknowledged,
or what John Locfc called the " appeal to heaven."

This is, as S. C. Vestal, an American writer, has said :
"a fundamental natural right of the people of a state
which does not exist in virtue of the constitution, where
constitutional government prevails, but in spite of the
constitution. It is a disorder for the cure of greater
disorders, for the law may become a weapon in the
hands of its bitterest enemies and good men may have
to face the alternative of slavery or civil confusion.
This right belongs to the people as a necessary inference
from the freedom and independence of the nation;
but it is entirely outside the pale of the law." This
right to rebel, against what are considered to be intoler-
able conditions, is so much a fundamental principle of
democracy that Thomas Jefferson once exclaimed:
" What signifies a few lives lost in a century or two ?
The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time
with the blood of patriots and tyrants ; it was its natural

Yet, when General Franco raised his standard in
July last, did the democratic Powers recognise this
" sacred right of revolution ? " No ! Instead of say-
ing : Because in this war there are two contending parties
each believing its cause to be just, therefore let us stand
clear of this turmoil so that it may be decided by the
sword, they at once proclaimed Franco a brigand.
Forthwith Russia and France, the countries which were
in alliance against Germany, poured volunteers and
munitions into Red Spain; whereupon Germany and
Italy supported the Nationalists, and Great Britain, by
refusing to grant Franco the rights of a belligerent,
sided with France and Russia. No sooner was Madrid
threatened than non-intervention became the Anglo-
Franco-Soviet slogan, and now that non-intervention
has been put into force, as it has not brought the
Nationalists to their knees, and because Bilbao is in
desperate straits, the same Powers which a few months
back were urging non-intervention are now agitating
for the opposite, on the plea that, as Franco cannot
win, it is only humane to bring the war to a rapid ending.

That many have been misled by this propaganda is
true, because they have not troubled to examine the
gains and losses of the Nationalists and Reds : these I
will now turn to.

What was the position in July last ? Though
throughout Spain the majority of the people were firmly
nationalist, they were in no way organised for action.
There was no deeply concerted plot or plan, it was
increasing misrule culminating in the assassination of
Calvo Sotelo which drove them into revolt. Then,
when the rebellion occurred, what do we see ? Franco
firmly established in Morocco, Seville rapidly mastered
by General Queipo de Llano, and Pamplona in the hands
of General Mola. Though morally the bulk of the
people were on the Nationalist side, physically control

was in Red hands. In spite of the fact that General
Franco was in no way prepared, before August was out
the area he controlled (see map) covered rather more
than a quarter of Spain. Since then—that is, within
nine months of the opening of the war—he has doubled
this area (see map), the population of which is over
twelve and a half millions compared to a litde over nine
miUions m the territories still under Red control.

Considering that at the opening of the conflict
outside Morocco, nothing was certain; that the Army
was in a state of disintegration; the Navy largely red;
that Franco was cut off from Spain by the sea, and that
the hideous campaign of terror had dislocated the entire
country, when the history of this war is written it will
be seen how remarkable have been his successes and how
overwhelming the losses of his red opponents, who
not only were in control of the government, but of the
entire administration, finances and resources of Spain
When compared to the American Civil War his progress
has so far been phenomenal, the sole reverse being his
repulse last March at Guadalajara, which was magnified
by die hostile international Press into an overwhelming
disaster m order to prove that the Reds were winning
the war. Yet, when we turn to them, what do we see ?
That within less than a year they have lost half of Spain
that though they fight staunchly enough behind bricks
and mortar, except for their gain at Guadalajara, they
have never attempted an offensive operation, and this in
spite of the fact that the larger part of the Nationalist
front IS not entrenched. Though victories are reported,
in every case they have proved to be either inventions
or petty skirmishes exaggerated into batdes. For
instance, a short time back a decisive Red victory was
reported at the smaU town, almost village, of Santuario
de la Virgen de la Cabeza, which was held hy a handful of
Civil Guards and their wives ! Except for their counter-
attack at Guadalajara, the initiative- has never been
theirs. This fact, above all others, goes to prove how
successful Franco has been as a general and as an
administrator.

