In this book the Conquest of Britain by the Anglo-Saxons is for the first time treated as anbsp;military lt;juestion. and it is shown that all thenbsp;evidence indicates that they took iJondon first,nbsp;and settled round it, and that they then foughtnbsp;up the Valley of the Thames.

PREFACE

The Conquest of Britain by the English will never be explained unless it is treated as a whole,nbsp;and an explanation is offered which is coherentnbsp;and adequate.

It is claimed for the version of the second stage of the conquest here put forward that whatever faults it may have it is at least coherent andnbsp;adequate.

The only way to tackle a subject of this kind IS to begin by asking ourselves what are the chiefnbsp;difficulties that have to be faced, and at least anbsp;tentative explanation of them offered ? Thenbsp;nainor difficulties are legion, but the two chiefnbsp;ones seem to be, firstly, marine transport, and hownbsp;that Avas continuously provided as it was wantednbsp;during a period of about 150 years ; and secondly,nbsp;the relations of the southern invasion by thenbsp;Saxons, led by Angle Kings, to the northernnbsp;invasion by the Angles.

These crucial questions have not been shirked m this work. No version can possibly be adequatenbsp;that offers no answer to them. Then it would benbsp;impossible to give an adequate explanation of the

second stage of the conquest without offering a coherent explanation of the battle of Monsnbsp;Badonicus.

It is assumed, and for reasons that seem to the writer conclusive, that this battle took place atnbsp;Bath.

The way in which it came about that an Enghsh force got itseK into such a false positionnbsp;as to have been besieged on a mountain at Bathnbsp;is suggested, but has of course to be conjectural.nbsp;The way in which that force got away after sustaining heavy losses, is explained by means ofnbsp;evidence which does not appear to have beennbsp;recognized hitherto as such, since it is derivednbsp;from a tainted source, namely, the so-called historynbsp;of Geoffrey of Monmouth.

No apology is offered that a certain amount of conjecture has to be indulged in with a view tonbsp;enabling the reader to realize what sort of disasternbsp;to the English the battle of Mons Badonicus mustnbsp;have been, since without thus visualizing thenbsp;battle, we cannot form an estimate as to itsnbsp;consequences to the invasion as a whole, and thenbsp;lasting effects it had upon the course which thenbsp;conquest eventually followed. One of these consequences was the making of the Wansdyke bynbsp;Ceawlin, and the reasons for which he made it,nbsp;and the way he used it, are fully explained.

The W odnesbeorg of the Chronicle under the year 591 is identified as Wednesbury nearnbsp;Wolverhampton, and reasons for this identificationnbsp;are given.

The reasons for this identification seem to be conclusive, and they are confirmed by the fact

PREFACE

that it enables a consistent and coherent explanation of Ceawlin�s career of conquest after Deorham to be given, and more especially to explain hisnbsp;tragic end.

A point in this book which will probably excite the objurgation of critics is the fact thatnbsp;the battle of Fethanleah, mentioned in thenbsp;Chronicle under the year 484, is once morenbsp;identified as Faddiley in Cheshire, in spite of thenbsp;adverse verdict of philologists. It is shown thatnbsp;that verdict is based on very uncertain premises,nbsp;and that at most it only amounts to a verdict ofnbsp;� not proven.�

The general resemblance of the names is Sufficient to make it reasonable to submit thenbsp;question to the judication of Military science, andnbsp;�'vhether we approach Faddiley from the standpoint of the invaders or of the defenders ofnbsp;Cheshire (to use the modern name), the verdictnbsp;in favour of the identification of Fethanleah withnbsp;�'addiley is conclusive. Very strong reasons arenbsp;given for supposing that Ceawlin, in league withnbsp;the Angles, did attack Cheshire at this time, andnbsp;if those prove acceptable, then it follows that thenbsp;niost likely spot for a great battle to have takennbsp;place was unquestionably Faddiley.

LIST OF MAFS

Mons Badonicus .

� .

FASE

. nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;79

The Dbe Valley

. 228

Faddilby and District .

. 237

CHEONOLOaiCAL TABLE

CONQUESTS OF CEAWLIN

The conquests of Ceawlin the second Bretwalda have become easier to explain, since it has becomenbsp;recognized that the invading English did advancenbsp;Up the Thames Valley. That such a crucialnbsp;question should have ceased to be a matter ofnbsp;controversy, constitutes an immense advance innbsp;our knowledge of the history of our land andnbsp;people.

The publication of the book, � The Storming of London and the Thames Valley Campaign. Anbsp;Military Study of the Conquest of Britain by thenbsp;Angles,� in the year 1908, first proved that thenbsp;invading English certainly made an advance upnbsp;tbe Thames Valley, after taking London, the leading feature of the first stage of their conquest.nbsp;These conclusions were arrived at by means ofnbsp;inductions from the literary evidence, and fromnbsp;that of the countless traces of the conquest thatnbsp;remain, and these inductions were co-ordinated

and welded into a coherent story by deductions from the principles of Military Science.

Five years later the fact of the advance of the invaders up the Valley of the Thames was confirmed by archseology, namely, by the publicationnbsp;of the book, � The Archaeology of the Anglo-Saxonnbsp;Settlements,� by E. Thurlow Leeds, F.S.A,, thenbsp;Curator of the Ashmolean Museum. It, therefore, does not seem likely that this, the fundamental feature of the English conquest of Britain,nbsp;can ever again be called in question; and so itnbsp;may be accepted as a firm foundation upon whichnbsp;the further advances of the invaders may be built.nbsp;Or to change to a better metaphor, the advance ofnbsp;the invaders up the Thames Valley provides a truenbsp;source from whence the flow of the further streamsnbsp;of conquest may be followed.

It must be borne in mind that invaders, who declined to live in walled towns, but destroyednbsp;them all, and settled in open villages and farms,nbsp;must have made arrangements for constantlynbsp;guarding these open settlements, and no freshnbsp;ones could ever have been made without carefulnbsp;provision for their protection.

It is important to keep the fact that conquest was accompanied by colonization constantly beforenbsp;us, and that the sort of conquest we are dealingnbsp;with, is that permanent conquest that was madenbsp;with a view to occupying each district as it wasnbsp;won, and then guarding it; until, in the processnbsp;of time, with the coming of fresh immigrants, collected, for the most part, from Saxon clans on thenbsp;Continent, a fresh permanent advance becamenbsp;possible. This permanent conquest, which origin-

GUARDED SETTLEMENTS 3

ally began with the landing of Hengist and Horsa at Thanet, differed altogether from the previousnbsp;incursions, by means of which the power of thenbsp;Britons was reduced and the country explored,nbsp;and wealth collected.

This limitation of our inquiry is of the utmost importance, and also is of the greatest assistance,nbsp;since it imposes on our investigations the samenbsp;limitations as must have constrained invaders, whonbsp;had given so many hostages to fortune in thenbsp;shape of open settlements.

We have seen how, during the first stage of fhe conquest, the settlements of the invaders werenbsp;Constantly guarded by the strategical genius ofnbsp;-^ella, who used the river Thames to protect hisnbsp;*^ght flank, at the same time that he used it asnbsp;a means of advance, until, between the army undernbsp;B^ing Aesc at Englefield, near Reading, and thenbsp;army under Cerdic advancing from the southnbsp;Calleva Atrebatum was reduced, and becamenbsp;known henceforth by the English name �Sil-chester.� It is hardly too much to say that thenbsp;mst stage of the conquest of Britain by thenbsp;English, could never have been understood but fornbsp;the evidence of Bede that Aella King of thenbsp;South Saxons had sole command of all the invaders south of the Humber. The Anglo-Saxonnbsp;Chronicle tells us much, and gives us the mostnbsp;important facts; but it would have indeed beennbsp;difficult to co-ordinate them, and weld them intonbsp;a whole, and give a coherent explanation ofnbsp;his stage of the conquest, but for the evidencenbsp;evidence also of the Chroniclenbsp;hat Aella was given the mysterious title of

� Bretwalda � is of almost equal importance, and as Ceawlin became the second Bretwalda, thatnbsp;title must be explained.

The fact that Bede�s evidence is of late date, namely, some two centuries after the time of Aella,nbsp;hardly affects its value at all, if we consider thenbsp;manner in which it came about that Bede feltnbsp;himself compelled to give the important statement about Aella that we find in his Ecclesiasticalnbsp;History.

The reason why this evidence of Bede is given rather fully here will appear later. For the presentnbsp;all the reader is asked to do is to consider itsnbsp;unsophisticated character, and how impossible itnbsp;would have been for a Northumbrian ecclesiasticnbsp;like Bede, who never left his native kingdom, tonbsp;have made such a statement, unless, not only itnbsp;was true, but would be recognized as true by allnbsp;his readers.

It was, indeed, a fact known to all the men of Bede�s time which could not be omitted without,nbsp;in their estimation, detracting from the value ofnbsp;his history. Although Bede was writing only annbsp;ecclesiastical history, yet he felt it incumbent onnbsp;him, when telling us about Ethelbert, the firstnbsp;Christian King to have sole rule in this country,nbsp;to show that he knew that two great heathennbsp;kings, Aella and Ceawlin, held the same rulenbsp;before him.

Bede�s evidence is as follows. Speaking of Ethelbert he says, �tertius quidem in regibusnbsp;gentis Anglorum, cunctis australibus eorum pro-vinciis quae Humbras fluvio et contiguis ei terminisnbsp;sequestrantur a borealibus imperavit; sed primus

omnium CEelestia regna conscendit. Nam primus imperium hujusmodi ^lli� rex Australium Sax-onum; secundus Caelin rex Occidentalium Sax-onum, qui lingua eorum Ceaulin vocabatur; tertius,nbsp;nt dixi, iEdilberct rex Cantuariorum; quartusnbsp;J^eduald rex Orientalium Anglorum, qui etiamnbsp;vivente Aldilbercto eidem suag genti ducatumnbsp;pi�^bebat, obtinuit.� Then follow, fifth Edwine,nbsp;Sixth Oswald, and seventh Oswy, with remarks onnbsp;the extent of the conquests made by each. Thennbsp;m the Chronicle under the year 827 we find itnbsp;stated that Egbert was the eighth king who wasnbsp;Bretwalda, in succession to the above list ofnbsp;hings.

It is plain to every one that we here have before us two great facts. Firstly, the solenbsp;�imperium� or �ducatus� clearly borne witnessnbsp;to by Bede; and secondly the title of Bretwaldanbsp;that Was borne by those kings who succeeded, ornbsp;claimed to have succeeded, in exercising a similarnbsp;I�ole or authority to that borne witness to by Bede.

Of these two facts the fundamental one was evidently the supreme military command, or annbsp;authority, won for themselves by each of thesenbsp;*^^iigs; and though this rule or authority maynbsp;have varied according to the character of the kingnbsp;and the times he lived in, yet in all cases it wasnbsp;I�ccognized that there was sufficient similarity, tonbsp;that won for himself by Aella King of the Southnbsp;�axons, to warrant the successful Monarch innbsp;claiming the glorious title of honour that was firstnbsp;granted to Aella.

rs evident that the Bretwaldaship was not c name of an office with definite rights and

duties, but merely a title of honour that was claimed by certain kings after they, in emulation of the deeds of the first king who was grantednbsp;that title, had done enough, at least in their ownnbsp;estimation, and that of their followers, to justifynbsp;them in adopting the title. Although the rulenbsp;established in all cases was primary, and thenbsp;title of Bretwalda secondary, it will be best tonbsp;consider the Bretwaldaship first.

To do this it will of course be necessary to consider how it was that the title of Bretwaldanbsp;came to be given to Aella King of the Southnbsp;Saxons, and by whom it was so given, that itnbsp;was thought ever afterwards to be the highestnbsp;honour a successful monarch could win.

It is manifest that the title of Bretwalda could only have been devised and given by the leadingnbsp;king of the English race, and under circumstancesnbsp;of peculiar honour, at some important juncture.

Under no other circumstances is it conceivable that the Bretwaldaship would have remainednbsp;for centuries such a glorious tradition.

Such a tradition could never have resulted merely from the personal swagger of a Saxonnbsp;Chieftain who claimed the kingship of the Southnbsp;Saxons, the smallest party of invaders who gavenbsp;their name to a district. It is this paltry kingshipnbsp;of the South Saxons that must be explained, beforenbsp;we can understand the commanding position ofnbsp;Aella, their nominal king, when he was madenbsp;Bretwalda.

We want to understand how a man who had sole command of all the invaders south of thenbsp;Humber, could have been king of a horde of

immigrant Saxons, collected from their numerous clans on the Continent, and there is only onenbsp;explanation possible.

Aella was the only king who was not of the I'oyal race of Woden, and he probably was sprungnbsp;from one of the Jutish or Saxon branches of thenbsp;English race. Nothing but superlative abilitynbsp;could have won for him the position he undoubtedlynbsp;lield, since it is vouched for by Bede.

Then the time came that it was essential that Saxon immigrants should be brought to settle onnbsp;I'lie lands won. How could they be induced tonbsp;leave their homes ? They knew that the firstnbsp;thing they would do would be to quarrel amongstnbsp;hemselves, unless they were certain of findingnbsp;sorne settled form of government on their arrival,nbsp;which they could respect. Aella quickly solvednbsp;he difficulty by saying, � I will be yournbsp;king.�

For quite a long time Aella could be constantly m Sussex, and could attend to the partitioningnbsp;the land; but later he must have ruled entirelynbsp;y deputies, chieftains appointed by himself, if henbsp;Was to give his whole attention to the invasionnbsp;^d conquest, and by the time he was madenbsp;Bretwalda, which could only have been upon hisnbsp;mtirement from active campaigning, his connectionnbsp;With Sussex had probably ceased altogether. Thusnbsp;We need not allow his temporary kingship of thenbsp;outh Saxons to distract our attention fromnbsp;cllas far greater services to the cause of thenbsp;mvaders. It is evident that the kingship of thenbsp;outh Saxons was a relatively unimportant incidentnbsp;Aella�s career; important at the time, since it

settled a difficulty, and secured the willing cooperation of the Saxons; but it was a difficulty that gradually disappeared. Moreover, it isnbsp;evidently characteristic of Aella, since it gives usnbsp;an insight into the confidence he had inspired, notnbsp;only in the leaders of his race, but also it showsnbsp;that his fame had spread to the Continent; andnbsp;the assurance that Aella would be their king,nbsp;drew Saxon immigrants in thousands from theirnbsp;scattered clans on the Continent.

It is now time to come to some conclusion as to the origin and meaning of the mysterious titlenbsp;of Bretwalda, and in order to enable us to do so,nbsp;we must try and form some idea as to the positionnbsp;of the invaders in the Thames Valley when Aellanbsp;had consummated the work of his life by thenbsp;taking of Calleva Atrebatum, or Silchester, whichnbsp;probably had to surrender to the combined armiesnbsp;of Cerdie and Aesc about the year 510.

We shall thus be able to form a reasonable conception how it was that the unique titlenbsp;of honour � Bretwalda � came to be given. Thatnbsp;it was only a title of honour, giving the royalnbsp;recognition and confirmation of a primacy of command long exercised, we may feel confident fromnbsp;the analogy of the later claimants of the title,nbsp;as well as from the probabilities of the case.

During Aella�s long period of active command, we have no reason to suppose that he was anythingnbsp;more than Chief Heretoga, or, in modern languagenbsp;Commander-in-Chief of all the invaders.

Possibly his Kingship of the South Saxons served incidentally an object of considerable importance, amongst invaders who paid great respect

THE BRETWALDASHIP nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;9

to rank, since it raised Aella to a rank equal to that of Hengist, and later of his son Aesc.

However that may have been, there can be doubt at all that King Aesc and Cerdic, asnbsp;^oll as all of lesser rank and authority, obeyednbsp;�^olla as long as he was in active command, ifnbsp;^ere is any truth in the remarkable evidence ofnbsp;Bede.

Then came Aella�s retirement from active Command which can hardly have taken placenbsp;cfore the capture of Calleva.

fhe retirement of a man who had had sole rule, toe sole � imperium � or � ducatus,� of all thenbsp;lovaders for many years, must have been a verynbsp;�Important event. Every one, from the leadingnbsp;log of the race, downwards through all ranks,nbsp;Oiost have desired that such a beloved and evernbsp;'Victorious leader should continue to exercisenbsp;�oine influence, as long as he retained his faculties;nbsp;�od at any rate all would wish that such anbsp;cader should hold a position and rank secondnbsp;o none in the lands he had won. A title wasnbsp;Ranted that, whilst it expressed the rule thatnbsp;cfla had exercised for so many years, over everynbsp;one with whom he had to deal, whether friends ornbsp;enemies, at the same time carried no definitenbsp;nties or authority with it. The only authoritynbsp;. � old man could exercise was that of his personalnbsp;influence. That, supported by the approval of hisnbsp;Sovereign, could not pass away until his death.

A he title of king with its many arduous duties ^nd the necessity it involved of keeping some sortnbsp;o state. Was impossible. But a title for whichnbsp;�cre were precedents was not far to seek. The

title � Walda� or Wielder had been used before. We read of a Folcwalda in Beowulf, and Tacitusnbsp;mentions a Catualda, personal names, it must benbsp;admitted, but they show that there was nothingnbsp;novel in the term � Wielder.� A man couldnbsp;hardly be called a Wielder who had not alreadynbsp;wielded a nation or people, unless indeed the termnbsp;formed part of his personal name given at birth.nbsp;It is impossible to conceive a title more suited tonbsp;a man who for many years had so exercisednbsp;supreme authority amongst the invaders of Britain,nbsp;as everywhere to settle his friends in security, andnbsp;defeat their enemies, than � Bretwalda � ornbsp;�Wielder of Britain.� Even if Bretwalda onlynbsp;meant Broad or Wide Wielder, as has beennbsp;suggested by some, the argument would scarcelynbsp;be weakened.

It is important to realize that such a title as Bretwalda could only have been given to a mannbsp;who had already done his work, it could only havenbsp;been the royal and national recognition of annbsp;accomplished fact. It would have been absurdnbsp;to bestow such a title upon a leader at the beginning of his career, or even before he had establishednbsp;his people in a definite position of security, withnbsp;wide districts at their command, and fresh settlersnbsp;pouring in, as ships became available for theirnbsp;transport. Aella must have proved himself to benbsp;the � de facto� wielder of Britain, before such a titlenbsp;as Bretwalda could have been bestowed upon him.nbsp;What more perfect title of honour than that ofnbsp;Bretwalda can be conceived for bestowal on thenbsp;aged leader Aella upon his retirement? Whilstnbsp;it carried with it no definite responsibilities or

anxieties, it put the stamp of royal recognition and approval upon th e gold of a life spent in thenbsp;service of the English race.

And yet there is one more deduction to be niade from the evidence of Bede, and of thenbsp;Chronicle, and it is one that we may make withnbsp;a confidence and certainty that almost amountnbsp;to demonstration. If the Bretwaldaship wasnbsp;indeed such a glorious tradition, that it was soughtnbsp;at least seven of the greatest kings of thenbsp;English, after they and their followers thoughtnbsp;that they had done enough to deserve it, thennbsp;It follows, that the first bestowal of that title cannbsp;have been no hole and corner affair, but it pointsnbsp;clearly to some great assembly of the invaders atnbsp;^hich Aella was invested with the title, andnbsp;probably rewarded with other gifts, with thenbsp;acclamation of the assembled warriors, and thenbsp;chief leaders of the invasion.

The retirement of a leader who had had sole command for so many years, would make it abso-jutely necessary that some sort of assembly shouldnbsp;he convened to arrange for the future, and distribute rewards for the past. The most centralnbsp;and convenient spot for such a meeting at thatnbsp;time Was unquestionably the meadow which, atnbsp;the time of Magna Charta, bore the name ofnbsp;Runnymede or the Meadow of Council. Thatnbsp;name can only be accounted for by the fact thatnbsp;Some great council, or possibly councils, had beennbsp;held there in former times.

It is suggested that the great council which rst gave its name to this spot, which has sincenbsp;cen almost made sacred by the sealing or signing

there of Magna Charta, was the Couneil-Meeting at which Aella was invested with the title ofnbsp;Bretwalda.

However, no one is compelled to believe that the first council that gave its name to Runnymedenbsp;was that held on Aella�s retirement, and those whonbsp;pride themselves in doubting everything not provednbsp;by literary evidence, will probably continue tonbsp;indulge their propensity to doubt. The point isnbsp;that unless Aella was made Bretwalda at somenbsp;great meeting of the invaders somewhere, thenbsp;Bretwaldaship could not possibly have remainednbsp;a glorious tradition for at least three centuries.

The only place that might possibly vie with Runnymede for that honour is Kingston, but it isnbsp;a detail that cannot matter. Thus, from a studynbsp;of the circumstances that led to its initiation, wenbsp;have been able to form a fairly clear conceptionnbsp;what the title of Bretwalda meant. It was a titlenbsp;of honour given with honour. It was a title thatnbsp;had to be won, it could not be granted except atnbsp;its initiation. It was the recognition of deedsnbsp;accomplished for the wielding of Britain, by thenbsp;leading King of the English race, but even thatnbsp;royal recognition would have been soon forgotten,nbsp;if it had not been received with acclamation by thenbsp;assembled leaders and warriors of the nation.

Enough has been said to explain what the Bretwaldaship was; it is now time to consider hownbsp;the later winners of the title qualified themselvesnbsp;for it, and why it took the course it did, finallynbsp;becoming extinguished in Northumbria, untilnbsp;eventually it was renewed by Egbert.

need be said here, since his life-history fills the bulk nf this book, and no one who knows how he settlednbsp;np the west, and later on conquered, and largelynbsp;settled up, the West Midlands, can questionnbsp;Ceawlin�s right to the title of Bretwalda.

It is different with Ethelbert; it is hardly possible to understand how he could have donenbsp;niuch in the way of the conquest of fresh districts,nbsp;^nd although his rule, after the death of Ceawlin,nbsp;^ay have extended very far, it is difficult to believenbsp;that Bede was not mistaken in claiming for Ethel-^srt anything approaching sole command of allnbsp;fhe invaders. It is quite likely that for some timenbsp;there was a sort of primacy claimed by the Kentishnbsp;^ings, and, whilst Ceawlin was away in the Midlands, the kingdom of Kent was quietly accumulating wealth and acquiring a more extended

Whatever may have been the character and extent of the � imperium � claimed for Ethelbertnbsp;% Bede, it is evident that there was a largenbsp;party who would not admit it, although theynbsp;may have submitted to it for a time, and untilnbsp;they could find a claimant worthy of it, andnbsp;capable of asserting his claim. Perhaps it was thenbsp;fnct that Ethelbert had ceased to worship Woden,nbsp;that aroused a large party of heathen dissentientsnbsp;to his rule.

Their opportunity came with the accession pt Bedwald to the kingdom of East Anglianbsp;year 593, and to secure the support ofnbsp;his heathen faction Redwald gave up Christianitynbsp;^hich Ethelbert had persuaded him to adopt,nbsp;seems certain that a warrior like Redwald

would take advantage of the weakness of the Welsh, caused by the victorious advance ofnbsp;Ceawlin in the west, to conquer large parts of thenbsp;east Midlands; and having done this, he wouldnbsp;later on be proclaimed Bretwalda, with thenbsp;acclamation of his heathen followers; not onlynbsp;because he had earned that title, but also becausenbsp;the Christian King Ethelbert would thus be oustednbsp;from a command and a title he had done little ornbsp;nothing to deserve.

We do not hear of Redwald asserting his authority over Ethelbert in any way, and thereforenbsp;we may conclude that it was the title of Bretwalda,nbsp;assumed by Ethelbert, that had aroused thenbsp;jealousy of the East Anglian heathens, and Ethelbert appears to have thought it better to resign it,nbsp;lest he should have to fight such a redoubtednbsp;warrior as Redwald, and risk losing all.

We now come to a great crisis in the history of the Bretwaldaship, and learn by what meansnbsp;it came about that it was transferred to Northumbria.

The youthful Edwine began life as a fugitive from King Ethelfrith, and, after having beennbsp;pursued by the emissaries of the latter, eventuallynbsp;took refuge with King Redwald in East Anglia�nbsp;who refused to give him up ; and eventually tooknbsp;his part, and raised an army, and defeated andnbsp;slew Ethelfrith on the banks of the river Idle.

It must have been during Edwine�s long residence at Redwald�s court that he learnt allnbsp;about the Bretwaldaship and its glorious traditions,nbsp;and must often have heard Redwald saluted asnbsp;Bretwalda. Redwald died soon after he had

defeated Ethelfrith, and it evidently became the �wnbition of Edwine to win the title of Bretwalda,nbsp;^hich he soon afterwards did, by the conquest ofnbsp;Anglesey and the Isle of Man, as well as parts ofnbsp;the district which is now Lancashire.

By this means Edwine became so powerful that he was able, according to Bede, to extendnbsp;his dominion over all parts of Britain except Kent.nbsp;Edwine was succeeded by Oswald, whose dominionnbsp;^as of the same extent, What his qualificationsnbsp;Were for the title of Bretwalda we do not know,nbsp;hut there must have been several Welsh districtsnbsp;still left for him to conquer and rule.

The seventh Bretwalda was Oswy the brother of Oswald. He appears to have qualified himselfnbsp;for the title by conquering and rendering tributarynbsp;some districts of the Piets and Scots.

After the death of Oswy the Bretwaldaship seems to have lain dormant, until it was revivednbsp;about one hundred and fifty years later by thenbsp;great King Egbert, about whose sole rule therenbsp;can be no question.

It is easy to see how the Bretwaldaship thus remained in abeyance so long. Northumbria, innbsp;which the Bretwaldaship survived so long, wasnbsp;constantly at war with Mercia; and so Mercianbsp;Was not likely to carry on a title that had becomenbsp;merely a Northumbrian tradition. The Bretwalda tradition seems to have died out in Mercia,nbsp;or even if it still lingered, there appears to havenbsp;been no king, except perhaps OlFa, who couldnbsp;have made a legitimate claim to the title. It isnbsp;quite possible that Oflfa did claim and acquire thenbsp;title, but that the fact has not been recorded, or

that he would have claimed it, if he had not died so soon after his last great victory over the Welshnbsp;in the marshes of Rhuddlan, That the Merciannbsp;kings did claim a very extended supremacy mustnbsp;be admitted, but never the Bretwaldaship.

These surmises are merely intended to show how easy it is to explain the lapse of the Bretwaldaship for so many years.

It is also quite easy to explain its revival by Egbert. In Kent and Wessex, the tradition ofnbsp;the Bretwalda must have been carefully preserved;nbsp;although since Ceawlin and Ethelbert, no kingnbsp;had risen in those districts who was capable ofnbsp;qualifying for the title by conquest and universalnbsp;rule, until the rise of Egbert, who was not only anbsp;West Saxon King, but also connected with Kent,nbsp;and Egbert established a rule with a universalitynbsp;that had never been approached by any of hisnbsp;predecessors.

Is there anything surprising in the fact that Egbert, who was descended from Ceawlin thenbsp;second Bretwalda, claimed that glorious titlenbsp;directly he had qualified himself for it by establishing universal dominion throughout England ?

By considering the circumstances under which the title of Bretwalda was first given, we havenbsp;realized that it was a title of honour and ofnbsp;nothing but honour, it gave no extra power to thenbsp;holder, it was only the recognition of the pastnbsp;services of a great leader by his sovereign, approvednbsp;by the acclamation of all whom he had so constantly led to victory.

The story of the Bretwaldaship is a golden thread that laces together the greater events of

progress of the Conquest of Britain by the English, at the same time that it gives us annbsp;insight into their chief aspiration, which was, thatnbsp;some great king might in the course of time arise,nbsp;^ho would again weld together the scatterednbsp;branches of the race into unity.

When Egbert had once done this with some �iegree of permanency, and a permanency thatnbsp;quot;^ould probably have been complete but for thenbsp;later incursions of the Danes, the title of Bret-^alda could no longer be won, it lapsed from itsnbsp;own success.

The above story of the Bretwaldas lies largely beyond the scope of this book, and yet it is nonbsp;iligression, since it helps us to enter into the spiritnbsp;that Was all the time actuating the invaders,nbsp;though it was a spirit that blew where it listed ;nbsp;^nd many, if not indeed most, of them may havenbsp;been unaware of its presence, until it was arousednbsp;by opportunity; and then ithe king in whom fornbsp;the time their hopes became centred owing tonbsp;his wide success, was hailed as another Bretwalda.

Many attempts have been made to explain the conquest of Britain by the English, but none ofnbsp;them can be pronounced successful, although wenbsp;must all be grateful to their authors for havingnbsp;dragged into the light every piece of literary evidence that can be made to bear upon the subject.nbsp;M^hat strikes us most about each and all ofnbsp;these attempts is their inadequacy.

Many able investigators, by means of masterly induction from the evidence, have thrown light onnbsp;his or that phase of the conquest, and we feel, asnbsp;'ve read them, that we are learning something;

and then the conclusion is forced upon us that the theory put forward is inadequate, and somethingnbsp;greater is wanted. The fact is their inductionnbsp;from evidence is perfect as far as it goes, but theynbsp;dread deduction from principles, although deduction is but the strategy, as induction is the tacticsnbsp;of investigation, or, to change the metaphor, investigators are like sailors who dread to go out of sightnbsp;of land, and fear to trust themselves to the guidancenbsp;of the sun and stars. Fortunately for us our coursenbsp;is made more clear by the very difficulties of thenbsp;task the invaders had set themselves, namely, thatnbsp;of conquering by armies, and holding by means ofnbsp;colonization. This limited their powers of strikingnbsp;at a distance, and enables us to comprehend thenbsp;strategic factors of each step of the advance.nbsp;Invaders who constantly gave numberless hostagesnbsp;to fortune in the shape of open settlements, darenbsp;not go far from the broad base they had to protect.

This statement does not of course imply that they could not send out marauding or reconnoitringnbsp;expeditions to very great distances, but even suchnbsp;expeditions would have to be conducted with greatnbsp;caution and skill if they were not to entail disaster,nbsp;not only to the force concerned, but also to manynbsp;homesteads that would for a time be unprotected.nbsp;The difference between conquest accompanied,nbsp;step by step, by colonization, and ordinary warfare,nbsp;must be grasped, if we are to understand thenbsp;conquest of Britain by the English, which differsnbsp;altogether from the conquest of England by thenbsp;Danes. Although some have professed to detectnbsp;a resemblance between them, it extended no farthernbsp;than the facts that, for all we know to the contrary.

the warriors and vessels employed in the earlier invasion, probably resembled those of the later, andnbsp;they came from much the same countries, andnbsp;landed at the same ports. They were in fact thenbsp;same race, but here the resemblance ceases. Wenbsp;are considering only the final invasion for thenbsp;purposes of permanent conquest and occupation,nbsp;and it is quite possible that the earlier expeditionsnbsp;of the English, for the purpose chiefiy of plunder,nbsp;against Roman Britain, may have resembled thosenbsp;of the Danes, though even then the resistance thatnbsp;had to be encountered was of a wholly differentnbsp;character to that met with by the Danes.

The Danes when they first landed in England came as gangs of warriors for the purpose of plunder,nbsp;and without a thought for the morrow. Theynbsp;found not a single walled fortress in the wholenbsp;country, and all there was to resist them in eachnbsp;district that they swooped down upon was the Fyrd,nbsp;a sort of local militia, raised from the open farmsteads scattered over the country; unless indeednbsp;they happened to find the king ready to receivenbsp;them with his Gesiths and house-carls, but thesenbsp;were not numerous enough to form more than anbsp;rallying-point for the Fyrd.

But there was a greater difference still between the invasion of the Gallo-Roman Britain by thenbsp;English, and of England by the Danes. Thenbsp;Danes, in spite of all their ferocity and cruelty,nbsp;and the hatred they aroused, where their chronicnbsp;incursions prevailed, came to a people whose language they could understand, and with whom theynbsp;showed themselves in numberless instances quitenbsp;ready to amalgamate and to settle down together

in amity. Moreover, the Danes showed themselves quite ready to adopt the system of local government and administration that they foundnbsp;in the English districts they occupied, with verynbsp;slight modifications. Whereas the English changednbsp;everything, the Danes practically changed nothing,nbsp;beside adding a few laws, and a few fresh place-names ; and they set the example, to be followednbsp;of necessity by Alfred and his daughter Ethelfledanbsp;the Lady of the Mercians, of creating fortifiednbsp;centres. Considering that they began in the samenbsp;countries, crossed the same sea, and ended in thenbsp;same districts, we can hardly find two invasions,nbsp;followed by conquest and settlement, more contrasted than those of Britain by the English, andnbsp;of England by the Danes. Superficially, it maynbsp;be admitted that there was a sort of resemblance,nbsp;but intrinsically there was no resemblance at all.nbsp;It has been necessary to say this much about thenbsp;Danes, because so many investigators have beennbsp;led astray by having moulded their ideas of thenbsp;conquest by the English, on their knowledge ofnbsp;the later conquests by the Danes.

The first stage of the conquest of Britain ended with the death of Aella the first Bretwalda. It isnbsp;therefore incumbent upon us to form some idea ofnbsp;the position of affairs at that epoch, in order thatnbsp;we may be able to trace the strategic factors thatnbsp;influenced the invaders, and led later to the conquests of Cerdic and Cynric, and to the conquestnbsp;of the West Midlands by Ceawlin.

It seems necessary first to make a few preliminary remarks upon strategy, since that term is often used very vaguely. Strategic influences vary

much in intensity, sometimes they are evident all ranks in an army, sometimes it takes a greatnbsp;mind to grasp them. For instance, after the battlenbsp;of Crayford, when Hengist�s army slew fournbsp;thousand Welsh-men, and they fled with great fearnbsp;to Londonborough, we can well understand thatnbsp;Hengist�s followers, whether warriors or seamen,nbsp;i''^ould have mutinied if he had not at once gonenbsp;on to take London, the chief strategic and commercial centre, and chief seaport of the country.nbsp;All knew that, if London was once taken, thenbsp;whole of Kent would be theirs without a blow.

After London was taken the problem became more complex, and yet since we hear of no failures,nbsp;^nd as far as the lines of the invasion can be traced,nbsp;the invaders appear to have been directed andnbsp;restrained (a more difficult business) in a masterlynbsp;manner, we can only suppose that Aella was anbsp;consummate strategist. However, even if Aella snbsp;strategy was not so faultless and far-seeing as thenbsp;Writer supposes, it comes to the same thing innbsp;the end; since the mistakes would not have beennbsp;recorded, but only the far-flung war-strokes by seanbsp;and land, by which all districts south of the Thamesnbsp;Were conquered and colonized in safety, have beennbsp;recorded in the Chronicle; and even some of thesenbsp;are evidently missing, and have to be supplied bynbsp;the reasonable conjecture that what was so wellnbsp;begun was equally well ended.

With the death of Aella the restraining influence was gone, and we shall soon see how the invaders had to learn in the school of hard experience, that the dictates of sound strategy cannotnbsp;tgt;e neglected without disaster.

Of course we do not learn of this disaster from the Chronicle, it is not mentioned, and it is onlynbsp;from Welsh sources that we know about thenbsp;battle of Mons Badonicus.

Yet even this disaster seems to have been a blessing in disguise, since it restored that restraining influence which had vanished with the deathnbsp;of Aella; and the invaders were sobered down,nbsp;and directed to a wiser course, and induced tonbsp;restrict each advance that they made to a limitednbsp;conquest well within their powers, not only ofnbsp;taking but also of keeping. That is the point wenbsp;must grasp if we are to understand the conquestnbsp;and colonization of Britain by the English, namely,nbsp;that it was always a useless squandering of thenbsp;limited forces at the command of the invaders,nbsp;unless each victory was followed by the permanentnbsp;and secure acquisition of fresh territory.

A school of sound strategy had probably sprung up under Aella the first Bretwalda, but upon hisnbsp;death a fresh generation of ambitious warriorsnbsp;appears to have broken away from its traditions,nbsp;and were only brought to heel by the disastrousnbsp;campaign of Mons Badonicus. It is an instructivenbsp;fact that we only learn of this serious check to thenbsp;invading English from Welsh sources.

The inference from this is, that there may possibly have been other minor disasters, or there may have been successful minor campaigns thatnbsp;led to no permanent advantage, but if there werenbsp;any such, they were even less likely to have beennbsp;recorded than the disaster of Mons Badonicus.

It seems more probable, however, that, after that lesson, the strategic principles inculcated by

first Bretwalda prevailed; and that the invaders never afterwards committed their forces to � task that was not well within their powers ofnbsp;achievement. Then, with the rise of Ceawlin thenbsp;second Bretwalda, we find ourselves studying thenbsp;acts of a leader, who, whatever his faults maynbsp;have been, had as wide and far-seeing strategicnbsp;Vision, even as that of Aella himself. It has beennbsp;^accessary to make these few remarks on strategynbsp;because, whoever ventures to assume that whennbsp;nations are at war, military science can never be innbsp;abeyance, but must remain the chief science bynbsp;nieans of which the facts of that warfare may benbsp;co-ordinated, is apt to be met by a school ofnbsp;criticism that loves to veil its ignorance by quotingnbsp;Milton�s �Battles of Kites and Crows,� or withnbsp;Green, show its scorn for anything military bynbsp;talking of a � Drum and Trumpet History.� Suchnbsp;critics are apt to meet the use of the termnbsp;� strategy � in connection with the warfare of � so-called � barbarians, with a supercilious smile; andnbsp;assume that plain deductions from military sciencenbsp;are guess-work, and inapplicable to illiterate barbarians. They seem to fail to realize that a patch-work of inductions from very meagre literarynbsp;evidence, remains mere guess-work, unless theynbsp;can be co-ordinated by some scheme that is adequate, and will stand the severest criticism at allnbsp;the numberless points that call for explanation innbsp;a great invasion across the sea, and leading tonbsp;colonization.

Inductions from numerous facts relating to a great subject, great not only from its importance,nbsp;but also from its extent as measured in space and

in time, can only be co-ordinated, and brought into due relation to one another, by means of reasonable deductions from the principles of somenbsp;seienee.

In the ease of a transmarine invasion, followed by permanent conquests and settlement, uponnbsp;what prineiples can we base our deduetions withnbsp;any hope of sure guidance but those of militarynbsp;science? Not forgetting, of eourse, the demandsnbsp;of the ancillary science of Navigation, and thenbsp;difficulties involved in Marine transportation ? Thenbsp;use of the term � strategy � in conneetion withnbsp;the conquests of Britain by the English, seemsnbsp;to arouse the seorn of some, especially of thosenbsp;literary crities who had to use Green�s � Making ofnbsp;England � as a text-book in their university days.nbsp;It should be remembered that after all � Strategy �nbsp;is only a convenient term for common sensenbsp;applied to warfare, so the question merely resolvesnbsp;itself into one of whether the invaders aeted asnbsp;reasonable men or as blundering fools. In eithernbsp;case they must have been up against strategicnbsp;factors, working weal or woe, in precise aeeordancenbsp;with the way they were reeognized or disregarded.

It may be admitted that in a great invasion there were strategie problems that demandednbsp;something beyond what we understand by common sense, in fact, there were questions to benbsp;settled as a basis of action, that were only comprehensible by the superlative ability of a greatnbsp;leader. The conduct and the result of the firstnbsp;stage of the conquest proved that there was suchnbsp;a leader, and Bede tells us that he was Aella

It may be fairly urged that Military Science, or Strategy, is not merely common sense, butnbsp;systematized common sense applied to warfare,nbsp;and that when the invaders first landed, it is impossible for us to credit them with clearly definednbsp;system of strategy for not only defeating theirnbsp;enemies, but also for making their friends securenbsp;in their open settlements. Probably this was thenbsp;case.

The campaign along the north coast of Kent could have raised no very puzzling strategical questions; every man serving there, on landnbsp;and sea, must have known what was wanted,nbsp;namely, the capture of London and its port. Anynbsp;false moves made after that event might havenbsp;involved the invaders in hosts of difficulties, andnbsp;have squandered their forces in useless victories, ifnbsp;not indeed in disasters.

It must have been about this time that the ability of Aella was recognized and he was givennbsp;sole command.

Thus it came about that, by the time Aella retired, the methods of conquest and settlement had been reduced to a fixed system. Innbsp;fact, in modern language it had become scientific,nbsp;it had been systematized in accordance with thenbsp;dictates of the soundest strategy by a leader ofnbsp;consummate ability.

This book then is written to show that upon the death of Aella the natural thing happened.

Warriors who had been constantly victorious had learned to despise the Welsh, and so, freed

from the restraining influence of their great leader, they started on a wild campaign that was contrarynbsp;to the dictates of prudence and common sense,nbsp;in more modern parlance, it was contrary to thenbsp;principles of sound strategy; and so they metnbsp;with a disaster that was only partially retrievednbsp;by brilliant tactics, as we shall see later.

Thenceforward, the invaders having learned in the hard school of experience, never forgotnbsp;their lesson, but reverted to that systematizednbsp;scheme of invasion, followed promptly by freshnbsp;settlements, that had been devised and perfectednbsp;by the superlative genius of Aella the firstnbsp;Bretwalda.

It is hoped that these few remarks on Strategy will reconcile critics to the adoption of itsnbsp;principles as a guide in our investigations, andnbsp;that it will be admitted that deductions fromnbsp;sound principles are reasonable conjectures thatnbsp;do not deserve to be ranked as guess-work, butnbsp;rather that it is mere guess-work to assume thatnbsp;the invaders were nowhere actuated by a fixednbsp;policy, and that the movements of their fleetsnbsp;and armies and parties of settlers, were directednbsp;by the casual decisions of jealous leaders, with nonbsp;fixed principles or recognized system to guidenbsp;them.

It is a reasonable conjecture that one man could not have had sole command of all thenbsp;invaders south of the Humber for a period ofnbsp;probably half a century, but at any rate for a verynbsp;long time, without having established some sortnbsp;of scheme of invasion, by means of which freshnbsp;districts were conquered, and the open settlements

established upon them protected. In other words, that he taught his followers sound strategy.

If, however, it is admitted that the invaders did bring with them, or perhaps only evolved, anbsp;set scheme of conquest and colonization, it maynbsp;Well be asked, �Did it leave definite traces bynbsp;which it may be recognized ? � The answer is innbsp;the affirmative.

The traces of the conquest are too numerous to be specified here; some will be dealt with asnbsp;they are met.

On the whole the distribution of place-names is the most significant, and more especially aroundnbsp;London. However, this is too large a subject tonbsp;be dealt with here, and we only select one set ofnbsp;place-names, namely, the Stokes, for special notice;nbsp;since the Stokes help us to trace the course of thenbsp;conquest with greater certainty and precisionnbsp;than any other form of place-names.

It stands to reason that whenever invaders distributed in open settlements over the country,nbsp;and with no fortified centres at which they couldnbsp;assemble, and from whence they could advance,nbsp;and to which if necessary they could retire, wishednbsp;to undertake a further permanent conquest of anbsp;definite coveted district, it would be necessarynbsp;for them to fix upon a base of operations for thenbsp;above purposes at which stores and munitionsnbsp;of war could be collected, and at which they couldnbsp;eventually assemble.

We find this requirement of warfare, under the conditions that prevailed during the invasion,nbsp;perfectly fulfilled by the Stokes ; and so we maynbsp;conclude that the Stokes were in each and every

It does not follow that every single permanent advance of necessity premises the construction of a Stoke. In some instances the invaders may have been so overwhelmingly strongnbsp;that a base of operations was unnecessary, innbsp;others perhaps a strong tun served the purpose,nbsp;in fact we often find Stoketuns or Stocktons.nbsp;However that may be, wherever we do find anbsp;Stoke, we seldom, if ever, have any difficulty innbsp;discovering its objective, in other words, we cannbsp;always understand the purpose for which it wasnbsp;originally made.

Amongst the place-names of England the Stokes hold a unique position, they differ from allnbsp;others in one remarkable respect, although etymologists tell us that there is nothing in the wordnbsp;� stoke � to indicate anything more than � anbsp;place,� and that we are not even entitled tonbsp;assume, as we should be inclined to do, that anbsp;Stoke meant a place surrounded by a stockade.

It is evident, therefore, that with the Stokes, as indeed with certain other forms of place-names,nbsp;the powers of etymology to explain what theynbsp;meant to those who first gave them, are limited,nbsp;and we must visit the Stokes themselves, andnbsp;study their relation to other place-names, and tonbsp;their surroundings, if we are ever to hope to learnnbsp;more.

In dealing with such a far-fiung place-name as Stoke, the difficulty is to arouse a spirit of inquirynbsp;that is of equally wide extent. The followingnbsp;suggestion may be of some assistance.

Supposing we took the map of, say, the south of England, and scratched out every Stoke, andnbsp;Wrote instead the word � Place.� Our interestnbsp;Would be at once aroused, and we should naturallynbsp;ask. Why did the invaders select one spot innbsp;each district and call it the Place ?

And then our attention is drawn to another supreme fact, and that is that we only find onenbsp;Stoke in each district, and we never find twonbsp;Stokes together, in fact, seldom within ten milesnbsp;of one another. This statement is not traversednbsp;by the fact that we find a North and a Southnbsp;Stoke together in the Thames Valley, and againnbsp;near Arundel. One of these Stokes has been thenbsp;original, and another village that has risen near itnbsp;has assumed the same name. In fact, in thenbsp;Thames Valley there appears to have been a thirdnbsp;stoke intervening, from which the others derivednbsp;their names.

Apart from these very explainable exceptions, the Stokes stand in a solitary grandeur that isnbsp;unique amongst the various classes of place-names.nbsp;It may be said that the singular thing about thenbsp;Stokes is their singularity.

We find an apparent weakening of this characteristic in the west, in that part of Britain that was occupied by the Saetas or Settlers.

Saetas merely means � dwellers,� but the way this term was used evidently implies that thenbsp;Saetas had taken no part in the conquest, butnbsp;had been brought in as settlers with their familiesnbsp;to fill up districts which had been won by thenbsp;armies.

setas, and the use they made of Stokes is easily explained. In this region we often find a stoke innbsp;one valley near to a stoke in the next valley.

This change in the character of the stokes will be more fully accounted for when we follow thenbsp;strategy of Ceawlin later on. For the present itnbsp;is sufficient to state that, when Ceawlin had completed the first stage of his advance westwards,nbsp;and before his advance northwards from Deorham,nbsp;he professed to be satisfied with what he had won,nbsp;and established the Wansdyke as his frontier line,nbsp;and kept a strong force in constant readiness tonbsp;guard it. Behind this strategic frontier line, whichnbsp;the Welsh were taught to respect, although fornbsp;miles it was only marked by a Roman road,nbsp;Ceawlin settled up the country by bringing innbsp;Saxon clans, not as armies, but as settlers withnbsp;their families, and perhaps even cattle; in fact,nbsp;they were correctly termed � Saetas � or Settlers.

The distribution of these saetas seems to have been carefully thought out and provided for, sincenbsp;the results leave evidenee of the same system ofnbsp;settlement having prevailed everywhere throughout Dorset, Wilts, and Somerset.

Each party of saetas seems to have been apportioned a valley to conquer and to keep, onnbsp;condition that they drove out all the Welsh fromnbsp;their district. This they could easily do, althoughnbsp;in many cases they found the Welsh withdrawnnbsp;into the fancied security of vast hill-fortresses;nbsp;and the wretched Welsh soon learned that a fort,nbsp;however strong, that cannot be relieved, mustnbsp;sooner or later be surrendered to invaders whonbsp;had come to stay, and who knew that a great

leader was watching to prevent the approach of any relieving force too great for them to dealnbsp;with.

And now we can see how it came about that We find a Stoke, and only one, in almost all thenbsp;larger valleys of the west.

It was essential even for settlers, since they had to be prepared for much local warfare, to havenbsp;a base of operations. For a few seasons, at anynbsp;rate, they must have required a secure centre atnbsp;which stores could be collected, and from whencenbsp;they could be issued; at least until the newnbsp;system of valley cultivation, which the Saxonsnbsp;introduced, had been established, and their fieldsnbsp;and their herds had become productive.

At first each stoke was evidently just the Stoke of its district, though many of the smallernbsp;stokes were soon distinguished by being callednbsp;after the stream on which they were situated, suchnbsp;as Alverstoke, Plimstock, Tavistock, etc.

The greater stokes seem to have remained for a long time without any distinctive addition tonbsp;their names, even until the time of the Normans,nbsp;whose propensity for travelling from one castlenbsp;to another made it essential that the stokes shouldnbsp;be distinguishable, and so we find such names asnbsp;Stoke D�Abernon, Bishops� Stoke, ete., althoughnbsp;many stokes have remained simply � Stoke � untilnbsp;this day.

Etymology is an accurate science, and must be absolutely respected so far as it leads us, but it isnbsp;evident from the stokes that it has its limits, andnbsp;where we find plain facts to help us to extendnbsp;our knowledge of the actual meaning that the

invaders of Britain attached to certain words, we should be foolish not to study them.

We get an interesting illustration of the limits of etymology in the place-name suffix � Stead.�

Etymology can only tell us that it is the same as the German � Stadt,� and it appears to havenbsp;much the same meaning as the word � Station,� anbsp;place or spot where people resided for a time ornbsp;permanently. The science of language gets usnbsp;no further than this, and so it is necessary fornbsp;those who care for facts, and wish to know whatnbsp;meaning our invading forefathers attached to thenbsp;word � Stead,� to visit all the steads they can, andnbsp;see for themselves, when a very striking peculiarity makes itself apparent.

The steads, almost without exception, are on relatively high ground, and generally on thenbsp;highest ground in their neighbourhood. It looksnbsp;apparently as if steads were look-out stations, butnbsp;we are now only concerned with facts and notnbsp;with deductions that may be made from them.

Then, again, etymologists tell us that the word �Tun� simply meant an enclosure, and theynbsp;quote the Anglo-Saxon scriptures and the chartersnbsp;to prove it. Some tuns may have been such, butnbsp;we are concerned with tuns formed some twonbsp;centuries before the scriptures were translated, ornbsp;the charters were drafted, and during a time ofnbsp;strenuous warfare.

We naturally suppose that tuns which gave us permanent place-names, under such arduousnbsp;circumstances, were more likely to have beennbsp;enclosures for keeping out armed men than fornbsp;keeping in cattle and swine; and we are supported

township, many have other forms of place-names. In the combination Stockton and Hampton, wenbsp;find tuns used as stokes and as hams.

The first Hampton appears to have been the one that gave its name to Hampshire, and which,nbsp;later on, when the Northampton was founded, hadnbsp;to be called Southampton to distinguish it.

In conclusion, let it be clearly understood that this book is not written to show that the English,nbsp;or Anglo-Saxon, invaders of Britain were perfectnbsp;strategists. Very much the contrary. We happennbsp;to know, from Welsh sources, of one stupidnbsp;blunder in the disastrous campaign of Monsnbsp;Badonicus; and there may have been numerousnbsp;lesser ones which in a similar manner would notnbsp;be recorded. In fact, it is possible that the invaders may have been driven to adopt the wisenbsp;course by which they eventually succeeded, by anbsp;process of trial and failure.

It is more probable, however, that this was not the case, and the lesson of Mons Badonicus, confirming as it did the principles of warfare and ofnbsp;guarded settlements, once for all laid down by thenbsp;first Bretwalda, was sufficient.