Why, then, have the Reds failed, seeing that on the
outbreak of the rebellion they were not only in power,
but also controlled all the resources of Spain? The
reasons are embedded in their philosophy and in the
strategy and tactics developed from it. Had their
philosophy been sane—that is, had it aimed at eliminating
the causes of discontent in Spain instead of exploiting
their effects—nothing could have saved the Nationalist
cause from disaster. But being intellectually undis-
ciplined, their philosophy was inhibited by a suicidal
tendency, and directly the revolt opened, instead of
their intellectuals taking command, they capitulated
to the rabble. Arms were handed out to the denizens
of the unden^^orld, and the " East Ends " of the cities
went roaring red.

The technique adopted was purely Soviet, which is
based on two well known factors : (i) The unlimited
credulity of the masses, and (2) the restricted self-
assurance of the average individual. This is clearly
explained by Herr Hider in Mein Kampj when he says :
" The credibility of a falsehood depends on its enormity.
The masses, the crowds of simplicity of soul, fall victims
much less easily to the petty falsehood, such as they
themselves are guilty of on occasions, than to the great
he which would cover them with shame. They cannot
believe that others could possibly be guilty of such
cynical and dehberate untruth." In other words :
whilst lies which normal individuals are capable of telling
leave the masses cold, lies they are incapable of telling
instantaneously turn them white hot. Therefore the
old technique of exaggeration and suppression of news
is replaced by the new technique of colossal mendacity—
the more outrageous the lie the more rapidly is it gulped
down. This technique lends itself to a further refine-
ment, for under the stimulus of mass-emotionahsm
It enables the most atrocious deeds to be carried out
and instantaneously foisted upon the moral shoulders
of the enemv.

So far this technique has consistently been applied
by the Valencia Government. Once moral chaos was
estabhshed in February, 1936, physical chaos in the
form of church burnings and assassinations followed.
Then, direcdy General Franco raised his standard, the
Russian-trained Communists, in order to gain control,
at once estabhshed a terror and simultaneously broad-
casted to the outer worid that the atrocities they had
committed were perpetrated by Franco. This enabled
them to go on with their butcheries and turn world
public opinion against their opponents. So far the
most noted example of this is the alleged bombing of
the town of Guernica, which sent France, England and
the U.S.A. into hysterics. Whether this town was
bombed or not is outside the question, because it was
m every way a legitimate air target. But what is
undoubted is that it was not destroyed by air bombard-
ment, but instead was burned down by order of the
Basque Government which, as it set it on fire, attributed
Its total destruction to Franco\'s inhumanity. From the
point of view of the new propaganda of mendacity, tliis
was an extremely skilful piece of work; but by\' this
propaganda alone the war will never be won, and to
explain this I will now return to the Nationalists.

Once General Franco had gained a secure footing in
Spain, what was his problem ? It was :—

(2) To build up an army and destroy the Red cause
in the country still unoccupied.

The first was the more immediate, because he had no
inteiition of following in the footsteps of Generals
Denikin and Kolchak in the Russian Civil War—that is,
to advance on his enemy before he had established a firm
moral base for such an operation. In brief, his whole
policy pivoted upon how to discipline disorganisation

so as to cancel out the Red policy of omanisin^
undisciphne. Therefore his actions are diametrically
opposite to the Reds : instead of conquering by terror
he set out to subdue terror by first establishing
confidence, and, secondly, to eliminate the causes of
anarchism, communism and discontent.

His policy is, therefore, shaped to solve this problem,
^d It may be examined under three headings : (i)
Towards his opponent ; (2) towards his own people ;
and (5) towards the war as a military operation.

As regards the first, he has said : " For the ringleaders
and those who are guilty of murder, death must be the
penalty. But to the ordinary rank and file of our
opponents we shall continue to show leniency and
mercy. Many now serving in the Red ranks are there
against their will. Many have been helplessly caught
up m the enemy\'s web through the accidents of chance
and war. Many are ignorant and credulous people
who have been led away by the specious words of crafty
agitators. The mere fact that a man has borne arms
agamst our forces is not regarded by us as a crime
We prefer to think it a folly or misfortune."