However that may have been, all we want is a coherent explanation of the successful movesnbsp;that were recorded, and by means of which thenbsp;conquest was extended to the West Midlands bynbsp;Ceawlin, and even to the taking of Chester bynbsp;Ethelfrith.

One word more. It does not follow that because we find that, in the process of permanentnbsp;conquest, a severe restraint appears to have beennbsp;exercised, and that no permanent advance was

made without due consideration and preparation, therefore the invaders were always thus confined ; but their ascendancy was evidently suchnbsp;that they could at any time they chose send outnbsp;strong reconnoitring and marauding expeditions,nbsp;and scour the country as they did of old, as longnbsp;as they took proper precautions against being cutnbsp;off by a superior force.

Unless we grasp this difference between permanent conquest and expeditions for temporary purposes, we cannot understand how the invadersnbsp;were able to learn all about the country beyondnbsp;their borders, and how they were able to hold thenbsp;Welsh near their borders in subjection.

With regard to the names of the invaders and defenders of Britain. The invaders were, broadlynbsp;speaking, all English, although some branches ofnbsp;that race had, owing to long separation, adoptednbsp;distinctive names, of which the Seaxes and Jutesnbsp;are the chief ones. The Jutes seem to have quicklynbsp;dropped their name, but the Seaxes were broughtnbsp;over in such large numbers that they gave theirnbsp;name to the various districts where they settled,nbsp;and became known as the East, Middle, South, andnbsp;West Seaxes ; yet even they soon called themselves English, largely perhaps because their kingsnbsp;and many of their leaders were Engles, and allnbsp;were desirous of becoming united under the ancientnbsp;name of their race. The northern invaders werenbsp;all Engles, or English, led by the same dynastynbsp;that provided kings for the rest. It is convenient,nbsp;however, and in accordance with convention, tonbsp;use the Latinized name � Saxons � when speakingnbsp;of the southern invasion, and the Latinized name

� Angles � for the northern invaders, and this practice is followed. With regard to the defendersnbsp;of Britain, the tribes of Britons, mixed with thenbsp;descendants of people brought in by the Romans,nbsp;might be called Britons, but now Englishmen arenbsp;often called by that name. The name � Welsh,�nbsp;though it is of English origin, is more distinctive,nbsp;and Englishmen have learned to honour it for thenbsp;brave defence the Welsh made against overwhelming odds, and for the part they have sincenbsp;played in the combined nation and empire. Thenbsp;Chronicle often speaks of the Wealas, or Welsh,nbsp;and so that name is generally the one usednbsp;throughout this book.

CHAPTER II

In order to explain the conquests of Ceawlin, it is first of all necessary to explain the events thatnbsp;led up to them, and thus to connect them up withnbsp;the previous conquests of Aella the first Bretwalda,nbsp;and so through those of Cerdic, and of Cynric, tonbsp;the time when Ceawlin became king.

Our story begins with the year 514, since that is the year Aella is said to have died; and moreover it is the year the West Saxons first came, asnbsp;we know from a definite entry in the Chronicle.nbsp;It is a statement that could hardly have beennbsp;made unless it was true. It should be noted thatnbsp;Cerdic, with his victorious army, had already beennbsp;in the country nineteen years, this fact helps tonbsp;explain a great difficulty. W^e know from Bedenbsp;that the Saxons lived in separate Clans or Tribesnbsp;on the Continent, under Chieftains whom Bedenbsp;calls � Satraps.� It is impossible to conceive hownbsp;jealous clansmen, living for the most part in thenbsp;interior of the Continent and away from the sea,nbsp;could have organized a large naval expedition tonbsp;an enemy�s country, or what they could have donenbsp;with their families whilst the country was beingnbsp;cleared of the enemy. These difficulties disappearnbsp;directly we realize that Cerdic, for nineteen years,

38 THE JUTES AND WEST SAXONS

had been preparing large districts north of the Solent for the reception of fresh settlers; and thatnbsp;it was Cerdic�s emissaries who had collectednbsp;families of Saxons near convenient ports on thenbsp;Continent, and provided transports for bringingnbsp;them across the sea.

Even so, the difficulties that have to be explained are puzzling enough, but they mustnbsp;be fearlessly tackled; always bearing in mind thatnbsp;explanations that are inadequate, although theynbsp;may serve their purpose for a time, are certainnbsp;sooner or later to lead to confusion, and then wenbsp;have all our work to do over again.

It is the custom of historians of this period to sigh over the lack of evidence, because forsoothnbsp;the literary evidence is very meagre and disjointed.nbsp;Yet it may be fairly said that no conquest has leftnbsp;more, if so much, evidence of its tracks, in countless place-names, in dykes and earthworks, and innbsp;boundaries of Counties, Hundreds, and Townships, etc. The plain difficulties that the invadersnbsp;had to face and overcome are helps to investigatorsnbsp;who have the courage to face such facts, andnbsp;consider how such difficulties could have beennbsp;overcome. Let us by all means collect all thenbsp;facts we can, but let us at the same time remembernbsp;that mere inductions from facts, however numerous,nbsp;can never explain a conquest that extended itsnbsp;operations over such vast tracts of land and sea,nbsp;during a period of about one hundred and fiftynbsp;years.

To enable us to co-ordinate facts so widely spread both in space and time, and to harmonizenbsp;them with the literary evidence, we must appeal

to deductions from principles; and these, in the first place, must be the principles of Navigation

slurred over by historians, in connection with the history of Britain, than those concerningnbsp;navigation. They constantly ignore the fact thatnbsp;no ship could leave a continental port for Britain,nbsp;^mless she had a crew of expert seamen; and yetnbsp;We are not justified in assuming that more thannbsp;ten per cent, of the invaders came under thatnbsp;category. As for the Saxon branch of the Englishnbsp;Race, it is doubtful if more than one per cent,nbsp;could have been seamen or had ever seen the sea.

This statement is not traversed by the fact that the Romans, and the Welsh, taught by them.nbsp;Called all the invaders Saxons. This arose, withnbsp;hardly any doubt, from the fact that the firstnbsp;Englishmen, with whom the Romans came innbsp;contact, belonged to a tribe of Saxons, perhapsnbsp;the Chauci, and as Englishmen were then, atnbsp;least, as distinct from other races as they arenbsp;to-day, and whether Angles or Jutes, had thenbsp;same general appearance, the Romans continuednbsp;to call them Saxons. It is important to realizenbsp;this fact, and to understand that the Saxons, withnbsp;the exception of a few living near the mouths ofnbsp;the Ems and the Weser, must ail have beennbsp;landsmen and quite unable to organize navalnbsp;expeditions without the assistance of the Anglesnbsp;and Jutes, Then there is another error that mustnbsp;be corrected before we proceed further. It isnbsp;commonly assumed that Cerdic was a Saxon, butnbsp;this guess, derived apparently from the fact that.

40 THE JUTES AND WEST SAXONS later on, he assumed the Kingship of the Westnbsp;Saxons, is evidently a wrong one. Cerdie likenbsp;Hengist was a descendant of Woden, the Royalnbsp;ancestor of all the kings of the Angles, and therefore he must have been an Angle. The Anglesnbsp;were the King-governed branch of the race, tonbsp;which the others looked for guidance. They werenbsp;the only branch that could organize and conductnbsp;a transmarine conquest; and although the othernbsp;branches, the Saxons and Jutes, had long beennbsp;separated from the Angles, yet they were onlynbsp;too glad to return to their allegiance to Anglenbsp;kings, with the prospect of winning an Islandnbsp;home. As for the army that Cerdie commandednbsp;when he first came to the Solent, nineteen yearsnbsp;before the coming of the West Saxons, it wasnbsp;probably raised from all branches of the Englishnbsp;race, the bulk of it probably being Angles. Somenbsp;of these warriors may have elected to settle innbsp;Wessex, others may have returned to the Continent, and have gone later on with their fellowsnbsp;to the North of Britain.

Of what elements the original army of Cerdie was composed, and what became of the warriorsnbsp;in the ranks, are details which, after all, do notnbsp;affect the main issue, which was that the firstnbsp;state of the invasion of Britain for the purposesnbsp;of permanent conquest and colonization, beginningnbsp;with the landing of Hengist and Horsa at Thanet,nbsp;and ending at the death of Aella, had been unquestionably conducted by the Angles ; and hadnbsp;been supported throughout by their nationalnbsp;organization under kings, and by all their powersnbsp;as reckoned chiefly in men and ships. The col-

lection of the W est Saxons on the Continent and their transportation to Britain, was probably thenbsp;last operation in the South that the northernnbsp;Angles assisted; and after the Saxons had beennbsp;landed on the shores of the Solent, the ships ofnbsp;the Angles probably took away such Anglenbsp;Warriors as wished to return to their homes. Thenbsp;service of these seasoned and experienced fightingnbsp;men, who not only knew all the arts of campaigning, but also the well-tried principles of establishingnbsp;and protecting open settlements, were now wantednbsp;for the pure Angle invasion of the North ofnbsp;Britain, which must have begun at least as earlynbsp;as this.

We find Ida beginning to reign in Northumbria in the year 547. Ida could hardly have been saidnbsp;to have begun to reign, before a kingdom had beennbsp;established in Britain for him to reign over, andnbsp;this must have taken at least thirty years tonbsp;effect. After the year 514 we must thereforenbsp;expect to find Cerdic left to his own resources.nbsp;Although much of his army had probably beennbsp;taken, these would have been more than replacednbsp;in numbers, although as yet lacking in experience,nbsp;by the West Saxon warriors, and doubtless contingents from Kent, Sussex, and Surrey wouldnbsp;remain with him, at least until all had been madenbsp;secure. For shipping, however, Cerdic must havenbsp;been entirely dependent on the Jutes, and it isnbsp;interesting to see the measures that he took tonbsp;maintain his command over them.

Although we are not told when the Jutes took the Isle of Wight, it is evident that they had beennbsp;there a long time; and it is probable that they

42 THE JUTES AND WEST SAXONS came there about the time that Aella first landednbsp;near Regnum (Chichester) and took it, namely,nbsp;the year 477.

We should here remind ourselves that the great battle near Kingston, when the Welsh flednbsp;from the Angles as from fire, and the Angles tooknbsp;spoils innumerable, took place in the year 473.

It is likely that the invaders would follow up this crushing victory by some forward move,nbsp;before the Welsh could recover themselves, andnbsp;yet as long as the Welsh held the south coastnbsp;there was no inland district safe to settle in.nbsp;The Jutes had long been divided, by half of themnbsp;having come to Kent and the remainder wished tonbsp;follow. Here was an island covering the chiefnbsp;ports remaining to the Britons, and covering thenbsp;point too where Aella was so soon to begin hisnbsp;attack on the south coast.

We may search the whole period and we cannot find a more likely time for the conquestnbsp;and occupation �f the Isle of Wight by the Jutesnbsp;than the years 474 to 476.

We are not told when the Jutes came to the Isle of Wight, but we may be quite certainnbsp;that it was some time before Cerdic came to thenbsp;Solent, as he would never have landed nearnbsp;Southampton before the Isle of Wight had beennbsp;occupied.*

* It is a point worthy of consideration whether the Jutes may not have had a trading station at Cowes even in the time of thenbsp;Eomans.

The Eomans were largely dependent upon the hardy mariners of the North Sea for ships to cross the Channel, and so it may wellnbsp;have been worth their while to allow the Jutes to occupy, not onlynbsp;the port of Cowes, but perhaps even the whole of the Isle of Wight,nbsp;so as to retain their services, and have a valuable pledge for theirnbsp;loyalty.

It may seem extraordinary that such an important event was not recorded in the Chronicle, hut it is probable that the Chronicle was basednbsp;upon annals recorded on wood in runic writing,nbsp;and stored in such places as Kingston, or the royalnbsp;palace at Old Windsor, and some of these stavesnbsp;may have rotted and become indecipherable.

Although there can be no doubt that the Jutes must have occupied the Isle of Wightnbsp;before Cerdic landed in Wessex, yet one naturallynbsp;scans the evidence very closely to see if we cannbsp;discover any corroboration of this deduction, and

� This year the West Saxons came to Britain with three ships, at the place which is callednbsp;Cerdic�s Ore, and Stuf and Wihtgar fought againstnbsp;the Britons and put them to flight.� Now Wihtgarnbsp;could hardly have been given the name he borenbsp;unless he had been born in the Isle of Wight, sonbsp;he must have been a Jute.¹ We can hardlynbsp;suppose that Wihtgar could have been less thannbsp;twenty-five to thirty years of age in 514. Fromnbsp;this we should gather that the Jutes had capturednbsp;and occupied the Isle of Wight by the year 490 atnbsp;the latest, and this is certainly in accordance withnbsp;the probabilities of the invasion of the south coast.

If, as thus appears from the Chronicle, the Jutes protected the landing of the Saxons, and

It must be admitted that aTithorities differ as to the significance of the name Wihtgar. The view of Sir 0. Oman is adopted here.nbsp;See � England before the Norman Conquest,� p. 224 and note.nbsp;But apart from the apparent significance of Wihtgar�s name, therenbsp;is plenty of evidence to show that he must have been a Jute, althoughnbsp;he was a kinsman of Cerdic.

did the fighting for them, it explains the question that has always puzzled historians, namely, how itnbsp;came about that the Jutes had a settlement innbsp;Wessex. We may be sure that they did not getnbsp;such a valuable grant of land for settlements, asnbsp;well as a good harbour for their ships, withoutnbsp;having done something to earn them; and it wasnbsp;very desirable that they should help the Westnbsp;Saxons to establish their settlements, if they werenbsp;to hope to live at peace with such jealousnbsp;neighbours.

To understand the position when the West Saxons came, we must turn back to the landingnbsp;of Cerdic in the year 495 and follow the ensuingnbsp;course of events. Cerdic evidently establishednbsp;his head-quarters at what is now Southampton,nbsp;with a view to following the usual course adoptednbsp;by the invaders, namely, ascending a river as far asnbsp;it was navigable; and the River ftchen was thennbsp;navigable as far as Winchester. But a great dealnbsp;had to be done before the ascent of the Itchennbsp;was possible. Cerdic appears to have landed innbsp;Stokes Bay and made a stoke on the little Rivernbsp;Alver. From this he probably drove out thenbsp;Welsh as far as Bishopstoke. But the peninsulanbsp;on which Portsmouth stands, and the Romannbsp;fortress of Porchester, were still in the hands ofnbsp;the Welsh. Here was a chance for the Jutes;nbsp;they had long coveted the harbour of Portsmouthnbsp;for their ships, and more land for settlers thannbsp;could be found in the Isle of Wight. But if suchnbsp;land was to be obtained it must be earned bynbsp;conquest, the only title to it that was recognizablenbsp;at this early stage of the conquest.

� This year Port, and his two sons Bieda and Maegla, came to Britain at a place which is callednbsp;Portsmouth, and they soon effected a landing,

We may perhaps dismiss the eponymous chieftain Port with a smile, but Bieda and Maeglanbsp;Were undoubtedly two Jutish chieftains, since wenbsp;know that the Jutes held Portsmouth and itsnbsp;hinterland, the valley of the River Meon. Laternbsp;on we see the Jutes from Meon Stoke assistingnbsp;in the taking of Winchester. The Jutes seem tonbsp;have acquired all the country between the Rivernbsp;Meon and Sussex, thus leaving the valley of thenbsp;Itchen open to the advance of the West Saxons.nbsp;Thus no confusion was permitted, but each districtnbsp;in turn was fully occupied, and not left as anbsp;wilderness in rear where Welsh refugees couldnbsp;assemble.

It should be noted that it was in Cerdic s interest that the Jutes should have a large settle-ttient on the main land, since he knew that whennbsp;the time came for the Angles under his commandnbsp;to leave for the North, he would become dependentnbsp;on the ships of the Jutes for transport; and thusnbsp;by their settlements in Hampshire, the Jutes gave

Then in 514 we see the Jutes, not only helping with their ships to bring large numbers of Saxonsnbsp;with their families to Cerdic�s Ore, but also supplying a force under Stuf and Wihtgar to guard theirnbsp;landing. This landing of Bieda and Maegla at

Portsmouth corroborates evidence of Bede that the Jutes held Portsmouth and the country northnbsp;of it; but only on the understanding that Biedanbsp;and Maegla were Jutes. That they were Jutesnbsp;there can be no doubt at all, the evidence of Bedenbsp;is conclusive. This is not arguing in a circle,nbsp;as there is no room for any other tribe tonbsp;intervene.

But the recognition of Bieda and Maegla and their followers as Jutes, carries with it muchnbsp;larger deductions. To begin with, it again proves,nbsp;if indeed further proof is necessary, that the Jutesnbsp;had held the Isle of Wight for many years beforenbsp;the year 501; since the Jutes would never havenbsp;consented to invade the main land, before theynbsp;had had long possession of the Isle of Wight.nbsp;There seems no doubt that, wherever the variousnbsp;constituents of the expedition, in men and ships,nbsp;were originally collected, their final port ofnbsp;departure for Portsmouth was Cowes.

We must not forget that in the year 501, the invaders were still directed by Aella the firstnbsp;Bretwalda, since he had sole command of all thenbsp;invaders south of the Humber, according to Bede.

Although we can have no reason for doubting the sterling evidence of Bede, it will be well tonbsp;use this landing of the Jutes to test it. Was thisnbsp;incident the casual landing of an independent war-band ? or, on the other hand, was it dictated by thenbsp;highest strategy ?

If it can be shown, as it certainly can, that the landing of Bieda and Maegla at Portsmouth wasnbsp;an important military operation filling a definitenbsp;place in a great scheme of conquest, then, and

not otherwise, we have a strong corroboration of the truth of Bede�s statement. We must recallnbsp;to our minds the fact that Aella and Cissa onlynbsp;took Anderida (Pevensey) in 491, and it wouldnbsp;take some years for Aella to clear out thenbsp;Andredswald, and then to bring in the Southnbsp;Saxons who had accepted Aella as their king.

It is easy to see why Aella was appointed king. Phe Saxons were drawn from scattered clans onnbsp;the Continent, and jealous as these clans mustnbsp;have been of one another, they would know thatnbsp;they would be quite unable to settle in peace,nbsp;unless they were under the rule of a king who hadnbsp;proved his capacity. The Saxons may indeednbsp;have demanded that some guarantee should benbsp;given them that the land would be fairly apportioned among them, but that if Aella himselfnbsp;Would consent to be their king, that would benbsp;sufficient.

Although Aella probably ended his days as Bretwalda in the Thames Valley, yet we may benbsp;sure that he did not leave Sussex before hisnbsp;subjects had settled down in peace under a rulernbsp;appointed by him, and these matters would takenbsp;some years to carry out, and whilst thus engaged,nbsp;Aella probably made Chichester his head-quarters,nbsp;and from there he would easily visit the Solentnbsp;and the Isle of Wight and Southampton. Onnbsp;such reasonable deductions is based the conclusionnbsp;that the advance of Cerdic towards Winchester,nbsp;and the simultaneous advance of the Jutes uponnbsp;Portsmouth and Porchester, were directed by thenbsp;strategy of Aella,

48 THE JUTES AND WEST SAXONS

himself was getting old, and probably took little or no part in the operations ; at a given date Cerdicnbsp;probably advanced to Botley, or to some chosennbsp;position covering the Roman road from Winchester, to prevent any succour coming fromnbsp;thence.

At the same time the Jutes landed at what is now Portsmouth, and that peninsula they probablynbsp;cleared without any difficulty, if indeed it wasnbsp;defended at all by the Welsh. The chief objectivenbsp;of Bieda and Maegla�s force must undoubtedlynbsp;have been the Roman fortress of Porchester. Thisnbsp;seems to have been held by an important Britishnbsp;prince, probably a son of Ambrosius Aurelianus.

If he expected help from his father at Winchester, he was doomed to disappointment, and Porchester seems to have been taken at once,nbsp;probably by storming. Scaling-ladders couldnbsp;easily be brought there by ships. Invaders hadnbsp;thus two lines of advance and of supply, and Cerdicnbsp;appears to have advanced with the main army tonbsp;Bishopstoke supplied by boats on the Itchen.nbsp;And the Jutes under Bieda and Maegla to Meon-stoke, and soon after Winchester must have fallen.nbsp;Surely the meagre entries in the Chronicle arenbsp;capable of a reasonable explanation that corroborates the evidence of Bede, and confirms thenbsp;greatness attributed to Aella by the Anglo-Saxons.

Some comment seems necessary on the absurd number of ships mentioned in the Chronicle entriesnbsp;of the various landings, varying from two to five.nbsp;Of course no serious invasion could have beennbsp;effected even with five ships, and although we maynbsp;safely dismiss this item in the entries as due to

It is suggested that the main entries of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle were gathered fromnbsp;Squared wooden staves, covered with runic writing,nbsp;recording the main facts for each year, one stavenbsp;or hoc used for a year. TYhen the annal thusnbsp;recorded on wood referred to a landing, it isnbsp;suggested that the sign or symbol of a ship wasnbsp;burned or carved on the wood, in more numbersnbsp;than one, in accordance with the supposed greatness of the event. Then in transcribing thesenbsp;annals for the purpose of the Chronicle the scribesnbsp;added the number of ship symbols to the entry.

This may be legitimately characterized as a mere guess, but when we are confronted with anbsp;manifest absurdity in a deeply serious work likenbsp;the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, any suggestion thatnbsp;offers a reasonable explanation of it can hardly benbsp;unworthy of consideration.

But to return to the landing of the West Saxons, directly we drop the preconceived theorynbsp;that has hitherto clogged the steps of historians,nbsp;namely, the theory that the invaders came innbsp;separate gangs, it is extraordinary how easy itnbsp;becomes to explain things.

The landing of the West Saxons, and the settlement of a portion of the Jutes in Hampshire,nbsp;have been supposed to be so mutually destructive,nbsp;that the truth of both statements has been callednbsp;in question. When, however, we start our investigations without any theory, unless indeed it is anbsp;theory to suppose that a great leader like Cerdicnbsp;did lead, and that he did make the best use of his

50 THE JUTES AND WEST SAXONS

limited resources, we find that entries in the Chronicle, and in Bede, that have been supposednbsp;to be mutually destructive, become mutuallynbsp;explanatory.

As the Saxons had come from scattered clans in the interior of the Continent, and had beennbsp;collected at some seaport, probably Calais, it isnbsp;clear that they could not leave their familiesnbsp;behind, but must have brought them with them,nbsp;in probably the largest fleet of transports that hadnbsp;yet been collected.

In this case, however, no difficulty arises. The Welsh had been crushed by the loss of Silchester,nbsp;and communications with the Thames Valley hadnbsp;long been opened, and no more opposition to thenbsp;landing of unorganized hordes of colonists couldnbsp;be expected than could be dealt with by localnbsp;forces. Then the invaders had had ample time tonbsp;collect supplies, sufficient to maintain even thisnbsp;large number of immigrants, until they were in anbsp;position to maintain themselves, and the inlandnbsp;waters of the Solent provided ample anchoragesnbsp;and landing-places.

The thirty-seven Hundreds into which Hampshire was divided are worthy of study. They bear a strong contrast to those of other shires, andnbsp;appear to be the result of parcelling out the landnbsp;amongst gangs of settlers in a haphazard manner.nbsp;Some are in two parts�notably Fawley, thenbsp;largest except the New Forest, has its name-givingnbsp;place near Calshot Castle, between the Beaulieunbsp;River and Southampton Water; whereas the mainnbsp;portion lies along the east bank of the Itchen, andnbsp;up to, and beyond, Winchester. This seems to

This first arrival of the West Saxons was an important event, and it heralded the second stagenbsp;of the conquest, as the death of Aella the firstnbsp;Bretwalda marked the end of the first. Muchnbsp;depended on this first introduction of colonists onnbsp;a large scale with their families. A very differentnbsp;affair to the landings of armed warriors ; as failure,nbsp;or even an undue amount of hardship and suffer-mg on the part of the new-comers, would havenbsp;checked immigration for many years; and wenbsp;have every reason to believe that it went on unceasingly as fresh districts became safe, and asnbsp;shipping became available.

The next entry in the Chronicle is under the year 519. We read that this year Cerdic andnbsp;Cynric obtained the kingdom of the West Saxons;nbsp;^-od the same year they fought against the Britonsnbsp;where it is now named Cerdicesford. And fromnbsp;that time forth the royal offspring of the Westnbsp;Saxons reigned.

There is nothing puzzling in the fact that Cerdic allowed five years to elapse before henbsp;assumed the kingship of Wessex, since he couldnbsp;hardly do so before he had established a kingdomnbsp;to reign over, and it may well have taken fivenbsp;years, and fresh introductions of Saxon clans,nbsp;efore that was accomplished.

There was, however, a more serious reason for elay, though we only learn about it from Welshnbsp;sources. An army of the invaders was drivennbsp;mm the field with great loss, at the siege ofnbsp;ons Badonicus about this time. A great deal

This chapter must be concluded with some remarks about Cerdic himself, since his very existence has been questioned by historians, on nonbsp;other grounds apparently than that he had anbsp;Welsh-sounding name. The first mention ofnbsp;Cerdic and Cynric his son in the Chronicle, undernbsp;the year 495, raises a difficulty, but one which cannbsp;easily be accounted for. It is stated that � Thisnbsp;year two Ealdormen came to Britain Cerdic andnbsp;Cynric his son.� If Cynric was an Ealdorman henbsp;cannot have been less than twenty years old, andnbsp;would more probably have been over thirty.nbsp;Even if Cynric was but twenty years old in 495,nbsp;he must have been eighty-five when he died, andnbsp;over eighty when he fought at Beranburgh; andnbsp;as for Cerdic, he must have been about ninetynbsp;when he died, if he had a son over twenty yearsnbsp;of age in 495. That there is some mistake in thisnbsp;entry seems evident, but it is easy to suggest annbsp;explanation. Cerdic had a very able son namednbsp;Cynric, whom he associated with himself in thenbsp;government when he became King of the Westnbsp;Saxons in 519. Henceforward the names Cerdicnbsp;and Cynric were always mentioned together, andnbsp;associated in men�s memories, and so when thenbsp;Chronicle was first committed to writing, the scribenbsp;put them together. Perhaps Cynric did land innbsp;Britain with his father, as a lad of about five yearsnbsp;old; and so the only mistake was calling him annbsp;ealdorman.

Since so much has been made of the fact that Cerdic had a Welsh-sounding name, even to the

extent of casting doubt upon Cerdic�s very existence as an English king, it may be well to consider whether it may not have been possible for him to have been called after the Ceredig Gwledignbsp;of Welsh history.

There is no reason to doubt that before the famous landing in Thanet in the year 449, for thenbsp;purposes of permanent conquest and colonization,nbsp;the assistance of the Saxons, as they were called,nbsp;was sought by the Welsh against the inroads ofnbsp;the Piets and Scots; and the Saxons, or Angles,nbsp;as they really were, would have been only toonbsp;glad to seize such an opportunity for surveyingnbsp;the country they were so soon going to attack.nbsp;This being the case, then Elesa, Cerdic�s father,nbsp;may well have taken a leading part in thesenbsp;military operations in alliance with the Welsh.nbsp;If so, then it is extremely likely that he wouldnbsp;have met their great leader Ceredig Gwledig, andnbsp;he may even have married a daughter of thatnbsp;renowned conqueror. At any rate he may havenbsp;been so impressed with this great ruler of Britain,nbsp;that he called his son, born about 450, after him.nbsp;It may be said that this is all conjecture, but if itnbsp;is, every step of it is more probable than thenbsp;absurd conjecture, that Cerdic could not havenbsp;existed as an English king, because he had anbsp;Welsh-sounding name.

The possible intimate association of Cerdic with Ceredig Gwledig is, to say the least of it, annbsp;interesting suggestion, and, at any rate, it is notnbsp;so wildly improbable as the idea that Cerdic himself Was a myth.

It is now possible to form a general idea of the position held by the invaders in the south ofnbsp;Britain at the end of the year 514, after the arrivalnbsp;of the West Saxons, and after the death of Aella.nbsp;The fact that it is now definitely taught as historynbsp;that the invaders fought up the Thames Valley,nbsp;and that, by this time, they must have reached atnbsp;least as far as Abingdon, saves us a vast amount ofnbsp;trouble, and we may assume, without fear ofnbsp;serious contradiction, that they had planted theirnbsp;settlements as far as Abingdon, on the south banknbsp;of the Thames. With the north bank we are notnbsp;at present concerned, and we need not trouble tonbsp;consider whether an English settlement had yetnbsp;been formed beyond the ford at Oxford.

On the south bank, however, there can be little doubt that all the land surrounded by thenbsp;sharp bend of the Thames beyond Oxford, wouldnbsp;be held by the invaders as far as Faringdon.nbsp;There is a King�s tun in it (Kingston Bagpuize),nbsp;and south of Faringdon, about eight miles, we findnbsp;Ashbury, and further south Ashdown, and therenbsp;are strong reasons for believing that the Aesc, who

Aesc the son of Hengist, after whom the kings of Kent called themselves Aescings.

This seems rather an advanced position for King Aesc to have held before the fall of Sil-chester, but it was protected by the Thames andnbsp;the slope of the land favoured it.

It was probably at this time that the white horse was cut on a high hillside facing northwards,nbsp;as a standard from which there would be no retirement. This was a standard that was extremelynbsp;likely to have been raised by King Aesc the greatnbsp;son of Hengist.

We see him here, with his main army at Engle-field, at the extreme outpost, watching the Roman road, and ensuring the encirclement of Silchester,nbsp;until Cerdic had advanced from the south andnbsp;demanded its surrender.

But we are dealing with a time four years after the taking of Silchester, and Aesc must have returned to his kingdom of Kent, and died there innbsp;512. This territory must have been comparativelynbsp;safe now that Silchester had fallen, but as yet itnbsp;could have been but sparsely settled, although thenbsp;invaders may by this time have become morenbsp;venturesome.

The rest of the boundary of the lands occupied by the invaders may be roughly demarcated by anbsp;line running due north and south from Newburynbsp;to Southampton. The front of the invaders may,nbsp;therefore, be described as a straight line runningnbsp;due north from Southampton to Abingdon, exceptnbsp;that the right was thrown forward to Ashburynbsp;nnder the protection of the River Thames.

56 THE BATTLE OF MONS BADONICUS

right flank of the invaders must have extended from Bath by Chippenham and Malmesbury tonbsp;Cirencester, and they still held an advanced postnbsp;at Cunetio, now Marlborough.

We cannot suppose that the invaders remained supinely within the bounds of their settlements,nbsp;but they are certain to have ravaged the landsnbsp;beyond their front for many miles, thus not onlynbsp;gaining information and loot, but overawing thenbsp;Welsh, and maintaining their own ascendancy.nbsp;But beyond these, they were cultivating a rashnbsp;spirit, that was bound sooner or later to lead to anbsp;disaster.

We must now turn our attention to the southern border of the Welsh front. This rannbsp;from Amesbury and followed the River Avonnbsp;to the sea. The settlements of the Welshnbsp;may have extended east of this line, but thisnbsp;must have been the line they hoped to defendnbsp;permanently.

Besides Amesbury, this line was defended by fortresses with vast earthworks, of which thenbsp;chief were Old Sarum, and Badbury Rings nearnbsp;Wimborne. Besides these the Welsh made anbsp;dyke known as Bokerley Dyke from Cranbornenbsp;Chase to the Avon Valley. This seems to havenbsp;been the only dyke of any size that was made bynbsp;the Welsh in their own interests ; and it differs innbsp;character from all the other dykes.

More will have to be said about dykes when we come to see the Wans Dyke, for the presentnbsp;only two remarks need be made about Bokerleynbsp;Dyke. One is that it was evidently made to opposenbsp;an enemy expected from the north-east. The

other is that, when Bokerley Dyke was made, the invaders could hardly have landed at the ports ofnbsp;Poole, Wareham, and Weymouth, since, foolishnbsp;as the construction of this dyke was in any case,nbsp;we can hardly suppose that the constructorsnbsp;would have gone on with their work after thenbsp;invaders had landed in their rear.

One of the most remarkable facts of the invasion and conquest, of Britain is, that the invaders appear to have left the Welsh in what is nownbsp;Dorsetshire undisturbed for so long, and they seemnbsp;to have ignored it for a time during their advancenbsp;towards Bath.

This must be explained. Certainly if the invaders had come in separate and independentnbsp;gangs, without a central authority to direct them,nbsp;we should have supposed that they would havenbsp;landed at Poole and Wareham and Weymouth asnbsp;soon as the lands near Southampton were settlednbsp;up. But we find nothing of the sort, except thatnbsp;in the year 519 we find Cerdic giving the Welsh,nbsp;rendered too confident by their victory at Monsnbsp;Badonicus, a lesson at Chardford on the Avon,nbsp;and we feel inclined to ask why that victory wasnbsp;not followed up. The reasons for this will appearnbsp;as we proceed. For the present only a generalnbsp;statement can be offered.

Although Dorsetshire could have been easily Won after Chardford, there can be no doubt thatnbsp;it would have been a strategical error thus tonbsp;extend the scattered fronts of the invaders, andnbsp;the correct course was to obstruct all roads fromnbsp;I^ath and Bristol first, when the Welsh of thenbsp;West would be cut off from the main body of that

This was the course eventually followed. And yet we need not credit Cerdic with the foresightnbsp;and strategical ability that undoubtedly characterized his grandson Ceawlin. Cerdic took thenbsp;right course because he was too weak in men andnbsp;ships to take any other. We see here merely thenbsp;effect of the constant action of strategic factorsnbsp;moulding the actions of nations at war. All thatnbsp;Cerdic appears to have known was that hisnbsp;northern frontier was constantly threatened bynbsp;large and well-led and well-organized forces ofnbsp;Welshmen from the direction of Bath and Cirencester, etc., and he could not leave it unguardednbsp;for a day, whereas on his western frontier all wasnbsp;quiet, and few Welshmen dared cross the Avonnbsp;after the battle of Chardford. Above all, thenbsp;disaster at Mons Badonicus had opened his eyes,nbsp;for that had occurred three years before.

The year 516 is here accepted as the date of the Battle of Mons Badonicus. The questionnbsp;is to be found examined and explained on pp.nbsp;200 and 201 of Oman�s �England before thenbsp;Norman Conquest,� and the sdggestion made bynbsp;Mr. E. B. Nicholson, and given in the footnote onnbsp;p. 201, seems to be conclusive. Over and abovenbsp;the careful calculations and convincing argumentsnbsp;there given, lies the great fact, that no other datenbsp;could conceivably fit in so well with all we knownbsp;of the state of affairs on the frontier of the invaders,nbsp;from the bend of the Thames round Abingdon tonbsp;Southampton.

that would be likely to lead to a rash enterprise. A great leader had recently died and a freshnbsp;generation of warriors had sprung up, to whomnbsp;victory had always come easily, thanks to thenbsp;wonderful strategy of Aella ; and now that Aella�snbsp;restraining influence was gone, they began to formnbsp;visions of further conquests won with equal ease.nbsp;The fall of Silchester had overwhelmed the Welsh,nbsp;and had left the English settlements in the largenbsp;districts that had had their centre of governmentnbsp;and of trade at Calleva, in an apparent conditionnbsp;of peaceful security, none making them afraid.

Doubtless Calleva had surrendered on the sole condition that the lives of all who dwelt therenbsp;should be spared. The stronger men had beennbsp;promptly taken to make the great dyke that runsnbsp;from Mongewell near Wallingford to Henley, andnbsp;the rest had been allowed to depart to becomenbsp;a burden on their friends elsewhere.

A strong force was always kept in readiness as a frontier guard, and from this frequent expeditions were sent out for marauding and reconnbsp;noitring. These returned with spoils and withnbsp;reports of the goodness of the land, and that nonbsp;Welsh force had dared to resist them. Mountednbsp;parties had often ridden round Cunetio, and evennbsp;up to the walls of Cirencester, and of Bath.

But it is one thing to reconnoitre and maraud, and quite another thing to invade for the purposenbsp;of conquest, and this difference, and the risks thatnbsp;are inevitably incurred by the invading armies,nbsp;this rising generation had yet to learn; and sonbsp;they were eventually taught by a lesson that theynbsp;and their children could not forget.

One child at any rate imbibed the lesson of Mons Badonicus with his mother�s milk; fornbsp;about this time was born to Cynric the son of anbsp;Cerdic, a son named Ceawlin, who was to becomenbsp;the second Bretwalda, and the conqueror of Bathnbsp;and the West Midlands. As a boy Ceawlin maynbsp;have followed his grandfather to the field of battle,nbsp;and as a young man he took part in the victoriesnbsp;of his father Cynric.

No one can doubt the strategic ability of Ceawlin, but that blessed word � genius � is notnbsp;sufficient to explain surpassing excellence in anynbsp;walk of life, and no one now expects talents,nbsp;however great, to approach perfection, without anbsp;school to develop them.

As we proceed, we shall see the school of warfare, accompanied by colonization, in whichnbsp;the youthful Ceawlin was trained.

We only learn that there was such a battle as that of Mons Badonicus from Welsh sources, andnbsp;then only from vague allusions to it. The mostnbsp;important, that from Gildas, is so short that itnbsp;had best be quoted, so far as the mention of thenbsp;battle is concerned; it runs as follows: � Down tonbsp;the year of the siege of Mount Badon, which isnbsp;near the mouth of the Severn, the year of the lastnbsp;and not the least slaughter of these ruffians.� Itnbsp;should be noted that the battle is called � obsessionbsp;Badonici Montis,� and that this Mons Badonicusnbsp;was near the mouth of the Severn.

We have fixed the date of the battle as the year 516 with tolerable certainty, it now remainsnbsp;to be seen whether we cannot fix the place withnbsp;equal, or even greater, certainty.

That having been done, then the next thing is to suggest how an English army could havenbsp;been driven to take up such a false position asnbsp;to have been surrounded by Welshmen on thenbsp;top of a mountain. Since there is no Englishnbsp;evidence to help us all this must of course benbsp;surmise ; guess-work, perhaps the strait-laced criticnbsp;will exclaim. But when we are tied and boundnbsp;by certain very peculiar conditions as regards thenbsp;nature of the battle itself, and when we have tonbsp;start an army from a certain frontier, vaguelynbsp;defined perhaps, but with no uncertainty as to itsnbsp;general position, since we know the invaders werenbsp;in the Thames Valley; as long as our suggestionsnbsp;are reasonable they do not deserve to be dubbednbsp;as mere guesses, but they are indeed wise conjectures, such as are conceded to all men of sciencenbsp;when they are trying to co-ordinate certain knownnbsp;facts. The first point to be settled is the actualnbsp;site of the battle of Mons Badonicus. We naturallynbsp;suppose that it must be at or near the City ofnbsp;Bath, and the extraordinary thing is that any onenbsp;should ever have doubted it.

We do not know for certain the Welsh name for the City of Bath, though we should naturallynbsp;suppose that it was � Caer Baddon.� We do,nbsp;however, know that the Welsh for a bath isnbsp;� baddon,� pronounced � bathon �; and we donbsp;know that, at the foot of the hill where thenbsp;City of Bath stands, there was the finest Bathnbsp;in Britain, called by the Romans � Aqusenbsp;Sulis.�

We therefore may conclude with absolute certainty that the mountain at whose base stood

62 THE BATTLE OF MONS BADONICUS

this wonderful Bath, would be called by the Welsh the Bath Mountain, perhaps in Welsh � Mynyddnbsp;yr Baddon,� and in Latin � Mons Badonicus.�

Geoffrey of Monmouth, with all his faults, may be quoted in this connection. He givesnbsp;perfectly clear and unsophisticated evidence thatnbsp;in his time Bath was called by the Welshnbsp;� Badon.�

And it must be remembered that Geoffrey was an educated man, who, whether he was himself a Welshman or not, knew the Welsh language,nbsp;and wrote from the Welsh standpoint.

In Book II, Chapter iii, of his history, Geoffrey makes Merlin prophesy that � The bathsnbsp;of Badon shall grow cold, and their salubriousnbsp;water engender death.�

It should be noted that the absurdity of Merlin�s prophecies does not affect the question.nbsp;They were written by Geoffrey to be read andnbsp;understood by the men of his time, and there cannbsp;be no question at all what meaning Geoffreynbsp;intended them to attach to this statement�^he cannbsp;only have been alluding to the waters of Bath.nbsp;In fact, when we go up Milsam Street in Bath, wenbsp;are beginning the ascent of Mons Badonicus.*

* In the English Historical Beview, XVII, p. 663, footnote 88, Mr. W. H. Stevenson tells us on the authority of Professor Ehys, that the alleged modern Welsh � baddon � is a loan word fromnbsp;the English � bath.� Geoffrey of Monmouth demonstrates that thenbsp;name � Badon � for Bath was so old in his time that the Welsh thennbsp;took it for granted that it went back to the time of Merlin, and therenbsp;appears to have been no question as to the position of Mons Badoni-ous then, since Geoffrey never mentions that name, although henbsp;describes the battle. The specific name � Badonicus � must havenbsp;had a Welsh origin, since it is first mentioned by Gildas, and it mustnbsp;have been derived either from � baddon,� or some word very like it.nbsp;It is for Welsh scholars to say what that word meant if it did notnbsp;mean � bath � or � baths.�

There is much more evidence positively identifying Mons Badonicus with the mountain on which the City of Bath stands ; this will be evolvednbsp;in due course as the story of the campaign, andnbsp;ensuing battle, and retreat, proceeds, but for thenbsp;present it is contended that the above plain andnbsp;simple evidence is sufficient.

And yet it would not be wise to ignore the fact that other sites have been suggested, butnbsp;there is only one which has been put by competent historians in serious competition with thenbsp;claims of Bath. This is a large circular treblenbsp;earthwork called Badbury Rings near Wimbornenbsp;in Dorsetshire.

It is difficult to treat the idea that, under the circumstances of the English invasion at the time,nbsp;Badbury Rings could have been the scene of anbsp;successful siege by the Welsh, with the respectnbsp;due to the great names that have supported it.nbsp;It is a military fallacy to suppose that the invadersnbsp;would have left their countless open settlementsnbsp;exposed to Welsh attack, in order to march anbsp;large army to their left flank, and across thenbsp;Hampshire Avon, merely to shut themselves upnbsp;in a circular earthwork on the downs, and of nonbsp;strategical importance whatever. That they didnbsp;risk a very important force in the campaign ofnbsp;Mons Badonicus goes without saying; but it wasnbsp;for a greater prize than Badbury Rings, and onenbsp;of the greatest substantial as well as strategicalnbsp;value, namely, the town of Bath.

Why Badbury Rings should ever have been called Mons Badonicus, these guessers fail tonbsp;explain. But if arguments derived from military

The ecclesiastic Gildas, who wrote in Brittany, tells us that Mons Badonicus was near the mouthnbsp;of the Severn. This is a fair description of thenbsp;mountain at Bath, but absolutely shuts out Bad-bury Rings as a possible site for the great Welshnbsp;victory of Mons Badonicus.

Since a great deal will have to be said about Bath, not only in this chapter, but also later on, itnbsp;will be well to study the position of Bath, andnbsp;consider why it was the key of the Welsh position,nbsp;guarding the entrance to the Severn Valley.

It must be borne in mind that what is here said about Bath was not known to the invadersnbsp;at the time of Mons Badonicus; but it is whatnbsp;that battle taught them, and taught them sonbsp;thoroughly, that they did not venture to attacknbsp;Bath again for about fifty years, when after longnbsp;and careful preparations Bath was taken bynbsp;Ceawlin.

No one would suppose that Bath could possibly have any military strength or strategic importancenbsp;now-a-days, and it is probably for that reason thatnbsp;no one seems to have pointed out what an important part it must have played in the Welshnbsp;defence of the Severn Valley. Bath owed itsnbsp;position solely to its healing waters, and it was tonbsp;protect that wonderful thermal spring, and becausenbsp;they found easily worked stone on the spot, thatnbsp;the Romans strongly fortified the small town thatnbsp;rose there. Though Bath does not seem to havenbsp;been used as a military station by the Romans,nbsp;yet it must have had some slight military value in

their eyes, since it commanded the gorge of the river Avon, upon which several Roman roads converged. The Fosse Way passed from Coriniuranbsp;(Cirencester) through Bath, on its course tonbsp;Ilchester; and just north of B,oman Bath, and innbsp;the middle of the modern city, it was joined bynbsp;the Via Julia from Bristol. Then the Romannbsp;road from Spinae, near Newbury, joined the Fossenbsp;Way at Batheaston; and there is no doubt thatnbsp;another road led from Bath to Sorbiodunum (Oldnbsp;Sarum), though it is not easily traceable. Yetnbsp;these roads, although they must have added tonbsp;the importance of Bath in Roman times, addednbsp;nothing to its strength ; and by the period we arenbsp;dealing with, they can have been of little usenbsp;except to serve as tracks to guide travellers.nbsp;Besides its high walls of squared stone, whichnbsp;would have made Bath a difficult problem in anynbsp;position, its chief strength lay in the fact thatnbsp;it was situated in a deep loop of the river Avon,nbsp;and from that loop the course of the river trendednbsp;to the north-east for three miles, until it bendsnbsp;southward again beyond Batheaston and pastnbsp;Bathford, towards Claverton and Limpley Stoke,nbsp;and so to Bradford-on-Avon.

The chief point to be realized is that all the country to the north of this great bend of thenbsp;Avon is hilly and broken, and large forces mightnbsp;easily be concealed there, and so an invading forcenbsp;when once it was round the Batheaston bend wasnbsp;liable to have its retreat cut off.

But this is not all, for as an invading force approaches Bath the conditions get far worse, andnbsp;for the last mile or more the ground rises from

about 80 feet to a height of 500 feet, at Beacon Hill, only a quarter of a mile from the road.

Furthermore, a force advancing beyond this danger-point towards Bath has to go round anothernbsp;bend of the river, with high ground on its rightnbsp;flank all the way, and by the time it reached thenbsp;wall of Roman Bath, it would be facing almostnbsp;south-east.

All these frightful risks must have been apparent to the invaders as they advanced, and we can only wonder at the madness that the intoxication of constant victory can produce in youngnbsp;and ignorant warriors, that they should have facednbsp;them in a vain attempt to take Bath by escalade.

We have alluded so far only to local risks, but there were worse ones beyond. Doubtless thenbsp;invaders had taken Cunetio, and perhaps othernbsp;fortresses, by a bold and sudden stroke, and theynbsp;hoped to do the same with Bath. But they hadnbsp;not yet learned what was beyond those hills thatnbsp;rise above Bath to over 700 feet, neither couldnbsp;they have realized the importance that the Welshnbsp;attached to Bath.

The cities of Bristol and Gloucester (Glevum) and Cirencester and Malmesbury, and manynbsp;others, could all send contingents to defend Bathnbsp;with but very few weeks� notice; and across thenbsp;the estuary of the Severn would come as manynbsp;more to defend their famous and beloved city,nbsp;and all these preparations could have been madenbsp;behind those hills without the invaders having thenbsp;slightest inkling of them.

Moreover, from the south large forces could be sent into Bath itself by the Fosse Way, with-

It is hoped that enough has been said to show what a strong position Bath held, and that it wasnbsp;the key to the Welsh main position, but the worstnbsp;has not been said yet, having regard to the opennbsp;settlements of the invaders.

The worst that could have happened would have been if the invading force had succeeded innbsp;taking Bath by storm at the first onset. Shut innbsp;in Bath by a vast Welsh army on the slopesnbsp;above it, not a man could have escaped to tellnbsp;the tale.

The question that naturally arises is. How could the invaders have been so mad as to attemptnbsp;to take Bath by a coup-de-mam ? Well, the intoxication produced in ignorant warriors by constant victory is hard to gauge, and then we mustnbsp;constantly bear in mind the difference betweennbsp;reconnoitring expeditions boldly led, and thenbsp;advance of an army for the purpose of stormingnbsp;a fortress.

There is no reason to doubt that a well-mounted party, or parties, had ridden right up to the walls of Bath, and had forded the Avon andnbsp;looked right into Bath from Bathampton Down.nbsp;These may have robbed rich villas, whose contents whetted their appetite for more of suchnbsp;spoils. All must have seemed so easy, if therenbsp;did not happen to have been amongst thesenbsp;marauders a man with military foresight. Thusnbsp;it is quite easy to understand how the battle ofnbsp;Mons Badonicus was brought about on the hillnbsp;above Bath.

The frontier force of the invaders was composed of young warriors under a young leader, and the restraint exercised by the older and morenbsp;prudent leaders was absent. Cerdic was gettingnbsp;old, and he with Cynric his son were fully occupied bringing in the West Saxons, and apportioning the land among their families and clans.

The actual circumstances that led up to a march to Bath, and the course that the battlenbsp;there took, in its earlier stages, must, of course,nbsp;be pure conjecture, and yet it would be pusillanimous not to indulge in it, when we have tonbsp;account for the undoubted fact that such a marchnbsp;did take place.

Fortunately we have evidence of the later stages of the battle, though as it is from a taintednbsp;source, namely, Geoffrey of Monmouth, it is leftnbsp;out of the account for the present, the evidence ofnbsp;Gildas is sufficient.

The account following will be given for the sake of brevity, as a positive statement, since it isnbsp;tedious to be constantly explaining that it is onlynbsp;conjecture. It of course challenges criticism, butnbsp;it is to be hoped that critics who do not agreenbsp;will offer a better explanation.

In the year 514, the frontier force had its headquarters at Newbury, with a detachment at Abingdon, and a small outpost at Ashbury; andnbsp;the front was guarded by constant mountednbsp;patrols, and occasionally by larger reconnoitringnbsp;parties that penetrated farther into the countrynbsp;still held by the Welsh.

The commander of this frontier force had made it his constant practice to visit Aella in the

Thames Valley near Hurley, and seek his advice. Advice which was of course loyally followed.

With the death of Aella a changed spirit came over the whole frontier force from the commandernbsp;downwards. Much was expected from the ablenbsp;and dashing young commander, who had alreadynbsp;proved his ability and courage on the field ofnbsp;battle, as he was indeed to prove it once again,nbsp;by his tactics, and by his death.

That far-seeing military vision that makes a strategist was, however, beyond his powers, andnbsp;he lacked the experience that might have givennbsp;it. He trusted in fact to his own tactical ability,nbsp;and to the staunchness and discipline of hisnbsp;followers, to get his army out of any difficultynbsp;that a despised enemy could get them into.

It had long been the desire of all in the frontier force to take Cunetio, but hitherto Aellanbsp;had forbidden it. The old man had pointed outnbsp;that it was against his principles to take a districtnbsp;that they could not occupy and cultivate. It wasnbsp;far better to leave it in the hands of the Welsh,nbsp;who would to some extent keep it cultivated.nbsp;The acquisition of Cunetio would merely add tonbsp;the difficulties of guarding the frontier, withoutnbsp;any corresponding gain.

However, to put it shortly, in the spring of 515 Cunetio was easily taken by surprise, and sonbsp;well had the expedition been planned, that largenbsp;spoils, in the shape of corn and cattle and horses,nbsp;fell into the hands of the victors.

Highly elated with their easily won victory, the frontier force spent the summer in sendingnbsp;out mounted reconnoitring expeditions in all

70 THE BATTLE OF MONS BADONICUS

directions, but the chief of these was one which followed the Roman road to Bath, and rode upnbsp;to its gates, and looked into it from the hill acrossnbsp;the river.