As regards the second, in interviews, speeches and
over the radio he has said : That after the war Spain
wiU not return to the Parliamentary system. " It may
be good for other countries, but for us it has been an
unnutigated curse, opening the door to class hatred and
foreign intrigue." The system he has in mind is one
based on the Portuguese model, yet one in which the
historic institutions of the country, so far as they con-
tribute towards nationality and unity, will be maintained
The régime will not be of a military character, yet " those
of us who have lived in contact with the working classes
and slept with soldiers on the ground, know the needs
of the people better than do the old-fashioned poli-
ticians." Further, he has said : " We shaU aUow no
parasites. Every Spaniard will have to work according
to his capacity. The labourer is worthy of his hire,
and will receive an absolute guarantee that he wiU not

be a slave to capitaHsm provided that he does not adopt
the methods of class war, which make collaboration
impossible. We are fighting for a State which will be
like one great family, without overlords, serfs, plutocrats
or proletarians ; and in which all the elements that go
to make the national wealth will be represented."

Finally, as regards the third : from these quotations
it will be reahsed, and General Franco told me so himself,
that he is not fighting the people of Spain, but solely
the Red elements and the foreign mercenaries who are
supporting them. Therefore he can only fight where
the Reds are, and as they seldom enter his area, because
the whole of the peasantry in National Spain is against
them, and as their main support is in the towns, he is
compelled for the time being to restrict his operations
to sieges. Therefore, so far, this war has not been a
field war, a trench war or a guerilla war, but a city war,
and because of this it is likely to prove a long one; for
each city taken has to be supplied and reorganised.
Only by establishing healthy and contented peace
conditions can the contagion of Communism and
AnarcMsm be eliminated. We see, therefore, that
Franco\'s strategy is closely circumscribed by his pohcy,
which is to estabhsh a better peace and not merely to
gain victories.

When this policy is understood, it will at once be
appreciated that its end is not only the conquest of
Red Spain, but of the Old Spain as well. Not only
the elimination of false doctrines, but also of the causes
which enabled them to take root. Therefore Franco\'s
progress is not one which can be measured solely by
acres_ gained and by batdes won, but above all by the
conditions which have been and are being estabhshed.

To many, and more especially so in England, where
red propaganda has so largely submerged the Press,

it is generally supposed that this has only been accom-
pHshed by wholesale destruction of all those holding left
wing views and by drastic policing of the rest. Nothing
could be further from the truth, for during my visit
not only did I talk to many people who held strong
radical views, but the number of police seen was no
more than normally employed in any peaceful country.
Only at the entrances of towns and villages, and by no
means all, did I meet small posts of Civil Guards who
checked the passes of people entering and leaving.
What to me seemed to be most remarkable was the
almost entire lack of protection of the main communica-
tions. On the Seville-Salamanca road an armed peasant
informed me that a raid had recendy been attempted
against the railway. I thereupon asked him if these
raids were frequent. He replied : " No, this was the
sole one attempted for months." I asked him why
this was so, for the Reds were not far ofF. His answer
was simple and direct: " When they were here we had
enough of them—too tnuch. We now know what they
are worth, and therefore every man\'s hand is against
them." In fact, the terror they once established has
recoiled on their heads. It is this loathing of what
took place in July and August last which is the true
protector of Franco\'s communications.

Were this not so, and had he attempted to meet
terror by terror, to-day at least 50,000 soldiers would be
required to guard the Salamanca-Seville line alone, and
every village would be a potential hostel for red guerillas
and bandits.

In the towns it is the same, few police are seen. In
them there is no feeling of tension. Citizens go about
their daily work, taxis ply for hire, all shops are open
and well stocked, and cafés and restaurants are full
until long after midnight.

These things and many others for which I have no
space here we should try to understand, for a new Spain
is emerging from out of chaos : a Spain of historic
traditions and of future hopes. The urge of the

Conquistadores is once again abroad, and it is a proud,
valiant and all-conquering spirit. Thus, in Malaga,
spoke the Marquis de Valdecanas to me—a descendant
of one of those old conquerors and a man who had lost
aU in this war : " Though terrible for the individual,
this war is the salvation of my country." He is right,
for to-day Franco is conquering the rottenness within
Spain.

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