The expedition returned with valuable spoils and with more cattle and horses, and some carts.nbsp;Altogether the frontier force found itself innbsp;possession of sufficient provisions and transportnbsp;to enable them to arrange to send a force ofnbsp;between four and five thousand men to Bath innbsp;the following spring. The height of the walls ofnbsp;Bath had been estimated, and so scaling-laddersnbsp;formed part of the outfit of the expedition.

Thus it come about that, as soon as the days were long enough, namely, in May 516, the Englishnbsp;started on their mad march to Bath. They hadnbsp;only some thirty miles to go. Everything wentnbsp;well, in fact only too well and too easily, if theynbsp;had only known it. The reason they met withnbsp;no opposition was that the Welsh had gained fullnbsp;knowledge of their intentions, and had decided tonbsp;entrap them under the walls of Bath.

On reaching the bend of the Avon, the English leader left a third of his army, perhaps as manynbsp;as 2000 men, to make a temporary camp watchingnbsp;the Fosse Way, and to secure the retreat of thenbsp;main body round this fatal bend of the Avonnbsp;from being attacked by a force from Cirencester.

Then, fondly thinking that they were going to surprise Bath, the English pressed forward roundnbsp;the bend of the Avon, and on towards the city.

Scouts had been thrown out upon the right flank, but they had not been given time to scournbsp;the country and report. The English leader was

far too good a tactician to neglect the ordinary precautions, but he allowed himself to be hurriednbsp;by his eager followers.

He sent a strong outpost to hold Beacon Hill, and to patrol the hill beyond. The modern namenbsp;is given to help the reader, but this was nothingnbsp;less than Mons Badonicus. That post was onlynbsp;occupied by a small Welsh detachment thatnbsp;rushed down to Bath. Everything was cleverlynbsp;arranged by the astute leader of the Welsh tonbsp;distract attention from the large forces that werenbsp;lying hidden beyond the hills around, and withnbsp;supreme confidence the English force advanced tonbsp;the walls of Bath, little dreaming what was innbsp;store for them. It was about 8 o�clock in thenbsp;morning.

All this time keen Welsh eyes had been watching the advance of the invaders from the mountain on the other side of the river, now known asnbsp;Bathampton Down, and as the English reachednbsp;the walls of Bath, far back on Bathampton Downnbsp;and out of sight of the main body of the English,nbsp;a beacon fire was lit.

Upon this preconcerted signal large armies of Welshmen rose from their various hiding-places,nbsp;and began their march, each to its appointed post.nbsp;At last they had got the hated Saxon in theirnbsp;grasp.

The English scouts came running in to report to their chief, who, with the main body at Bath,nbsp;Was preparing to set up his scaling-ladders. Then,nbsp;and not until then, their incredible folly wasnbsp;revealed to the English.

English could take up before the Welsh were upon them, and that was on Beacon Hill. Fromnbsp;its top the ground towards the north and westnbsp;sloped favourably for the defenders, and to thenbsp;east, which became the rear of the position, was anbsp;sheer precipice.

The ground was strewn with boulders, and with these the English hastily constructed thenbsp;best defences they could, in the short time at theirnbsp;disposal, before the Welsh were upon them.

Thus began the � Obsessio Montis Badonici,� and it lasted the live-long day.

Then we should like to know whether any of the English succeeded in getting away, and if so,nbsp;what proportion of them ? We should also like tonbsp;know the names of the commanders on either side.

So far the battle that has been described and the position taken up has been deduced solelynbsp;from the evidence of Gildas.

If Gildas was right in speaking of this Welsh victory as �the siege of Bath mountain,� then itnbsp;follows that he referred to Beacon Hill. To nonbsp;other spot can an English force be brought by anbsp;continuous course of reasonable conjectures, withnbsp;no weak link, so that it should be besieged on anbsp;mountain. No other spot can possibly be held tonbsp;dispute the claim of Beacon Hill to be indeed thenbsp;Mons Badonicus of Gildas.

The writer had got thus far in his conclusions regarding the battle of Mons Badonicus, and wasnbsp;trying to puzzle out how such a battle probablynbsp;ended. That some of the English must have got

GEOFFREY OF MONMOUTH 73

away seemed evident, as otherwise the Welsh would have swept down on the open settlementsnbsp;of the invaders and destroyed them all; and yetnbsp;we hear of nothing of the kind. At the best anynbsp;suggestions the writer might have made mustnbsp;have been pure guess-work, and certainly he wouldnbsp;not have had sufficient military intuition, andnbsp;tactical skill, to have been able to suggest thenbsp;wise and bold course that was adopted by thenbsp;English, unless by mere chance he had comenbsp;across certain statements made by Geoffrey ofnbsp;Monmouth. Since it must be admitted thatnbsp;Geoffrey of Monmouth is a very weak authoritynbsp;indeed, a few words about him seem necessary,nbsp;in order to show why certain statements of hisnbsp;about a battle at Bath, which will be quoted later,nbsp;may be relied on.

No man has done so much to poison the wells of history as Geoffrey of Monmouth. Thenbsp;Normans in the early part of the twelfth centurynbsp;wanted a history of the country they had conquered, and had already begun to make theirnbsp;home ; but as true history would have been boundnbsp;to reveal the great deeds of the vanquished English,nbsp;and to have told the story of a far greater conquestnbsp;than their own fortunate incursion, when thenbsp;English were ill prepared, it was essential that ifnbsp;a history was to be acceptable to the Normans itnbsp;must be a false one. This false history Geoffreynbsp;of Monmouth supplied. It met with immediatenbsp;and lasting success, and it is hardly too much tonbsp;say that we have not yet thrown off the incubusnbsp;of falsehood with which he overlaid the historynbsp;of our land.

Geoffrey of Monmouth was an extraordinary person. Gauged by worldly success, and by thenbsp;influence of his writings upon his contemporariesnbsp;and upon succeeding generations, he was a greatnbsp;man. Judged by any higher standard, it wouldnbsp;be unpleasant to give full expression to the feelings of disgust which Geoffrey of Monmouth�snbsp;so-called history arouses.

In reading it, it is painfully evident that we have before us the Avork of a deceiver who wasnbsp;truckling to the dominant class, namely, thenbsp;Norman nobles, who by means of their castlesnbsp;and armour and armed retainers, were with difficulty holding in subjection a stubborn peoplenbsp;with a far finer history than their own. Ifnbsp;Geoffrey of Monmouth�s book was to be acceptable to the vainglorious public for which henbsp;catered, it was evident that the true history ofnbsp;the English must be concealed. Then, as longnbsp;as the book was plentifully spiced with vituperation of the English, or Saxons as he calls them,nbsp;it did not much matter with what stuff he fillednbsp;its pages.

Judged from the standpoint of sterling worth, Geoffrey of Monmouth was a stupid man, becausenbsp;he says such stupid things. He had, however,nbsp;great fluency and command of florid expressions,nbsp;and he must besides have had considerable knowledge of true history. Having decided, however,nbsp;to give false history, his fluency, coupled withnbsp;absolute recklessness, produced a sort of brilliance,nbsp;which dances like an ignis fatuus over the morassnbsp;of falsehood in which for centuries English historynbsp;was smothered.

Yet as any one wades through this so-called history he must become aware that there are somenbsp;facts blended with the farrago of absurdities whichnbsp;make up the book. Even these facts are as a rulenbsp;distorted, and no connected history can be deducednbsp;from them. Some such sterling facts we maynbsp;recognize in Geoffrey of Monmouth�s account ofnbsp;a battle at Bath. Here as we wade through thenbsp;slime, our feet seem to stand on firm ground.

Although these facts have to be picked out from a mass of bombastic fustian, like jewels fromnbsp;a dust-bin, it is not difficult to do so, since theynbsp;explain and make clear, instead of confusing; innbsp;fact, they enable us to solve a difficult problem.

The glints of truth with which they sparkle enable us to distinguish them from the rubbishnbsp;with which they are mingled. Geoffrey of Monmouth claims to have possessed a very ancientnbsp;book in the Welsh language, and it seems morenbsp;than probable that this statement was true. If so,nbsp;then it may be possible that some lingering sparknbsp;of respect for the story of a great Welsh victory,nbsp;as recounted by an old Welsh writer, may havenbsp;induced Geoffrey of Monmouth to embody thatnbsp;story in his book with a minimum of falsification.

Was it stupidity which prevented Geoffrey realizing that, in describing a Welsh success, innbsp;the process of which a numerically superior Welshnbsp;army surrounded an English one on the top of anbsp;hill, he was revealing a fine feat of arms on thenbsp;part of the English, in extricating themselves fromnbsp;such a position by means of brilliant tactics, andnbsp;with the heroic sacrifice of some of their numbers ?nbsp;It eould not have been generosity that led Geoffrey

to make this unwilling revelation, for he never spares vituperation of the Saxons as he calls them.

These considerations point to the fact that it is quite possible, and reasonably probable, thatnbsp;Geoffrey of Monmouth, in the middle of an absurdnbsp;and grandiloquent account of a battle at Bath, didnbsp;insert some sentences taken from an old Welshnbsp;book that he possessed. If these sentences arenbsp;true, and they certainly bear the impress of truth,nbsp;they can only refer to the battle of Mons Bado-nicus. Of that there can be no doubt at all. Atnbsp;no other time before Ceawlin�s campaign ofnbsp;Deorham, in the year 577, is it conceivable thatnbsp;the English could have besieged Bath.

Of course Geoffrey makes Arthur the commander of the Welsh, and the hero of the battle of Mons Badonicus. There seems no doubt thatnbsp;there was a Welsh, or perhaps Roman leadernbsp;named Arthur, or Artorius, who flourished aboutnbsp;this time, and did command the Welsh forces atnbsp;the battle of Mons Badonicus. On the othernbsp;hand, Geoffrey tells us that a leader named Cheldricnbsp;commanded the English, and although by badnbsp;strategy he got his army into a false position atnbsp;Bath, he seems to have been a brave and capablenbsp;leader in action, and one who under trying circumstances could calmly bide his time until the auspicious moment for action had arrived. Geoffreynbsp;of Monmouth�s account of a battle at Bath is tonbsp;be found in Book IV, Chapters v and vi, of hisnbsp;history.

We need not waste time over the rigmarole of absurd statements by means of which Geoffreynbsp;gets the Saxons and the Welsh to Bath. The

Saxons are said to have landed at Totnes, and to have been pursued eventually to Thanet. State-nients equally ridiculous. However, they servenbsp;Geoffrey�s purpose, which was to concoct a storynbsp;of some kind, which should enable him to utilizenbsp;an account of a battle at Bath which he possessed.

Fortunately Geoffrey does give enough of the true story to give a certain amount of consistencynbsp;to his ranting nonsense, and the remarkable factnbsp;remains, and cannot he gainsaid, that Geoffreynbsp;does describe just such a battle as would havenbsp;taken place, if the Welsh, by clever combinations,nbsp;had caught the English in the act of besiegingnbsp;Bath.

Throughout his book Geoffrey shows an utter incapacity for understanding warfare, and nowherenbsp;more so than at Bath.

There is something ingenuous and unsophisticated about his stupidity. If, on the one hand, we lose the fine account he might have truly given ofnbsp;the rallying of the Welsh tribes to Arthur�snbsp;standard, and the able dispositions he made of hisnbsp;untrained forces ; on the other, we gain the witnessnbsp;that the true account bears to the noble standnbsp;made by the English all day, on the top of a hill,nbsp;and drawn up in the form of a wedge, until towardsnbsp;sunset they suddenly evacuated it, and retired tonbsp;another hill with a camp on it.

The extracts from Geoffrey�s verbose account of the battle near Bath that seem to have beennbsp;taken from another work are as follows:�

� From thence the Saxons pursued their furious march to the town of Bath, and laid siege tonbsp;it �

Then follows a statement that involves the faet that Arthur, who was in the north, could not havenbsp;reached Bath until many weeks after the Saxonsnbsp;had begun to besiege it. This is of course absurd,nbsp;and may be dismissed with the speeches whichnbsp;follow.

Then, Arthur having armed himself, we get to business, and it is stated that Arthur � boldlynbsp;attacked the Saxons, who were drawn out in thenbsp;shape of a wedge, as their manner was. And they,nbsp;notwithstanding that the Britons fought with greatnbsp;eagerness, made a noble defence all that day; butnbsp;at length towards the sunsetting, climbed up thenbsp;next mountain which served them for a camp.�

These two sentences, short as they are, do help us to give some sort of shape to the battle nearnbsp;Bath, and the tactics employed ; and they certainlynbsp;seem to have been written by some one who hadnbsp;complete knowledge of all that happened.

That the Saxons � pursued their furious march to Bath � is a truthful touch, and shows how theirnbsp;mad march impressed their enemies. Then whennbsp;Arthur attacks them he finds them � drawn outnbsp;in the shape of a wedge, as their manner was,�nbsp;Now, every soldier must know that there is nonbsp;virtue in the wedge formation when on the defensive against superior numbers, unless it happensnbsp;that the shape of the position chosen for defencenbsp;favours a wedge formation, and, above all, that itnbsp;provides a secure defence for the rear of the wedge.nbsp;We are left in no doubt at all as to the fact thatnbsp;the Saxons were on the defensive, since the following words plainly tell us that � they made a noblenbsp;defence all that day,� For the whole of a long

80 THE BATTLE OF MONS BADONICUS

We now come to the most remarkable identification of Beacon Hill as the Mons Badonicus.

It has already been shown that, if a force besieging Bath had its retreat round the bendnbsp;of the Avon cut off by a large army suddenlynbsp;debouching from the hills. Beacon Hill was thenbsp;only possible defensive position that it could reachnbsp;before the enemy was upon it. Now, it is annbsp;unquestionable fact, that any one can test fornbsp;himself, by a visit to Bath, and a pleasant walknbsp;to Beacon Hill, that an army forced to take up anbsp;position there on the defensive must assume thenbsp;wedge formation, because the shape of the top ofnbsp;Beacon Hill suits the wedge formation, and innbsp;fact no other formation is there possible. Thenbsp;shape of the top of Beacon Hill compels a wedgenbsp;formation, and protects the rear of the wedge by anbsp;sheer precipice, as it was then, now it has zig-zagnbsp;paths up it.

At this day the lines of houses on Beacon Flill assume a wedge formation, for the same reasonnbsp;that the English assumed that formation therenbsp;fourteen centuries ago, namely, that the shape ofnbsp;the hill admits of no other.

Even on the one-inch ordnance map, the site of the battle, still uncovered, can be seen clearlynbsp;demarcated by the angle formed by the lines ofnbsp;houses, and subtended by the precipice. If allnbsp;this is merely a coincidence, it is indeed a verynbsp;remarkable one.

Does it not rather point to the fact that Geoffrey of Monmouth did take, not only his

general ideas of a battle at Bath, but even some of his plain statements, from a true account of thatnbsp;battle that he claimed to have in his possession ?

But there is far more than this that fits in, in a remarkable manner, with what would havenbsp;occurred, assuming that the English were com-nianded by a brave and capable leader, who didnbsp;not lose his presence of mind, notwithstandingnbsp;his strategical blunder, but calmly took the bestnbsp;naeasures for extricating his army, or at least anbsp;large part of it, from the false position into whichnbsp;he had got it.

A great deal could be said to show that the English held quite a strong position, and one that,nbsp;by limiting or extending the wedge, could benbsp;exactly adapted to their numbers ; whilst a strongnbsp;reserve could be kept on the reverse slope facingnbsp;the precipice, ready at any moment to deliver anbsp;counter-charge, should the enemy have thenbsp;temerity to charge home at any point. The lacknbsp;of water, however, made it imperative that theynbsp;should quit their position that day. The questionnbsp;Was, at what hour ?

And now we come to a fact that, if it is merely one of the inventions poured out from the teemingnbsp;brain of Geoffrey, is indeed a remarkable one.nbsp;Geoffrey, who never even by accident makes anbsp;sensible remark on military matters, here namesnbsp;the very best hour for the retirement of thenbsp;English from their false position, namely, at sunsetting.

Surely this egregious historian could only have taken this plain and sensible statement from anbsp;true account of the battle !

82 THE BATTLE OF MONS BADONICUS

Cheldric knew well the character of the foes that were surrounding him. He knew that theirnbsp;numberless forces, which he could see everywherenbsp;from the commanding position he held, werenbsp;composed of gangs of untrained and undisciplinednbsp;and badly armed tribesmen, gathered from allnbsp;parts. He knew that his trained warriors couldnbsp;walk through their ranks, and the thicker theynbsp;were, the more easily would they be mown, as anbsp;great leader of his own race once said.

Then he knew that upon his sudden move the Welsh would become a helpless rabble tumblingnbsp;over one another, some in their efforts to attack,nbsp;others in their efforts to escape his well-timednbsp;charges.

Above all, he knew that when darkness fell the Welsh would be helpless, and incapable ofnbsp;restoring anything like order before daylight camenbsp;again.

But it was essential that Cheldric should have enough daylight to ensure that all his men,nbsp;wherever scattered in the battle, should be ablenbsp;to find their way to the bend of the river Avon.nbsp;And so he chose sunset as the best hour for hisnbsp;sudden retirement.

Doubtless throughout that long day, not only every leader but every warrior of that beleaguerednbsp;force, had been taken to the top of the precipicenbsp;and pointed out the exact track he would have tonbsp;follow. And now there is a particular feature ofnbsp;the Beacon Hill position, not hitherto alluded to,nbsp;which helps to confirm the fact that this was thenbsp;course followed. From the wedge-shaped summitnbsp;the land falls, with an easy slope, right down to

The retreating force were thus able to rise, as one man, at the appointed moment, fall into theirnbsp;appointed places, and march away with quite anbsp;hroad front, and for more than half a mile theynbsp;Were charging down hill. Then, after a halt tonbsp;quench their thirst at the brook at the bottom,nbsp;and to effect a few defensive charges on the mobnbsp;that hung around them, they retired to anothernbsp;position, and by that time darkness had fallen.

We must again refer to Geoffrey of Monmouth. He says �they climbed up the next mountain whichnbsp;served them for a camp. . . . The next morningnbsp;Arthur, with his army, went up the mountain,nbsp;hut lost many of his men in the ascent, etc., etc.nbsp;Notwithstanding, after a very hard struggle,nbsp;the Britons gained the summit of the hill, andnbsp;quickly came to a close engagement with thenbsp;enemy, who again gave them a warm reception,nbsp;and made a vigorous defence. In this manner anbsp;great part of that day also was spent.� So far wenbsp;seem to be reading a true account of the secondnbsp;stage of the battle, from the pen of a true Welshman,nbsp;and not from that of the half-Norman Geoffrey.nbsp;This unknown Welsh writer evidently realisednbsp;that the true glory of this Welsh victory lay innbsp;the fact that untrained and ill-armed tribesmennbsp;had driven the seasoned warriors of the Englishnbsp;from the field, and had faced and defeated thenbsp;rear-guard that they had left in a strong position.

84 THE BATTLE OF MONS BADONICUS

the unmistakable style of Geoffrey, as he describes how Arthur drew his sword � Caliburn � and,nbsp;rushing into the battle, slew 470 men with his ownnbsp;hand. If he killed the Saxons at the quick rate ofnbsp;one a minute, this would have taken Arthur morenbsp;than seven hours. It is added that � the Britons,��nbsp;seeing this, followed their leader, in great multitudes, and made slaughter on all sides; so thatnbsp;Colgrin and Baldulph his brother, and manynbsp;thousands more fell before them.� From this heapnbsp;of chaff we may perhaps pick out two grains ofnbsp;truth preserved from the original Welsh story.nbsp;The number 470, slain by Arthur�s own hand,nbsp;according to Geoffrey, probably preserves for usnbsp;the actual number of the slain in this particularnbsp;position ; and the names Colgrin and Baldulphnbsp;may also be those of two renowned leaders of thenbsp;Saxons, proudly recorded by an ancient Welshnbsp;writer. If 470 was indeed the number of Saxonsnbsp;who sacrificed their lives in one rear-guard positionnbsp;in order to secure the retirement of the remaindernbsp;of their army, it does enable us to form at leastnbsp;a vague estimate as to their total number, and wenbsp;cannot put it at less than 5000 men and possiblynbsp;it may have been 6000.

And now there is added one more important statement that bears the impress of truth. It isnbsp;said that � Cheldric in this imminent danger of hisnbsp;men, betook himself to flight.� This seems quitenbsp;likely.

It must be borne in mind that on the previous nightfall, Cheldric, as soon as he had reached hisnbsp;chosen position at the bend of the Avon, is surenbsp;to have sent off the main body of his army on a

night-march to Cunetio, there to get food and rest, guarded by the strong detachment left there.nbsp;They could not lose their way, since they had butnbsp;to follow the track of the Roman road, and sincenbsp;they are sure to have chosen a time when therenbsp;Was a full moon, this would be easy. It is evennbsp;possible that the main body may have thus escapednbsp;without the knowledge of the Welsh. Even thenbsp;Wounded may have been carried away.

To cover the retreat of the main body Cheldric Would be sure to leave a strong force, probably atnbsp;least one thousand men.

These, as we learn from Geoffrey, made a fine resistance for the greater part of the day, and thennbsp;seeing that all was up, Cheldric, having beaten offnbsp;a severe attack, made a swift retirement with allnbsp;his unwounded men, except that some unwoundednbsp;may have decided to remain and sell their livesnbsp;dearly. At any rate Cheldric got away, thoughnbsp;with but a very small start of the enemy. Thusnbsp;appears to have ended the second stage of thenbsp;great Welsh victory of Mons Badonicus.

We must now turn back to consider where the position was that Cheldric retired to from Beaconnbsp;Hill.

There is a hill, now called Solisbury Hill, half a mile north-west of Batheaston; it has a broadnbsp;flat top surrounded by a low embankment. Thisnbsp;hill takes the eye and appeals to the fancy ofnbsp;those ignorant of military requirements; but itnbsp;only has to be considered a moment to be dismissed as an impossible position.

It has no water. It can be easily surrounded, and it is too large to be easily defended by a small

force, and, worst of all, it does not secure retreat round the bend of the Avon.

One is where the lower slopes of Banner Down run down to the Fosse Way and to the river;nbsp;the other where the Roman road to Cunetio ascendsnbsp;the hill near Bathford.

Only by visiting the neighbourhood can it be decided which is the more probable of thesenbsp;positions to have been chosen by Cheldric. On thenbsp;whole the Banner Down position seems to be thenbsp;most likely one at which Cheldric would have leftnbsp;a strong rear-guard to secure his retreat round thenbsp;bend of the river, with orders to prepare'the positionnbsp;for defence; and it has the immense advantagesnbsp;of an unlimited supply of water, and that the rivernbsp;protects its left flank.

So far it must be admitted that Geoffrey of INIonmouth has given us a very reasonable andnbsp;probable account of the first two stages of thenbsp;battle of Mons Badonicus, in spite of the Arthuriannbsp;fustian with which he has embellished it.

With regard to the third stage, namely, the flight of Cheldric and the forlorn remnant of hisnbsp;brave rear-guard from the Avon Valley, Geoffreynbsp;is less instructive, and yet we may gather somenbsp;reasonable deductions from his vague statements.

Geoffrey tells us that � the victory being thus gained, the King commanded Cador, Duke ofnbsp;Cornwall, to pursue them, while he himself shouldnbsp;hasten his march into Albania (Scotland), etc., etc.nbsp;... In the mean time the Duke of Cornwall, whonbsp;had command of ten thousand men, would not asnbsp;yet pursue the Saxons in their flight, but speedily

made himself master of their ships. . . . After this he hastily pursued the enemy . . . and allowed nonbsp;quarter to those he could overtake,

� At last the Saxons entered the Isle of Thanet � . . but Cador gave them no respite till he had killednbsp;Cheldric, and taken hostages for the surrender ofnbsp;the rest.�

Let us first notice that Geoffrey here makes Arthur desert his army, at a moment when hisnbsp;guidance was most wanted, and go off to Scotland.nbsp;If Arthur was the absolute king, with commandingnbsp;authority, that Geoffrey makes him, this desertionnbsp;of his brave men was certainly discreditable.

But if we take Arthur off the pedestal on which Geoffrey places him, and restore him to thenbsp;position he undoubtedly held, if indeed he existednbsp;at all, namely, that of a tribal leader, with influencenbsp;over all owing to his recognized ability, but withnbsp;authority only over his own men, we shall findnbsp;far better reasons for Arthur not pursuing thenbsp;Saxons himself, and reasons entirely creditablenbsp;to him.

After the second day�s battle had been won, �We may safely picture to ourselves the positionnbsp;crowded with swarms of half-starved Welshmennbsp;quarrelling over the meagre spoils that theynbsp;found there. It must have taken some timenbsp;to reduce this mob to something like order, andnbsp;get each troop sorted out, and assembled under itsnbsp;chief.

Then we must remember that Arthur�s army fiad lain out, at least two nights, and probablynbsp;Wiore, and had had no more food than they couldnbsp;Carry in their wallets; and they were quite unfit

to undertake a long march into a country where they could hardly expect to find food, and certainlynbsp;not enough for their needs.

To induce these men to return peacefully to their homes must have been a task that taxed allnbsp;Arthur�s abilities for the next few days. So farnbsp;we have only considered the condition of Arthur�snbsp;own army, namely, those who had rallied to hisnbsp;standard from the north, and from Southnbsp;Wales.

We must not forget, however, that there was another contingent that came into action on thatnbsp;fateful morning, when the Saxons retreated fromnbsp;the walls of Bath to Mons Badonicus. Thennbsp;Bath opened its gates, and from them issued thenbsp;men from Cornwall and Devon (as they are nownbsp;called), and we learn that their leader�s name wasnbsp;Cador.

These men had had plenty of food and a good night�s rest, and after the first day�s battle theynbsp;could return to Bath for more food and rest.nbsp;These men, with their well-filled wallets, were thenbsp;only troops fit to pursue a beaten enemy in a war-stricken country. Are we to assume that the factnbsp;that Cador and his men are named as the pursuersnbsp;of the Saxons is due to a fortunate guess onnbsp;the part of Geoifrey ? Or, on the other hand,nbsp;may we not, must we not, attribute it to an honestnbsp;old Welsh chronicler, whose true story Geoffreynbsp;uses, to give consistence to his own garblednbsp;account ?

The detail about the ships of the Saxons is either one of Geoffrey�s embellishment, or it maynbsp;embalm the fact that the Saxons did bring a few

flat-bottomed boats to enable them to throw force across the river to reconnoitre or maraud.

All these considerations justify us in assuming that Cheldric and his men may well have got fromnbsp;one to two hours� start before Cador could take upnbsp;their pursuit.

We can hardly suppose that they had had much if any food, and, at any rate, they had tonbsp;start on a twenty-five miles� march to Cunetionbsp;after a hard morning�s fighting, and a night withnbsp;little rest. Considering their losses in battle wenbsp;can hardly suppose that it was a band of more thannbsp;two or three hundred men that left that strickennbsp;field and climbed the hill out of the Avon Valley.nbsp;If they could but reach Cunetio they would benbsp;safe, since the main body would have been rested,nbsp;and prepared to meet any force that the Welshnbsp;could send so far against them.

There is one more statement of Geoffrey�s which is worth considering. In spite of its manifest absurdity, as regards place, it does preservenbsp;the fact that Cheldric took refuge somewhere, andnbsp;that he was there killed. Geoffrey tells us thatnbsp;�at last . , . they entered the Isle of Thanetnbsp;with their broken forces . . . but Cador gave themnbsp;no respite till he had killed Cheldric, and takennbsp;hostages for the surrender of the rest.�

Thanet is, of course, too ridiculous to waste time over, and all we have to do is to try andnbsp;discover some place between Bath and Cunetionbsp;where Cheldric may have made his last stand. Itnbsp;seems impossible to fix on any spot that deservesnbsp;Consideration, and so the question must be left innbsp;abeyance.

90 THE BATTLE OF MONS BADONICUS

It is, of course, possible that Cheldric may have got to Cunetio itself, and that the main body ofnbsp;his army had left it, and so that it was there thatnbsp;he was slain,

It is a balance of probabilities whether, having regard to the danger to the open settlements, andnbsp;possibly also a shortage of food, the main bodynbsp;retired ; or whether they remained, showing a boldnbsp;front and waiting for the possible escape of somenbsp;at least of their gallant rear-guard, before theynbsp;returned to Newbury.

There is one suggestion which, although it is admittedly a guess, yet may be worthy of consideration, if, indeed, a guess that provides food fornbsp;thought is better than pusillanimous silence.

This guess is worth considering because, should it turn out to be true, it would not only explainnbsp;the end of the final stage of the battle of Monsnbsp;Badonicus, but it would also solve one of thenbsp;greatest archaeological problems in England.

About twenty miles from the River Avon, and about five from Cunetio, the Roman roadnbsp;from Bath comes to the greatest artificial moundnbsp;in Europe, namely, Silbury Hill.

We know for certain that at least the lower part of Silbury Hill was there when the Romansnbsp;made their road, because that road, which pointsnbsp;straight to it, is there diverted in order to avoid it,nbsp;and it passes south of Silbury on its course tonbsp;Cunetio.

Another proof of the great age, of at least the base of Silbury Hill, lies in the fact that flintnbsp;arrow-beds and Bronze Age relics have been foundnbsp;at its base.

We know that some early race, or races, in Britain were great earth-movers. Witness Avebury itself, less than a mile north of Silbury Hill,nbsp;also the wonderful earthwork camps near Salisbury,nbsp;and in Dorsetshire.

It is suggested that such an earthwork camp stood here when the Romans came, it may wellnbsp;have been 60 or 70 feet high, or even more. Thenbsp;bench-marks on the 6-inch map show that the plainnbsp;from which Silbury Hill rises averages about 495nbsp;feet above sea-level. The ground south of Silburynbsp;Hill, however, rises so quickly that the 600-feetnbsp;contour is only 400 yards away.

It is suggested that, originally, this rising ground continued northwards where Silbury Hillnbsp;now stands, and formed a round hill rising somenbsp;40 or 50 feet above the plain. This hill the camp-naakers scarped, using the soil to build up theirnbsp;camp, and taking more from the high ground tonbsp;the south.

Thus Silbury Camp arose completely detached from the higher ground, and must have beennbsp;an outstanding feature of the landscape. Sincenbsp;Silbury Hill covers about five acres, a camp aboutnbsp;60 feet up may well have enclosed from three tonbsp;four acres.

It is a curious fact that both the Romans and Saxons do give some slight corroborative evidencenbsp;that it was such a camp that they found atnbsp;Silbury.

We know how accurate the Romans were in the alignment of their roads where no obstaclesnbsp;interfered. For more than two miles the Romannbsp;road runs in a dead straight line to the west of

Silbury. Now if, in the time of the Romans, Silbury Hill had risen to a peak as it does to-day,nbsp;it is inconceivable that the Roman engineersnbsp;would not have planted their alignment staff onnbsp;the top of that peak. That they did not do thisnbsp;is plainly evident, since the alignment of their roadnbsp;has been made on a point about 160 feet south ofnbsp;the present peak of Silbury Hill. On the assumption, however, that there was a camp and not anbsp;peak at Silbury in the time of the Romans, thenbsp;point selected by them to align their road uponnbsp;would certainly have been the highest, since it wasnbsp;on that part of the parapet of the camp that facednbsp;the high ground.

Although this evidence may seem to be minute, yet it is clear and positive, and it is incumbent onnbsp;those who question it, to find some other reasonnbsp;for the Romans having not aligned their road onnbsp;the peak of Silbury Hill.

The evidence of the Saxons is not quite so clear and positive, since, instead of dependingnbsp;upon the accurate science of engineering, it depends upon the science of language. Since thenbsp;writer is no etymologist, he cautiously prefers tonbsp;put it in the form of a question.

Would the Saxons have given Silbury the name it bears if they had not found a camp there ?

According to the ordnance survey, the top of Silbury Hill is 616 feet above sea-level, and therefore about 120 feet above the surrounding plain.nbsp;If there was a camp here when the Saxons came,nbsp;the question arises, who filled it up with soil, sonbsp;that it rises to a peak some 50 or 60 feet abovenbsp;the level of the camp ?

This will be answered as we conclude the third and final stage of the battle of Monsnbsp;Badonicus.

We here return to the flight of Cheldric from the Avon Valley. We see him and his wearynbsp;men approaching Silbury. Cador and his victoriousnbsp;Welshmen had caught him up long before, andnbsp;had killed many stragglers.

The moon was going down, and the way beyond Silbury more difficult. Here was a camp, wherenbsp;at any rate he could make a stand, with a hopenbsp;that relief might come from Cunetio next day,nbsp;and so they entered it. Silbury was but annbsp;ancient deserted earthwork with no gates, but itnbsp;Was a last resource, and the weary men could gonbsp;no further.

During the remainder of the night Cador and his men surrounded Silbury, and at daylightnbsp;stormed it, and had no difficulty in overcomingnbsp;and slaying all they found there, and after stripping the dead promptly took their departure.nbsp;And, probably, with no time to spare before anbsp;relieving force of the English from Cunetionbsp;appeared.

It must be borne in mind that Cheldric Would have been sure to send forward messengersnbsp;announcing his retreat ; moreover, he maynbsp;have been able to retain a few horses to mountnbsp;them on.

However that may have been, the force at Cunetio would have been sure to send forward anbsp;strong party, as soon as the men were rested, innbsp;hopes of being able to rescue their commander andnbsp;his men. These would arrive soon after dawn

94 THE BATTLE OF MONS BADONICUS

Then they would enter the aneient fortress, and find there the bodies of their slaughterednbsp;comrades.

After burying these where they found them, the English must have retired to Cunetio, andnbsp;later to Newbury, vowing vengeance on thenbsp;Welsh. It is suggested that the stern Woden-worshipper, Ceawlin, was brought up from childhood with these cries of vengeance ringing in hisnbsp;ears, and made it the task of his life to executenbsp;that vengeance.

It will be shown later that there can be as little question of Ceawlin�s ruthless brutality asnbsp;there can be of his ability as a leader.

It will be shown also that Ceawlin made the Wansdyke, and it goes without saying that henbsp;did this with the forced labour of his enemies;nbsp;he had nothing to teach them in earth-moving,nbsp;besides setting them to work according to hisnbsp;wishes.

It is suggested that when Ceawlin had thus completed that great part of the Wansdyke northnbsp;of Devizes, he made his wretched slaves fill upnbsp;Silbury Camp as high as the soil could be made tonbsp;stand, as a monument of his immortal revenge.

If this story of the battle of Mons Badonicus has thus been ended with a mere guess, it cannotnbsp;be denied that the rest of it is derived from reasonable conjectures, which, in a very remarkablenbsp;manner, do co-ordinate a large number of scrapsnbsp;of evidence, and produce a coherent and reasonablenbsp;account of that great Welsh victory.

For a wonder they show that Geoffrey of Monmouth for once spoke the truth, when he saidnbsp;that he possessed an ancient Welsh manuscript.nbsp;And, above all, they bear witness to the honesty ofnbsp;that old Welsh chronicler.

We are now in a position to take stock of the affairs of the invaders, and of their hopes andnbsp;anxieties, as they were affected by the greatnbsp;disaster of Mons Badonicus.

If any readers decline to accept the version of that battle given in these pages, they are remindednbsp;that the position of affairs is not thereby affected,nbsp;since there can be no doubt at all that some suchnbsp;disaster should occur at this time, if there is anynbsp;truth at all in Welsh evidence. Surely a tentativenbsp;explanation of the battle of Mons Badonicusnbsp;based on numerous scraps of Welsh evidence isnbsp;better than nothing. It at least helps us to realizenbsp;the sobering effect that such a disaster must havenbsp;had on the invaders for many years after, and tonbsp;some extent it enables us to make a rough estimatenbsp;of the extent of their losses. Several of theirnbsp;most experienced leaders and about one thousand,nbsp;or perhaps even as many as two thousand, of theirnbsp;best warriors were slain, at a time when theirnbsp;services were much wanted, and their weaponsnbsp;were lost to an enemy who much wanted them.

At the same time this presentation, this visualization, of a disaster at Bath, enables us to understand how it was that, whilst the actual settlements

of the invaders were unaffected, and we do not hear of a single village being lost, yet all attemptsnbsp;at further conquest ceased for more than anbsp;generation.

It is held that this statement is not traversed by the fact that Cerdic and Cynric fought thenbsp;Welsh at Cerdicsford (Chardford on the Avon) innbsp;519, and at Cerdic�s-lea in 527, since it seemsnbsp;evident that these battles were only of an offensive-defensive character; and intended to administernbsp;lessons to the Welsh, who were becoming toonbsp;presumptuous after their great victory.

If we are ever to hope to explain the Conquest of Britain by the English, it can only be by somenbsp;one offering a definite explanation which is adequatenbsp;and coherent, and then some one else, either improving this by sound criticism, or offering anbsp;better.

In spite of all the faults of Green�s � Making of England � it was used as a text-book at thenbsp;Universities for a quarter of a century, and hasnbsp;done much to encourage and help investigation.nbsp;Where would the question stand now, but for thisnbsp;gallant attempt of a great historian to make anbsp;synthesis of the Conquest of Britain by thenbsp;English ? If we are compelled to criticize somenbsp;of Green�s conclusions, to the point even of stylingnbsp;them ridiculous, let us not fail to emulate hisnbsp;spirit.

Green�s great weakness lay in his ignorance of military matters, and indeed in his contempt fornbsp;what he called a � drum and trumpet history.�nbsp;He does not even appear to have understood that,nbsp;without due consideration being given to strategical

98 REIGNS OF CERDIC AND CYNRIC

This is where the disaster of Mons Badonicus comes in to help us, for a failure is often far morenbsp;instructive than a success. This statement was asnbsp;true for our forefathers as it is for us to-day.nbsp;It taught our forefathers, who had given so manynbsp;hostages to fortune in the shape of open settlements, where their danger lay ; and it taught themnbsp;the difficulties, or, in military parlance, the strategicnbsp;factors, they would have to overcome, and this isnbsp;the same lesson that we may learn from it.

The disaster of Mons Badonicus is a remarkable instance of a blessing in disguise. Without the lesson thus taught at the supreme momentnbsp;that it was wanted, we can hardly conceive thatnbsp;it would have been possible for gangs of jealousnbsp;invaders, coming together from different parts ofnbsp;the continent, to have held together, and submitted to the necessary restraint, and to havenbsp;yielded loyal obedience to one supreme leader,nbsp;whom they were soon to make their king.

The laws of sound strategy had been broken once, and, as far as we can discover, they werenbsp;never broken again, the penalty for their infractionnbsp;had been exacted, and the advance of the invadersnbsp;had been checked for many years.

There may, of course, have been other mistakes made, to which some countenance is given, by thenbsp;claims of the Welsh to other victories of lessnbsp;importance. If so, we may be sure that theynbsp;would not have been recorded by the English,nbsp;and we may also be sure that they would confirmnbsp;the lesson of Mons Badonicus.

We can thus understand how it came about that even the most lawless and adventurous amongnbsp;the invaders were held in leash; and that thenbsp;systematized strategy of the first Bretwalda, constantly confirming conquest by colonization, wasnbsp;never afterwards relinquished.

There seems to be a tendency amongst literary men to despise the invaders of Britain, and, likenbsp;one of the greatest of them, to describe theirnbsp;battles as those of kites and crows.

The mere mention of the word � strategy � seems to arouse the rancour of some of them, andnbsp;lead them to quizz it, by such terms as �Warfarenbsp;of to-day.� They seem to think that there cannbsp;be no such thing as strategy without a Staffnbsp;College to teach it. They seem to forget that onenbsp;of the best books on strategy was written by anbsp;Chinese, long before the period we are dealingnbsp;^fith; and that the principles of strategy do notnbsp;alter, as those of tactics do with every change ofnbsp;armament.

They forget the constant influence of strategic factors on those engaged in warfare, ever penalizingnbsp;those who ignore them.

In the first stage of the conquest there is some excuse for this ignorance, since the consummatenbsp;genius of the first Bretwalda allowed no failures tonbsp;display to us the difficulties and dangers the invaders faced and overcame.

As much may be said of Ceawlin the second ^retwalda, of whose victorious career an explanation will be offered later.

Between these two great strategists comes the disaster of Mons Badonicus, and as by a flash of

There is no mystery about strategy, it is merely common sense applied to warfare. The leader ofnbsp;innate ability may possibly acquire a knowledge ofnbsp;strategy by simply applying his wits to any givennbsp;campaign. The ordinary man must learn it fromnbsp;his more experienced elders, or, as now-a-days,nbsp;from a Staff College. Otherwise he can only benbsp;taught it by disaster. After all, fear is the greatnbsp;instructress of the ordinary man, and this it is thatnbsp;leads him in times of great stress and anxiety tonbsp;repose his trust in leaders of known courage,nbsp;ability and prudence, and to yield them willingnbsp;obedience. After two generations of constantnbsp;success, the invaders wanted something to frightennbsp;them, and they got it at Mons Badonicus.nbsp;Henceforward there was to be no lack of cohesionnbsp;amongst the various bands, coming at differentnbsp;times, and often from very different places, thatnbsp;composed their armies, and every one must havenbsp;recognized the necessity for discipline.

Thus the immediate effect of the great disaster must have been a tightening up of that disciplinenbsp;to which the invaders had to submit, if only fornbsp;the purposes of immigration ; but which ^ wasnbsp;tending to become relaxed, as broad lands werenbsp;offered them for settlement, with no apparentnbsp;danger, even in the offing.

This tendency to disintegration, which is the inherent weakness of broadcast rural settlement,nbsp;was at once checked by the bracing effect of thenbsp;cold douche of threatening danger. Thus, whethernbsp;we call it discipline, or mere loyalty, that cohesion

Was preserved amongst the scattered invaders, which alone could make future conquests possible.nbsp;Then fortunately there could have been nonbsp;tendency to division of command, since Cerdicnbsp;and his son Cynric had not been implicated innbsp;the great disaster, and so confidence in them hadnbsp;not been shaken.

Cerdic had held chief command of the army of the west for many years, as King Aese had heldnbsp;command in the Thames Valley ; and everywherenbsp;success had crowned his leadership in battle ; andnbsp;besides, he had shown his capacity in organizingnbsp;marine transport, and for all the countless difficulties that had to be foreseen and prepared for,nbsp;in landings on a hostile shore.

Moreover, Cerdic�s son Cynric, from early boyhood, had been following in his father�s footsteps, and was beginning to show an equal, if not indeednbsp;a greater capacity. Cynric�s name could hardlynbsp;have been so constantly mentioned together withnbsp;that of his father, unless it had been universallynbsp;recognized that he was a real help to him.

We thus see how the disaster of Mons Bado-nicus was indeed a blessing in disguise, since it served to weld together the scattered invadersnbsp;under one experienced and capable leader, with anbsp;son ready to take his place, and, as we shall seenbsp;later, with a grandson of even greater capacity,nbsp;the renowned Ceawlin, the second Bretwalda andnbsp;conqueror of the West Midlands.

But Mons Badonicus did a great deal more than this. Although it was indeed a disaster, yetnbsp;unwittingly it fulfilled the conditions of an operation of war that was much needed.

Far better than if it had been designed for it, the campaign to the walls of Bath acted as anbsp;reconnaissance in force, and not only revealed thenbsp;strategical difficulties which had to be overcome,nbsp;but also it compelled the Welsh to display theirnbsp;forces. Thus it showed the invaders, not onlynbsp;that the Welsh could assemble quickly in vastnbsp;numbers near Bath without their knowing it, butnbsp;also that they certainly would thus assemble fornbsp;the defence of their beloved city if they got thenbsp;slightest warning that it was going to be attacked.nbsp;Knowledge is power, and we are met with thenbsp;paradox that disaster gave power to the English,nbsp;since it gave them knowledge. This does not mean,nbsp;however, that it gave them added power, but itnbsp;does mean that it prevented them squandering thenbsp;excess of power that they possessed over the enemy,nbsp;in the pursuit of at least risky, if not indeed unattainable objects.

The great result of this dire lesson will be shown as the story proceeds, but it may be broadlynbsp;stated here.

Led by Cerdic, the great pupil and understudy of Aella the first Bretwalda, the invaders decidednbsp;to revert to the strategical policy of that greatnbsp;leader, namely, limited conquests confirmed bynbsp;colonization. That only could win them purenbsp;homes untainted by foreign domination or intrusions of any kind, where they could live undernbsp;their own laws and customs and their own religion,nbsp;that of Woden. � Strategical policy� may seemnbsp;to be a contradiction in terms, but it is not so,nbsp;since in this case military and civil elements werenbsp;combined for their mutual support. It was only

by colonizing in safety that they could continue to conquer. Although the effect of the disaster ofnbsp;Mons Badonicus must have been instantaneous,nbsp;in the manner that has so far been described, wenbsp;should make a mistake if we supposed that all itsnbsp;lessons were as quickly understood; it was notnbsp;necessary that they should be, until the time camenbsp;that this or that lesson came in useful to explainnbsp;how the next difficulty should be overcome.

It is easy now for any tyro to open his maps and follow the course of that ill-omened campaign.nbsp;It Was far different then, and even the ablestnbsp;leaders could only have been able to form anbsp;Vague and confused conception of what hadnbsp;occurred.

And yet as years went on it must have often been a topic very seriously discussed at conferencesnbsp;of leading men, and so its lessons would be gradually absorbed, although not until the invadersnbsp;approached Bath would all of them be revealed.nbsp;I'he gradual advance of the invaders, culminatingnbsp;in the battle of Deorham in the year 577, can onlynbsp;be understood if we realize all the time, thenbsp;nioderating and controlling effect of the greatnbsp;lesson taught at Mons Badonicus.

We now return to Cerdic. There is nothing fo show that Cerdic was a man of more thannbsp;ordinary capacity, who had had the advantage ofnbsp;^ sound training, because for the first fifteen yearsnbsp;of his career as an invader, he had acted under thenbsp;Command of AeUa, and the best that can be saidnbsp;of him is, that Aella must have had the greatestnbsp;confidence in him. Then for the next four years,nbsp;after Aella had retired, with the honorary rank of

104 REIGNS OF CERDIC AND CYNRIC

Bretwalda, Cerdic must have been able to profit by the advice of his beloved leader.

The bringing over of large numbers of Saxons, which began at this time, so many in fact that theynbsp;eventually gave their name to Cerdic�s kingdom,nbsp;may have been due to Aella�s advice, but at anynbsp;rate it was a continuation of his policy. It mustnbsp;have been whilst Cerdic was attending to thenbsp;distribution of those new-comers, that he heard ofnbsp;the disaster to his frontier force.

The first report must have created great alarm, as first news of a disaster always does. Moreover,nbsp;as this was the first set-back the invaders hadnbsp;received, since they landed for the purposes ofnbsp;permanent conquest sixty-seven years before, itnbsp;must have created something like consternation.nbsp;And then, as it was realized that the main bodynbsp;of the frontier force had escaped, and after rallyingnbsp;at their temporary base at Cunetio, had checkednbsp;the pursuit of the Welsh, the alarm would subside.nbsp;The immediate effect of this state of alarm mustnbsp;have been to establish Cerdic�s authority so thatnbsp;it was never afterwards questioned.

With his knowledge and experience he would be able to take all necessary precautions to ensurenbsp;the safety of the settlers near the frontier, and sonbsp;confidence would be quickly restored. Cerdic,nbsp;like every one else, must have been filled withnbsp;disappointment; doubtless he had looked forwardnbsp;to doing great things, and now, for many years,nbsp;for the rest of his life as it turned out, he wasnbsp;compelled to act on the defensive, and to devotenbsp;himself to guarding what he had gained.

could only have known it, few things, if any, could have done so much to establish his dynasty as thenbsp;disaster of Mons Badonicus, since it forced all thenbsp;invaders to look to him for guidance and protection,nbsp;^nd, as we know, he proved worthy of the confidencenbsp;placed in him, with the result that the King ofnbsp;England is still proud to trace his descent tonbsp;Cerdic. Too much can hardly be made of thenbsp;far-reaching and long-lasting effects of the disasternbsp;nf Mons Badonicus, at any rate the writer willnbsp;not be deterred, by the risk of being tedious, fromnbsp;dilating upon them. As so often happens, difficulties faced turn into explanations. Solvunturnbsp;ogt;m,bulando.

The united character of the first stage of the invasion manifested itself as soon as due regard wasnbsp;accorded to the difficulties of warfare accompaniednbsp;liy colonization, and especially to those of marinenbsp;transport; and it was confirmed by the evidencenbsp;nf Bede, that Aella King of the South Saxons hadnbsp;sole command of all the invaders.

That one man of consummate ability should thus be able to establish his absolute authoritynbsp;^as easy to understand, more especially as thenbsp;Course the invasion took did display the guidancenbsp;nf a master mind; but it was long foreseen thatnbsp;^ difficult problem would arise, when it becamenbsp;Accessary to explain how such absolute authoritynbsp;nnuld have been handed on, amongst invaders ofnbsp;different branches of the race, and of differentnbsp;nlans, widely scattered in rural settlements.

Then it became necessary to explain a mys-fcrious Welsh victory, about which, all that was known with certainty was the place, and with

reasonable certainty the date. When this had been done, lo and behold I we find explainednbsp;the overmastering incentives to cohesion, whichnbsp;must have impelled the scattered colonists tonbsp;render willing obedience to one capable andnbsp;experienced leader. One difficulty explained hasnbsp;helped to explain another, thus adding to thenbsp;probability that both explanations are sound.

There is nothing to show whether Cerdic was a good strategist or not, but he must have been anbsp;good administrator and disciplinarian; and fullynbsp;qualified by long experience to distribute hisnbsp;frontier guards advantageously, and ensure thatnbsp;they did their duty.

That Cerdic soon earned the confidence of all is shown by the fact that, in the year 519, he wasnbsp;able to get himself acclaimed as King. That thenbsp;three intervening years had been arduous ones,nbsp;entailing constant vigilance, is shown by the factnbsp;that, in the year 519, Cerdic had to give thenbsp;Welsh a severe lesson at Chardford on the Avon,nbsp;as has already been stated. We must not infernbsp;from this that English settlements had beennbsp;pushed thus far as yet, since it must have beennbsp;essential that the English should show that theynbsp;could strike far beyond their own borders; andnbsp;the Downton that we find holding a commandingnbsp;position overlooking the Avon, may have beennbsp;established later. It is necessary to say this, asnbsp;some people are apt to assume that a victory at anbsp;given spot implies settlement up to that spot,nbsp;whereas it proves nothing of the kind.

The probable lines that settlements were pushed to at the various stages of the conquest.

must be left for local antiquaries to puzzle out, very few suggestions of that kind can be offerednbsp;here.

There is a long straight dyke running north and south, just east of Andover, with the ditch tonbsp;the west. This may possibly mark one stage ofnbsp;the gradual and cautious advance of the settlements ; but the pros and cons are too complex tonbsp;be dealt with here, and this is only put forward asnbsp;a suggestion likely to be fruitful.

The western boundary of Hampshire seems to mark the limit of safe settlements in the lifetimenbsp;of Cerdic.

Chardford was probably a severe lesson to the Welsh. Elated by their victory three yearsnbsp;before, they ventured to meet the better trained,nbsp;and better armed, and more powerful warriors ofnbsp;the English in a pitched battle. With strongnbsp;earthworks in their rear, to which they couldnbsp;retire if defeated, they appear to have tried tonbsp;prevent the crossing of the river Avon by thenbsp;English, and to have failed, doubtless with considerable loss, and the moral effect of their defeatnbsp;must have been great and lasting.

This is indicated by the fact that we hear of no more battles until the year 527, when thenbsp;Chronicle tells us that Cerdic and Cynric foughtnbsp;against the Britons at the place which is callednbsp;Cerdices-lea.

That it was a victory we may confidently assume or it would not have been recorded, butnbsp;apparently it did not lead to any great accession ofnbsp;territory; it must, in fact, have been of a defensivenbsp;character, and intended only to administer a sharp

108 REIGNS OF CERDIC AND CYNRIC

It probably took place on some exposed part of Cerdic�s extended frontier, and, as generallynbsp;supposed, it may have been near the river Avon.nbsp;The exact site of the battle of Cerdices-lea is notnbsp;of great importance.

Guest, that brilliant but rather wild, though very suggestive writer, and his followers havenbsp;supported the idea that Cerdices-lea may havenbsp;been at Chearsley between Oxford and Aylesburynbsp;and a few miles north of Thame ; but philologistsnbsp;will have none of this, since they point out thatnbsp;the � ic � of Cerdic is wanting in the earliest formnbsp;of the name � Chearsley,� which assume the formnbsp;of Cerdes-lai and point to an earlier Ceardes-leah.nbsp;With all due respect to philologists, etymology isnbsp;a good servant but a bad master, and havingnbsp;regard to the known tendency of local rustics tonbsp;abbreviate names, it seems necessary, since there isnbsp;such a close resemblance between Cerdices-lea andnbsp;Cerdes-lai, to consider whether Chearsley may not,nbsp;after all, prove to be the site of the battle atnbsp;Cerdices-lea.

The chief point against Chearsley is the entry in the Chronicle under the year 571, when Cuth-wulf fought against the Britons at Bedford andnbsp;took four towns, Lenbury, Aylesbury, Bensington,nbsp;and Eynsham.

This will be dealt with later, and it does not altogether preclude the identification of Chearsleynbsp;with Cerdices-lea.

It would be quite sufficient to account for a battle at Chearsley, if we supposed that the Welsh

CERDICES-LEA

had been too intrusive in the Thames Valley, and that this action was only intended to correct that.

The fact, however, that it is accorded a place in the Chronicle seems to imply that the battle atnbsp;Cerdices-lea was of some importance, and wasnbsp;more than a mere punitive expedition, and innbsp;studying this conquest, the larger view seldomnbsp;fails to yield a larger explanation. Assuming itnbsp;to have been at Chearsley it will be well tonbsp;consider what events might have brought it about.

The successful immigration of Saxons on a large scale in 514 is certain to have led manynbsp;others to follow their example, as reports reachednbsp;their friends on the continent of the goodness ofnbsp;the land, and, above all, that they had found themselves under the strong and wise and just rule ofnbsp;Cerdic.

Individual Englishmen in those days may have heen as ready then as always to try their luck innbsp;a new country ; but families, and even whole clansnbsp;of Saxons, would hardly have been induced tonbsp;emigrate without considerable assurances as tonbsp;their security. Such assurances were now ample,nbsp;and so we may assume that now a constant immigration of Saxons had been going on for manynbsp;years. Most of these would probably take shipnbsp;to London, and many would settle near it, andnbsp;become known later as the Middle Saxons. Manynbsp;Would doubtless push up the Thames, even perhapsnbsp;far as Oxford; and many more would push upnbsp;the rivers Crouch and Blackwater, and begin thenbsp;colonization of Essex, which must have been farnbsp;advanced by this time.

conquest had been devoted to establishing the invaders south of the Thames, with of coursenbsp;certain minor exceptions, it is probable that thenbsp;Welsh, in what are now Essex, Hertfordshire, andnbsp;Buckinghamshire, had been left in peace as longnbsp;as they remained quiet.

To leave them thus, to keep their lands cultivated until they were wanted, was evidently one of the principles of the invasion laid down bynbsp;Aella.

Now, however, these Welsh were being driven back gradually, and becoming concentrated innbsp;Bucks ; and were calling in the help of the Welshnbsp;of the north and west, who had not yet forgottennbsp;their one great victory, when by united actionnbsp;they had succeeded in driving an English armynbsp;from the field.

It was evidently some such state of affairs that demanded decisive action on the part of Cerdic.nbsp;He had made his frontier safe, and could affordnbsp;to leave many of his own West Saxons guardingnbsp;it, since he could doubtless reckon on a strongnbsp;contingent from Kent, and all the warriors in thenbsp;Thames Valley would be certain to join him.

A short campaign with the prospect of rich spoils must have been a great attraction ; and thenbsp;rich vale of Aylesbury, which the Welsh were surenbsp;to try to defend, offered such prospects.

Cerdic probably assembled his forces near Wallingford; and thence marched on Aylesbury, and met the brave but unfortunate Welshnbsp;at Chearsley, with the result recorded in thenbsp;Chronicle.

occupied during the first seven years of his reign in establishing the security of his self-chosen frontiers,nbsp;and after the victory at Cerdices-lea, which maynbsp;have been Chearsley, that security could nevernbsp;again be threatened as long as he left the Welshnbsp;alone.

Thus Cerdic was able to turn his attention to other matters, and a very serious challenge to hisnbsp;authority by a section of an important branch ofnbsp;his followers, namely, the Jutes, had arisen, whichnbsp;threatened the conduct of the invasion in future,nbsp;unless it was promptly and drastically dealtnbsp;with.

As has been pointed out before, Cerdic had now become entirely dependent upon the Jutesnbsp;for shipping. It was always important for Cerdicnbsp;to have ships at his command, but much more sonbsp;now. Cerdic and his chieftains had now hadnbsp;fourteen years to discuss the disaster of Monsnbsp;Badonicus, and to weigh and value the lessonsnbsp;it taught. They now knew for certain where thenbsp;chief centre of Welsh resistance lay. Everywherenbsp;they could if they chose drive back the Welsh innbsp;the open country, but that only led to an ever-widening frontier to be protected; and such extended settlements were liable to be swept awaynbsp;by Welsh armies suddenly debouching from thenbsp;Cotswolds and from the hills above Bath. Undernbsp;such conditions, and with long inland journeys tonbsp;face, colonization could not be expected to proceed unchecked.

It was different in the west, where there were many good sea-ports at which armies and settlersnbsp;could be landed within easy reach of their destina-

tions. In fact, the English possessed in sea-power one immense advantage over the Welsh; andnbsp;Cerdic, as an apt pupil of the first BretAvalda,nbsp;intended to use it to the full.

There can be little doubt that Cerdic had already sent fleets round Land�s End, and hadnbsp;surveyed the estuary of the Severn, and had beatennbsp;up the unprepared Welsh in their quarters, andnbsp;had possibly reconnoitred as far as Bath itself, Anbsp;bold reconnoitring expedition amongst the settlements of an enemy that had no warning of its approach was a perfectly feasible proposition, entailingnbsp;a minimum of risk, and gathering a maximum ofnbsp;information. However this may have been, therenbsp;is no reason at all to doubt that English shipsnbsp;could sail those seas, as well and as confidentlynbsp;as those of the Welsh and Irish had done fornbsp;centuries, and that they neglected to do so, nonbsp;one can believe for a moment. The rewards ofnbsp;raiding expeditions, like the later practices of thenbsp;Danes, would be a sufficient incentive, apart fromnbsp;the information gained, and so much needed bynbsp;Cerdic.

However this may have been, there can be no doubt that by this time Cerdic and his chieftainsnbsp;had realized that the future trend of the invasionnbsp;must be westwards, and that their objective, if anbsp;modern expression may be allowed without arousing the quizzing of critics, must be the hills thatnbsp;guard the mouth of the Severn from an enemynbsp;approaching them from the east. We are thusnbsp;able to see the constant influence of strategicnbsp;factors moulding the actions of nations at war;nbsp;and whether we call the result that of strategy, or

merely that of the application of common sense to difficult problems, little matters.

But to return to the Jutes. All that has been said implies that it was essential that Cerdicnbsp;should not only have plenty of ships, but alsonbsp;absolute control over their crews.

Now we read in the Chronicle, under the year 530, that Cerdic and Cynric conquered the islandnbsp;of Wight and slew many men at Wiht-gara�snbsp;byrg.

It has already been shown that the Jutes occupied the Isle of Wight, and had probably donenbsp;so even before the first arrival of Cerdic. Tonbsp;suppose that the W elsh had been holding the Islenbsp;of Wight all this time would be making too greatnbsp;demands upon our credulity, although Asser, anbsp;Welsh ecclesiastic, writing three centuries later,nbsp;seems to have thought so.

The fact, therefore, that Cerdic is said to have conquered the Isle of Wight does show what annbsp;independent position the Jutes must have heldnbsp;there all this time; and so we are now able tonbsp;grasp the far-sighted wisdom of Cerdic in bringingnbsp;another large section of the tribe of the Jutes tonbsp;Portsmouth, and giving them a large district tonbsp;settle in north of Portsmouth. To have such anbsp;good harbour for their ships on the mainlandnbsp;must have been a great attraction to these traders;nbsp;whilst their settlements in the Meon Valley didnbsp;not in the least interfere with the influx of thenbsp;Saxons by the Itchen Valley.

All this must have given great satisfaction at the time, but Cerdic, perhaps advised by Aella,nbsp;evidently had ulterior motives of great importance.

114 REIGNS OF CERDIC AND CYNRIC

when he induced so many more Jutes thus to come westwards, instead of going to Kent or tonbsp;London. He wanted some Jutes on the mainland, in order that by means of them and theirnbsp;ships he might, if necessary, be able at any timenbsp;to establish his authority over the Jutes in thenbsp;Isle of Wight.

We need not suppose that there was anything like a rebellion by the Jutes of the Isle of Wight,nbsp;but merely that they were beginning to display anbsp;spirit of haughty independence. They were quitenbsp;ready to render to Cerdic the services of some ofnbsp;their ships, but only on their own terms, and atnbsp;times that suited them. Besides this they arenbsp;sure to have had many shipbuilders at Cowes,nbsp;and so they could, to a great extent, control thenbsp;output of ships. The Wihtgaras, as they seemnbsp;to have called themselves, not a Welsh name,nbsp;probably sailed away every spring with such goodsnbsp;as they could collect for barter in Kent or onnbsp;the continent; and then spent a great part of thenbsp;summer in ferrying over families of Saxons tonbsp;London, or to the ports of Essex. Then theynbsp;would return in the autumn with such goods fromnbsp;the continent as were wanted in Wessex. Innbsp;this sort of way they may have been doing a roaring trade. Moreover, they could, up to a certainnbsp;point, reasonably urge that they were acting innbsp;the best interests of all the invaders.

So, indeed, they had been, up to a certain point, but it was not within the competence ofnbsp;mere traders to realize that that point had nownbsp;been passed; and unless the absolute control of

marine transport was in the hands of the leader of the conquest, in this case the king, it must eithernbsp;fail altogether, or at least be liable to be seriouslynbsp;hampered at all times by the selfish interests ofnbsp;one independent section of the invaders.

It was to put a stop once and for all to this chronic clashing of military and trading interests,nbsp;and to establish his own absolute authority, thatnbsp;Cerdic took drastic measures in the year 530. Itnbsp;Was none too soon, as Cerdic died in 534, andnbsp;it was desirable that the stern disciplinarian whonbsp;had conducted the invasion from its commencement in these parts, and had won the confidencenbsp;of all, should be the first to put down whatnbsp;amounted to a mutiny by the force of arms.

We learn from the entry in the Chronicle under the year 534 that Stuff and Wihtgar werenbsp;Cerdic�s nephews. It seems probable that a Jutishnbsp;chief, living in the Isle of Wight, had in days gonenbsp;by visited Cerdic on the continent to arrange tonbsp;bring him and his army to the Solent; and thennbsp;he had there married a sister of Cerdic�s, and takennbsp;her back with him to the Isle of Wight beforenbsp;the birth of Wihtgar, since he would hardly havenbsp;been given that name unless he had been born innbsp;the Isle of Wight.

As we should have expected, these chieftains appear to have been always loyal to their royalnbsp;uncle, and they probably succeeded Bieda andnbsp;Maegla as chiefs of the Jutes at Portsmouth ; andnbsp;then when Cerdic with their assistance had settlednbsp;matters in the Isle of Wight, he, according to thenbsp;Chronicle, with the concurrence of his son Cynric,nbsp;gave the rule of that island to Stuff and Wihtgar.

The fact that the Chronicle, which tells us so little, does tell us that in the year 544 Wihtgarnbsp;died, and that he was buried at Wihtgarabyrg, isnbsp;fair proof that Wihtgar was considered by hisnbsp;contemporaries to have been a chieftain of greatnbsp;importance, and one that had taken a leading partnbsp;in establishing the English in Britain. We maynbsp;conclude that, for the last ten years of his life,nbsp;Wihtgar gave loyal allegiance to Cynric, and thatnbsp;he introduced amongst the crews of his ships innbsp;the Solent, a discipline that was a prototype ofnbsp;that of later times.

Not often, if ever, are we told in the Chronicle of the death and the place of burial of a leadernbsp;not of royal rank. This, indeed, appears to havenbsp;been a case of a man whom kings delighted tonbsp;honour, and as we read the entry we almost seemnbsp;to be listening to a dirge on the death of a greatnbsp;sailor, though it must be admitted that the greatness of Wihtgar is only indicated by the sense ofnbsp;loss which this simple record of his death andnbsp;burial reveals.

Enough has been said to show that Cerdic was certainly not a myth, but a very capable leadernbsp;and a strong king. On the whole the chroniclersnbsp;seem to have touched in the most importantnbsp;and decisive events in Cerdic�s life with a certainnbsp;hand.

They write as men who could have told us more if they had not been sternly limited by thenbsp;terms of the national Chronicle for which theynbsp;selected the leading events to be recorded, andnbsp;they left those to be clothed with a history thatnbsp;they thought would never be forgotten. When

these meagre records are accepted without cavil, m the spirit in which they seem to have beennbsp;written, and reasonable suggestions are added asnbsp;to how each event recorded came about, we seenbsp;that a consistent and coherent history of the periodnbsp;is produced. If in this process a certain amountnbsp;of conjecture is absolutely necessary to fill in thenbsp;vacant spaces, surely it is better to use boldlynbsp;such conjectures, provided they are reasonable,nbsp;than to commit ourselves to the wild and improbable guess that the chroniclers did not knownbsp;what they were writing about. At any rate, wenbsp;are not entitled to adopt one entry because itnbsp;happens to fit some preconceived theory, andnbsp;reject another because it happens to traverse it.

We are bound in the first instance to assume that the chroniclers, and those whose actions theynbsp;recorded, were honest and capable men, unlessnbsp;indeed, in any particular case, strong and clearnbsp;reasons to the contrary can be adduced.

In the bald entries of the Chronicle it is not often that we can detect a human touch. Onenbsp;such seems to appear under the year 519. Afternbsp;telling us that Cerdic and Cynric obtained thenbsp;kingdom, it adds, �and from that time forth thenbsp;royal offspring of the West Saxons reigned.�

Surely it was with a feeling of pride that this claim to continuous royal descent from Cerdic,nbsp;Was made for King Alfred by a chronicler appointednbsp;by him. King Alfred could at any rate have hadnbsp;*10 shade of doubt about Cerdic, and his leadershipnbsp;^�nd reign.

Cynric began to reign in the year 534, and we ^-re at once struck by the remarkable fact that no

battle is recorded�in fact, no event of importance� except the death of Wihtgar, until the year 552,nbsp;when Cynric made his great advance to Searobyrignbsp;(Sorbiodunum or Old Sarum) and won a battlenbsp;there. And yet of course it is impossible to believenbsp;that there was not a great deal going on, and ofnbsp;considerable importance too, during these eighteennbsp;years.

It seems evident that if there were any actions caken during this long period, leading to smallnbsp;acquisitions of territory by the invaders, that theynbsp;were not accorded any notice in the Chronicle,nbsp;because they did not come under the immediatenbsp;personal direction of the King.

If there were any such small accretions of territory during this period, we are entitled tonbsp;suspect that they were won by Wihtgar with thenbsp;aid of his ships, his death would hardly havenbsp;merited notice unless he had some such achievements to his credit. As to these suggestions willnbsp;be made; for the present let us return to Cynric.

Cynric�s first business must have been to continue the policy of his father, and bring in more Saxon clans every summer, and for this and othernbsp;purposes he had in view, he would he sure tonbsp;give the greatest encouragement to shipbuilding.nbsp;Then as shipping increased he would be able,nbsp;with the assistance and advice of his cousinnbsp;Wihtgar, to arrange for a regular fleet of transportsnbsp;to ply to the continent for the purposes of tradenbsp;and migration, whilst another fleet would be retained under Wihtgar�s command for the purposesnbsp;of further invasions, and for further explorationsnbsp;and raids.

Then for years Cynric must have been fully occupied with the internal affairs of his kingdom,nbsp;and more especially with distributing fresh familiesnbsp;of immigrants as they arrived, and seeing thatnbsp;they were fed until they could provide for themselves. Besides these duties, the frontier guardsnbsp;had to be attended to, and constant vigilancenbsp;maintained. It would be tedious to suggest allnbsp;the multifarious duties which must have fullynbsp;occupied Cynric�s time for many years. We cannbsp;now only note that there were two things thatnbsp;held this varied horde of colonists in loyal allegiancenbsp;to Cynric�they latterly must have become crowdednbsp;on the land; one was that their safety dependednbsp;on it, the other their confidence that when thenbsp;time came that they were fully prepared andnbsp;strong enough, Cynric would strike again andnbsp;win fresh lands for them to settle on.

And now we have to face a difficult problem �with little or no evidence to guide us. It is,nbsp;how and when was the district now called Dorsetshire conquered ? The writer can but do his bestnbsp;to explain how this was effected, and leave it tonbsp;others to offer better suggestions if they can.

We are able to judge that this conquest had two phases, since from the name �Dorsaetas,�nbsp;We may conclude that the greater part of thatnbsp;district was peopled with mere settlers; thatnbsp;is to say, with families of Saxons who had hadnbsp;little or nothing to do with the main conquest;nbsp;although they may have had to drive out suchnbsp;local Welsh families as still lingered on the landsnbsp;they had come to occupy, yet their primary dutiesnbsp;Were to settle and cultivate the land.

It was different with the ports of Dorsetshire, Poole, Wareham, and Weymouth. These had tonbsp;be taken from the sea, with probably a land forcenbsp;co-operating. Then when Cynric had takennbsp;Sorbiodunum, and had occupied the valleys of thenbsp;Avon, and Wiley, and Nadder, which converge atnbsp;Wilton, the eastern end of Dorsetshire as farnbsp;as Blandford, and Shaftesbury, would becomenbsp;safe for settlement, and so the saetas would benbsp;brought in.

It is suggested that it was probably at the beginning of Cynric�s reign that he deputed hisnbsp;cousin Wihtgar to take Poole, Wareham, andnbsp;Weymouth, and the Roman fortress of Dorchester,nbsp;without at any time going inland further thannbsp;any easy march from one of these ports. Thenbsp;moral effects of such a minor conquest would, fornbsp;the time being, be greater than the materialnbsp;gains, although those would not be inconsiderablenbsp;since the loss of these ports would diminish thenbsp;possible chances the Welsh may have stilnbsp;possessed of receiving succour from the continent.nbsp;It seems extremely probable that a leader whonbsp;knew that he was going to attack Sorbiodunum,nbsp;and the upper valley of the Avon, in a few years�nbsp;time, would decide to secure these ports first. Wenbsp;are able to see very clearly the line of action thatnbsp;was taken in approaching and attacking Dorchester.nbsp;It is manifest that to land at Weymouth alone,nbsp;and advance from thence, would be a costlynbsp;operation, since the enemy could meet the advancingnbsp;force on a narrow front that could not possibly benbsp;turned.

within easy march of Dorchester, shows us how they got over this difficulty. They appear to havenbsp;landed a force at Wareham, probably the main body,nbsp;and then to have assembled at this Stoke. Thennbsp;the two forces from Wareham and Weymouth couldnbsp;advance simultaneously, and act in unison, asnbsp;circumstances might dictate. Since they had suchnbsp;short distances to traverse, many scaling-laddersnbsp;could be transported, and Dorchester was probably stormed before the Welsh could come tonbsp;its relief.

Although we may be certain that no settlers would be allowed to reside within the walls ofnbsp;Dorchester, according to the invariable practicenbsp;of the invaders, yet it seems likely that they maynbsp;have used Dorchester as a stronghold for a time,nbsp;protecting their left flank, since it would be sonbsp;easy to relieve it, if it was besieged.

These operations could have taken, at most, but two or three years. As for the rest of thenbsp;long wait before the great advance to Sorbiodunum,nbsp;the bringing in and distributing swarms of settlersnbsp;in the conquered territories, is quite sufficient tonbsp;account for it, but we should make a great mistakenbsp;if we did not look farther away. We are notnbsp;entitled to assume that these southern invadersnbsp;took no interest in the proceedings of the Anglesnbsp;who were the leading branch of their race.

Since all the invaders were English, it is best to use the Latinized form of the name when wenbsp;^ish to specify the leading, king-governed branchnbsp;nf the English race, who landed in East Anglia,nbsp;and on the north-east coast.

who, most of them, if not all, lived in the south, begin to evince an interest in the doings of thenbsp;Angles at this time; and the first notice ofnbsp;Northumbria in the Chronicle is under the yearnbsp;547, when we are told that Ida began to reignnbsp;there. The notice is a long one, ending by tracingnbsp;Ida�s descent from Woden, but we are not concerned at present with the doings of the Angles.

It is, however, necessary to consider whether it could have been possible for the invaders of thenbsp;south to have been quite uninterested in thenbsp;progress and success of their brothers in the north.

The reader�s answer to this question will depend largely on whether he is still obsessed withnbsp;the preconceived idea that the invaders werenbsp;merely independent gangs of marauders; or, onnbsp;the other hand, whether his mind is open to thenbsp;idea, supported by the evidence of Tacitus, and ofnbsp;the Chronicle and of the legends, that the invadersnbsp;came to re-establish in an island home their oldnbsp;institutions, including especially that of theirnbsp;ancient monarchy.

This question cannot be discussed here. But the idea here supported is that the Angles hadnbsp;always been under kings, and that they were anbsp;united nation, and the monarchy was essential tonbsp;their laws and customs, and to crown a socialnbsp;system which recognized nobility by birth.

If this was the case, and the evidence in its favour is overwhelming, then the crowning of Idanbsp;as King of the Angles in Northumbria was anbsp;national event which had a deep interest for allnbsp;the invaders, since it meant the transference ofnbsp;their ancient monarchy from the Baltic littoral, or

So essential was monarchy to English institutions that local kings had already been established by acclamation in Kent and Wessex.

That Ida�s father and grandfather, Eoppa and Esa, had fought in Northumbria is quite likely,nbsp;but they evidently had not then transferred theirnbsp;home and court and kingdom to Britain.

We are not forced to believe anything so wildly improbable, as that these kingdoms resulted fromnbsp;a new idea imposing itself on the invaders: farnbsp;otherwise. It was their national instinct, cultivated by centuries of happy experience, to seek anbsp;monarch to rule over them, chosen from the greatnbsp;family of Woden, the statesman and king,'and thenbsp;founder of their religion.

The transference of this ancient monarchy from the continent to Britain was an event of thenbsp;deepest interest to all Englishmen, whether Angles,nbsp;Jutes, or Saxons; therefore we are not surprisednbsp;to find it recorded in the Chronicle as the firstnbsp;event alluded to in connection with the Angles.

Of course the Angles must have begun establishing themselves in Northumbria and Eastnbsp;Anglia long before this, but the Chronicle whichnbsp;Was written and kept in the South of Englandnbsp;and in the Midlands, says nothing about any landing previous to the year 547, when Ida becamenbsp;king, although there must have been many, as wellnbsp;as many hard-fought battles.

There must, of course, have been a great difference between the invasion of the east coast by the Angle nation, and that which began at Thanet

some sixty years before, and ended at Deorham. When the Angles came the resistance of thenbsp;Welsh as a united nation under a capable leadernbsp;was no longer possible, although they probablynbsp;made some splendid rallies. Even from the Welshnbsp;records we learn of no victory claimed by themnbsp;that could be compared to that of Mons Badonicus.nbsp;Thus the Angles could, and evidently did, advancenbsp;much more recklessly without suffering any severenbsp;disaster.

Henry of Huntingdon, from whatever source he gained his knowledge, appears to give a truenbsp;account of the advance of the Angles. He saysnbsp;in Book II of his history�

�At that time (a.d. 527) large bodies of men came successively from Germany, and took possession of East Anglia and Mercia ; they were not asnbsp;yet reduced under the government of one king;nbsp;various chiefs contended for the occupation ofnbsp;different districts, waging continual wars with eachnbsp;other; but they were too numerous to have theirnbsp;names preserved.�

This account could never have been written of the southern invasion under Kings Hengist, Aesc,nbsp;and Cerdic, and directed by Aella. That wasnbsp;quite a different affair, and with two minor exceptions, namely, the correction of the .lutes innbsp;the Isle of Wight by Cerdic, and the correction ofnbsp;the youthful Ethelbert by Ceawlin, remained anbsp;united invasion until the death of Ceawlin.

It was because the Welsh were constantly menaced by this united southern invasion thatnbsp;they were unable to concentrate in order to resistnbsp;the greater but more scattered invasion by the

Angles in the north. Thus the Angles, meeting with but a weak and disjointed resistance, werenbsp;probably justified in advancing more recklesslynbsp;than did their fellow-invaders in the south.

At any rate, although there must have been many fights, we hear of no pitched battles andnbsp;epoch-marking victories with the Angles, such asnbsp;would certainly have reached the ears of thenbsp;chroniclers, and have been recorded by them. Itnbsp;Was the steady and cautious and ably-directednbsp;advance of Wessex, ending with the victory ofnbsp;Deorham, that finally crushed the Welsh.

There was, however, one great event in the north that the chroniclers could not, and did not,nbsp;fail to record, and it was the transference of thenbsp;kingdom of the Angles to Britain.

The final break-up of an ancient kingdom, and the relinquishment of beloved homes and ancientnbsp;centres of government on the continent, mustnbsp;have made extraordinary demands on the willpower and the energies of those who had to carrynbsp;this unique ethnical migration to a successful conclusion.

It could hardly have been carried out without serious risk from interference by jealous neighbours, but without going into particulars, it isnbsp;evident that an extra large number of ships wouldnbsp;be necessary, and these a king of the dynasty ofnbsp;Woden, like Cynric, would have been certain tonbsp;offer. This consideration helps us to understandnbsp;the long delay in the early part of Cynric�s reignnbsp;before he began to extend his dominion by a freshnbsp;conquest, and why he began to do this so soonnbsp;after the Angle monarchy had been established.

126 REIGNS OF CERDIC AND CYNRIC

We are not justified, on any terms, in assuming that the invaders of the south took no interest innbsp;the doings of the invaders of the north, and vicenbsp;versa, since the success of the one invasion wasnbsp;certain to help the other. But there was far morenbsp;than this to arouse the sympathies of each, and tonbsp;ensure co-operation when need called for it.

It all may be summed up in the fact that they were all the same people, with the same language,nbsp;laws, customs and religion, and, above all, withnbsp;the same dynasty ruling and directing them. Thenbsp;Angle King Cynric is sure to have helped thenbsp;leading branch of his race to carry out the finalnbsp;leaving of their continental home; and althoughnbsp;he probabiy was unable to leave his kingdom himself, it is extremely likely that he sent his youngnbsp;son Ceawlin to represent him. Thus it wasnbsp;probably that that great warrior learned all aboutnbsp;the Angles and their difficulties, and their certainnbsp;prospects of success, now that they had againnbsp;become united under a king; and he probablynbsp;then made up his mind that the conquest of thenbsp;West Midlands should be his. Although, withoutnbsp;his complete knowledge of the power of the Anglesnbsp;in the north, he would hardly have dared to havenbsp;taken the bold course in the Midlands that henbsp;eventually adopted.

It will be seen later that, in order to account for Ceawlin�s bold strategy, we have to assumenbsp;that he had a very complete knowledge of thenbsp;power of the Angles, who, though they werenbsp;probably only advancing westwards, for the sakenbsp;of their own selfish interests, were practically cooperating with Ceawlin, as he was with them.

However, this is a question for a later chapter; at present we are only concerned to explain thenbsp;long delay after the beginning of Cynric�s reignnbsp;before he began a fresh invasion.

The larger view of the conquest as usual comes to our help. Under the year 552 we readnbsp;in the Chronicle that Cynric advanced to Searo-byrig (Sorbiodunum or Sarum) and won a victorynbsp;there. By this time Wessex must have beennbsp;crowded with fresh immigrants, and these couldnbsp;now be distributed in the Avon Valley and in Eastnbsp;Dorsetshire. The great earthwork fortresses ofnbsp;the Britons they would soon find useless against anbsp;foe who had come to settle; since Cynric tooknbsp;great care that no relieving force should come tonbsp;their succour. Also Bockerley Dyke, which thenbsp;Welsh must have made about this time, was useless against invaders coming from the coast.

Thus numerous saetas would find safe settlements in East Dorsetshire, and even the Wilton saetas may have begun to occupy the valley of thenbsp;Wyley about this time, eventually giving theirnbsp;name to Wiltshire. We cannot help noticing thatnbsp;Ceawlin�s name is not mentioned with that of hisnbsp;father as having taken part in the battle nearnbsp;Sorbiodunum, although four years later father andnbsp;son take part together in a battle at Beran-Byrig.

We cannot but suppose that there was some definite reason for Ceawlin�s absence, and a reasonnbsp;entirely creditable to him. It so happens that thisnbsp;curious absence of Ceawlin from a great battlenbsp;beside his old father, the place of all others wherenbsp;he would have desired to be, suggests the solutionnbsp;of a very difficult problem. Although the difficulty

128 REIGNS OF CEDRIC AND CYNRIC

only arises a quarter of a eentury later the explanation may be offered here, since it serves to explain the gradual growth of the power of thenbsp;West Saxons.

Every difficulty cannot be dealt with in this sketch of the conquest, but one at least shall notnbsp;be shirked. A version of the conquest which failsnbsp;to explain how naval transport could have beennbsp;provided at all times must be a rotten one, andnbsp;explanations must always be either adequate ornbsp;futile.

We shall realize as we proceed, and more especially after the victory of Deorham, what anbsp;large number of ships the West Saxons must havenbsp;had constantly at their command, more a greatnbsp;deal than the harbours of Portsmouth and Cowesnbsp;could have supplied. How often one difficultynbsp;cancels out another when both are boldly faced !

The question naturally arises as to what became of the large number of vessels the Anglesnbsp;must have possessed, and employed to ferry themnbsp;across the North Sea ; there must have been verynbsp;many more than could find profitable employmentnbsp;afterwards in coastal trade. And yet trained seamen and traders do not readily give up theirnbsp;profession, but are given to seeking employmentnbsp;elsewhere. This the West Saxons could offernbsp;them with the certainty of finding good harboursnbsp;and trading stations, and full employment fornbsp;many years to come.

Portsmouth and Cowes were already occupied by the Jutes, but it is suggested that the youngnbsp;Ceawlin was sent to Bamborough, with full powersnbsp;to offer the Angle sea-captains and their crews,

the harbours of Southampton, Poole, Wareham, and Weymouth, with lands near them, and tonbsp;promise constant employment for many years.

If this was the case we can easily understand how Ceawlin came to be absent from the battlenbsp;near Sorbiodunum in the year 552.

Several trips to the Elbe may have been necessary to bring away the families of the Angle seamen, and also, we may be sure, the materialsnbsp;for shipbuilding that had been collected there.

We can now proceed with the story without any misgivings as to the lack of naval transport.nbsp;A reasonable conjecture has demonstrated thatnbsp;we need not suppose that there was ever anynbsp;shortage of ships, and ships too that would havenbsp;been under the immediate control of the Westnbsp;Saxons.

The Chronicle tells us that in the year 556 Cynric and Ceawlin fought against the Welsh atnbsp;Beran-Byrig. That this battle resulted in thenbsp;complete defeat of the Welsh there can be nonbsp;question, although the chroniclers do not take thenbsp;trouble to tell us so, but they would not havenbsp;recorded it if it had not been a victory.

Four years later, namely, in 560, we are told that Ceawlin succeeded to the kingdom. Nownbsp;the Beran-Byrig of the Chronicle has been identified with Barbury Castle, an earthwork about fivenbsp;miles north of Marlborough, and as many south ofnbsp;Swindon. The probabilities of the case are entirelynbsp;in favour of this identification. We see the armynbsp;of the invaders marching, either westwards fromnbsp;Newbury, or northwards from Sorbiodunum, andnbsp;retaking Cunetio, and founding Marlborough.

130 REIGNS OF CERDIC AND CYNRIC

Then the Welsh we see advancing from Cirencester and taking up a position on the high ground of Hackpen Hill, about six miles from Cunetio,nbsp;perhaps in Barbury Castle itself.

Cynric and Ceawlin would welcome this challenge to a pitched battle, and the result can hardly be doubtful.

Perhaps the reason that this battle is not recorded as a victory is that Cynric and Ceawlinnbsp;decided to retire from that exposed position, andnbsp;ultimately adopted a frontier line some sevennbsp;miles south of Barbury, and marked it by thenbsp;Wansdyke. This will be explained later.

As Cynric was getting old he probably retired to his home-centre of government, wherever thatnbsp;may have been, after the battle of Barbury; andnbsp;handed over the command of all the forces of thenbsp;invaders to his son, whose great ability and energynbsp;must by this time have been recognized by all.

Ceawlin was the greatest of the conquerors of Britain as regards extent of territory, since it wasnbsp;due to his masterly strategy that the English werenbsp;established in Dorset, Somerset, and Wilts, and innbsp;the West Midlands, as far north as the south ofnbsp;Cheshire.

It does not follow that all these districts were completely settled up in Ceawlin�s time, andnbsp;there is no doubt that the Angles from the eastnbsp;poured in, as very welcome intruders, amongst thenbsp;sparsely settled Saxons from the south, since therenbsp;Was land enough for all. But the Angles foundnbsp;the resistance of the Welsh completely shattered,nbsp;and the primary conquest of the West Midlandsnbsp;Was undoubtedly due to Ceawlin. In fact, a largenbsp;part of the Angle conquests were effected undernbsp;Ceawlin�s leadership, as will be seen later.

That Ceawlin was a man of consummate ability, specially fitted for the great task of his life, there cannbsp;be no question; but there is nothing to show thatnbsp;he was an original genius worthy to be comparednbsp;with Aella the first Bretwalda, by whose examplenbsp;and system, of conquest confirmed by colonization,nbsp;Ceawlin profited so much. Ceawlin must have

132 THE ORIGIN OF THE WANSDYKE learned all about Aella from his father and grandfather, and probably required no urging from themnbsp;to decide, from his earliest youth, to try to emulatenbsp;the deeds of Aella.

Then from the same source Ceawlin must have learned all about the disaster of Mons Badonicus,nbsp;and the lessons to be deduced therefrom, of whichnbsp;the chief one was, that the strategical policy ofnbsp;Aella must not be departed from, at least beforenbsp;he had taken the Cotswolds. Ceawlin must havenbsp;had instilled into him that most difficult of allnbsp;lessons for a young warrior in his prime to accept,nbsp;namely, the supreme necessity for caution, patience,nbsp;and restraint, when advancing, for the purposes ofnbsp;permanent conquest, from the broad frontier henbsp;would have to leave behind him. He would earlynbsp;realize the importance of selecting not only thenbsp;right place but also the right time to strike.

Ceawlin must have early foreseen that vast numbers of preliminary operations, each perhapsnbsp;small in its way, must be undertaken and carriednbsp;through, before he could be in a position to strikenbsp;at the Severn Valley, and ensure the conquest ofnbsp;the West Midlands.

As regards the actual kingdom of his father and grandfather, Ceawlin�s knowledge must of coursenbsp;have been complete. He must often have witnessednbsp;settlers pouring in, and have studied the arrangements made for their reception, until places couldnbsp;be found where they could settle in security, andnbsp;without quarrelling with their neighbours. Alsonbsp;we may be sure that he would often have riddennbsp;with expeditions beyond the frontier, for the purposes of marauding, and at the same time learning

It would he tedious to suggest the many other lessons that must have come under Ceawlin�snbsp;observation, and served to complete his trainingnbsp;for his great task; but there is one that must notnbsp;be neglected.

A leader of the invasion of an island would be unfitted for his task unless he knew all aboutnbsp;naval transport. Moreover, the lessons to benbsp;learned by marauding and reconnoitring expeditions by sea were even greater than of thosenbsp;on land.

It is quite inconceivable that when Ceawlin�s old cousin Wihtgar, the Jutish chieftain, sailednbsp;either eastwards to fetch immigrants, or westwardsnbsp;for discovery and marauding, that the youthfulnbsp;Ceawlin never went with him. It would, in fact,nbsp;be a silly guess to suppose that with such opportunities offered him, Ceawlin stayed at home.

It is not merely a possibility, it is indeed a very strong and reasonable probability, that Ceawlin asnbsp;a young man had visited the continental portsnbsp;used by Saxon and Angle emigrants, and also thenbsp;estuary of the Severn. In fact, it is quite likelynbsp;that Ceawlin with a Jutish fleet may have sailednbsp;round Anglesey and looked in at the port ofnbsp;Chester. By some such means he must havenbsp;learned the size and configuration of the land henbsp;Was invading.

Besides all these means of gaining knowledge and experience that were open to the youngnbsp;Ceawlin, as has already been pointed out, we arenbsp;not entitled to assume that the leaders of the

134 THE ORIGIN OF THE WANSDYKE

southern invaders, commonly called the Saxons, took no interest in the northern invasion by thenbsp;Angles, since the success of each was bound upnbsp;with the success of the other; and so the youngnbsp;Ceawlin, of all others, is sure to have been chosennbsp;as one of those sent to gain a knowledge of thenbsp;position of affairs in the north. Moreover, whennbsp;the Angles, with their monarchy, finally left thenbsp;continent, the Saxons, then in a peaceful andnbsp;safe condition, are sure to have lent assistance,nbsp;more especially as it was in their own interest tonbsp;do so.

If this was the case, and it is a perfectly rational conjecture to suppose that it was so,nbsp;then Ceawlin must have met Ida, and many othersnbsp;of his own great family, descendants of Woden,nbsp;in Northumbria. There Ceawlin would learn whatnbsp;the Angles had already done, and what they nextnbsp;proposed to do ; and doubtless it would be arrangednbsp;that there should be a continuous mutual exchangenbsp;of information in future, so that as the two invasions approached one another, they should be able,nbsp;to some extent, to act in unison.

We shall see later that we can only account for the extreme boldness, amounting apparentlynbsp;to rashness, with which Ceawlin advanced afternbsp;Deorham, by assuming that he had fairly complete knowledge of the advance of the Angles onnbsp;his right front. He seems to have been confidentnbsp;that his right flank was always safe. Possibly anbsp;spirit of emulation, and a determination to forestallnbsp;the Angles, may to some extent have influencednbsp;this jealous conqueror. But the point is, that itnbsp;would be unreasonable to suppose that the two

invasions were conducted with, if not indeed complete ignorance, at any rate with completenbsp;indifference, as to the movements of the other.

The larger view of the conquest here, as always, gives the larger and better explanation,nbsp;and we are not compelled to limit our inquiriesnbsp;merely because, in the past, it has been fashionablenbsp;to suppose that the invaders were all of themnbsp;ignorant and stupid. An invasion that was constantly limited by the demands of marine transport,nbsp;demanded at all times a very high order of intelligence, if sufficient supplies were always to benbsp;forthcoming, whether for armies or immigrants.nbsp;Unless it can be suggested how Ceawlin couldnbsp;have gained a full and accurate knowledge of sea-power and marine transport, it would be hopelessnbsp;to try and explain how he could have conquered,nbsp;and largely colonized, not only the western districtsnbsp;of Wessex itself, but also the West Midlands, whichnbsp;later on became Mercia.

Having thus ascertained what may have been possible as regards the powers possessed by thenbsp;invaders, and having shown that it is reasonably probable that they, as men of common sense.nbsp;Used those powers to the utmost; having alsonbsp;pictured to ourselves the environment of the youngnbsp;Ceawlin, and the school in which he must havenbsp;been trained; we can with confidence begin annbsp;investigation of his career as a conqueror, sincenbsp;�''^e have at hand explanations which are reasonablenbsp;3^nd adequate.

As regards the actual character of Ceawlin, we Can but gather what it must have been from hisnbsp;Actions. It is here taken for granted that he was

136 THE ORIGIN OF THE WANSDYKE as stark and stern and as ruthlessly brutal asnbsp;William the Conqueror was later on to the English.nbsp;Like William, Ceawlin was probably too great anbsp;man to have indulged in cruelty for mere cruelty�snbsp;sake; he had no time for such pettiness, hisnbsp;thoughts were set on higher things ; but there cannbsp;be no question that Ceawlin gave no considerationnbsp;to the sufferings of the Welsh, and that his conductnbsp;towards them was brutal in the last degree, butnbsp;always with one object in view. Conquest.

As regards the character of Ceawlin, we do just get one human touch from the meagre annals ofnbsp;the Chronicle, when under the year 584 we arenbsp;told that after his victory at Fethan Leag, wherenbsp;he lost his son Cutha, Ceawlin � wrathful returnednbsp;to his own.� A man with Ceawlin�s force ofnbsp;character must have had a temper such as couldnbsp;drive home his behests with a force that was unchallengeable, and made even any slackness innbsp;obedience impossible. And yet Ceawlin couldnbsp;not have done all he did unless at first he had hisnbsp;temper fairly under control. Latterly it appearsnbsp;to have become ungovernable, and in fact seems tonbsp;account for his undoing, and for his miserable end.nbsp;On the whole Ceawlin stands before us with tolerable clarity, as a man peculiarly fitted both by hisnbsp;abilities and his training for the great task ofnbsp;his life.

In assessing the advantages possessed by the invaders of Britain which helped them to complete their conquest, one detail has not yet beennbsp;alluded to, and though a small one, it is of somenbsp;importance.

have been constantly served by spies, whereas for the Welsh spies must have been quite unobtainable.

This implies nothing against the character of the Welsh, or in favour of the English ; but fromnbsp;the nature of the conquest of a heterogeneousnbsp;nation, composed not only of different tribes, butnbsp;also of men of all nations, brought in by Rome,nbsp;by a united nation all speaking one strangenbsp;language and carefully guarding their settlements,nbsp;spies must have been easily obtained from thenbsp;defenders, and impossible to get from the invadersnbsp;of Britain. The result of the possession of suchnbsp;an advantage by the invaders must have been,nbsp;that whereas they could at any time make largenbsp;preparations for a concentrated attack without thenbsp;Welsh being aware of it, the Welsh could donbsp;nothing of the kind, except perhaps on the smallestnbsp;scale, without information leaking through to thenbsp;enemy. Whether Ceawlin used Welsh spies ornbsp;not to gain information, we cannot of course tell;nbsp;but that he used the power he possessed, andnbsp;developed to a high degree, of concentrating hisnbsp;forces in absolute secrecy, in order that he mightnbsp;strike suddenly at the point he had chosen, will benbsp;shown in due course.

The chief thing that Ceawlin did with this end and object in view, was to cause the Wansdykenbsp;or �Woden�s Dyke� to be made; for it will benbsp;proved to demonstration that Ceawlin was thenbsp;author of the W ansdyke, or at least that no onenbsp;else could have been.

It will be better first to make a few explanatory remarks on War-dykes in general, and on the

138 THE ORIGIN OF THE WANSDYKE

Wansdyke in particular, before proceeding with the story of Ceawlin�s career of conquest. Thenbsp;only value that a long dyke can possess is as anbsp;delimitation of a frontier between two opposednbsp;nations. Such dykes were invariably made in thenbsp;interest of the victorious nation, though possiblynbsp;and probably by the labour of the weaker nation.

The rampart of sueh boundary dykes is as a rule on the side of the victorious nation, the ditchnbsp;on the side of the weaker one.

Such long straight dykes have no military value, beyond the fact that they may make merenbsp;raids more difficult, if the bank is high and thenbsp;ditch deep. To a certain extent also such dykesnbsp;have a moral value, if the stronger nationality isnbsp;always ready to take prompt action, and to administer due punishment if its territory is invaded.nbsp;Thus those on the weaker side would always knownbsp;that if they crossed such a clearly marked boundarynbsp;they must expect punishment.

The existence of a long dyke, or the remains of one, entitles us to assume that those on the rampart side of it wished to settle down and enjoynbsp;the fruits of their conquest, without disturbancenbsp;from their opponents. The existence of a dykenbsp;clearly implies that, when it was made, there werenbsp;two distinct nationalities, one on each side of it,nbsp;and that these nationalities had no desire tonbsp;coalesce; and in fact that the victorious one, innbsp;whose interests the dyke was made, was quitenbsp;determined to hold aloof from the other.

It is inconceivable that a dyke could ever have been made between two branches of the same race,nbsp;speaking the same language and having the same

laws and customs. The natural tendency of people, especially the younger ones, to meet together for trade or social purposes, would quicklynbsp;turn an intervening dyke into a solemn farce. Anbsp;dyke betrays an overwhelming desire on the partnbsp;of the conquering nation to live apart from thenbsp;conquered.

We therefore see that it would be quite absurd to suppose that any long straight dyke was evernbsp;made by one British tribe to keep out another one,nbsp;or for one kingdom or district of the English tonbsp;keep out another, as, for instance, Wessex to keepnbsp;out the Mercians.

A long incomplete dyke, with many miles of it only marked by a Roman road, would not stopnbsp;traffie in cattle and goods between men of thenbsp;same race, speaking the same language. It wouldnbsp;be no obstacle to, say, a gay West Saxon wishingnbsp;to visit a Mercian lady, or to their return togethernbsp;across it. Men of the same race would never gonbsp;to the expense of making such a useless line ofnbsp;demarcation between two districts occupied bynbsp;their own people.

We may therefore lay it down as an axiom that a long straight dyke is in itself a proof that at thenbsp;time it was made there were different nationalitiesnbsp;on each side of it. And furthermore, we maynbsp;with much confidence assume that the victoriousnbsp;race was on the rampart side of the dyke, and thenbsp;defeated race was on the ditch side of it. Wenbsp;may furthermore assume with equal confidencenbsp;that the victorious race had decided to have nonbsp;dealings with their opponents.

140 THE ORIGIN OF THE WANSDYKE

are not shaken, by certain minor exceptions; as for instance in the Chiltern Hills, where we find dykesnbsp;with very low profile, and with the ditch to thenbsp;south; or the remarkable instance of Bokerleynbsp;Dyke, near Cranborne in Dorsetshire. This dykenbsp;was apparently made by the Welsh in their ownnbsp;interests, and therefore has the rampart on theirnbsp;side. The chief evidence to be derived fromnbsp;Bokerley Dyke is that the Welsh had no leadernbsp;with any military genius, or they would nevernbsp;have taken the trouble to make such a long andnbsp;useless earthwork, at a spot that could be easilynbsp;turned by invaders from the sea.

That the invading English did make, or have made for them by their defeated opponents, longnbsp;straight dykes, and with a very sound and sensiblenbsp;object in view, there can be no question.

The dykes made by the English do in fact mark stages in their conquest. When the Englishnbsp;had reached a certain point, where, for the timenbsp;being, they wished to settle down in peace, innbsp;open farms and villages, their custom was to makenbsp;a boundary line, marked by a dyke, which it wasnbsp;death to any Welshman to cross. Doubtless innbsp;each case the unfortunate Welsh were led tonbsp;suppose that the dyke was intended to mark thenbsp;limit of their losses, provided they did not attemptnbsp;to cross it. If they did it was a case of war, andnbsp;sharp retaliation quickly followed.

In the dykes we see one of the chief means used by the invading English to keep their homesnbsp;free from what they considered the contaminationnbsp;of the Welsh, or Roman, social and legal systems,nbsp;which they so much disliked, and to maintain their

OFFA�S AND WAT�S DYKES 141

In order to pass in review some of the many dykes made during the English conquest, it is bestnbsp;to begin with OfFa�s Dyke, about the origin ofnbsp;which there can be no question.

Even the origin of OfFa�s Dyke has been questioned in the past; but the literary evidencenbsp;in favour of OfFa, together with the fact that thisnbsp;dyke has been found superimposed on Romannbsp;work, has long settled the question in favournbsp;of OfFa.

OfFa�s Dyke begins on the bank of the Severn, then the frontier was marked by the course of thenbsp;river Wye, until it turns into the mountains ; andnbsp;from thence OfFa�s Dyke is continued with verynbsp;few gaps right up to Brymbo near Wrexham,nbsp;where it is lost in the mountains. Ofifa�s Dykenbsp;is called � Clawd OfFa � by the Welsh.

Another dyke, called Wat�s Dyke, begins on the estuary of the Dee near Basingwork, where,nbsp;for some ten miles or more, it is still called � Clawdnbsp;OfFa � by the Welsh. Wat�s Dyke then runs pastnbsp;Wrexham and Wynnstay (the old name of whichnbsp;Was Wat�stay) and Oswestry, until it is lost innbsp;the marshes of IMaesbury, near Melverley, on thenbsp;Severn.

Wat�s Dyke cannot be dealt with fully here, but is reserved for the period in which it wasnbsp;made.

However, this much may be said, that Wat�s Dyke as a line of demarcation, and for protectionnbsp;from raids and cattle-lifting, is a masterpiece,nbsp;and bears witness to the wisdom and skill of its

142 THE ORIGIN OF THE WANSDYKE

designer. In this it bears a strong contrast to Offa�s Dyke which may well be called � Offa�snbsp;Folley�; made as a rule far beyond the hauntsnbsp;of men, and quite unguardable, it seems to benbsp;a fitting monument of the vain-glorious Offa.

All these remarks are not digressive, but are intended to lead up to the crucial point in thenbsp;argument, which is, that Offa�s Dyke could notnbsp;possibly have been a new idea with no precedents.nbsp;Even if the Mercian King Offa was as powerfulnbsp;as he appears to have been pompous, his subjectsnbsp;would have thought him mad, if, without anynbsp;successful precedents in his favour to point to,nbsp;he had ordered a dyke to be made from thenbsp;estuary of the Severn to that of the Dee, alongnbsp;all the foot-hills of Wales.

We may feel certain that under such conditions Offa�s Dyke would never have been made, or if begun, would never have been carriednbsp;so near to completion as it was. In fact, the verynbsp;existence of Offa�s Dyke points with no uncertainnbsp;hand to previous long boundary dykes, by meansnbsp;of which the Welsh had been segregated from thenbsp;invading English, and we have no difficulty innbsp;finding them. In the Thames Valley we findnbsp;dykes, in Middlesex, and in the Chilterns, notablynbsp;the one extending from Henley to Mongewell.nbsp;In Sussex we find the War Dyke near Chichester.nbsp;These all must have been made under the directions of Aella.

Then we find traces of dykes in Hampshire, presumably made by Cerdic. Then there arenbsp;dykes demarcating East Anglia from the Fens.nbsp;There are traces of long dykes in Oxfordshire and

Above all, we have the Wansdyke, made by Ceawlin, as will be shown, with hardly any doubt,nbsp;as the story proceeds. All these dykes demonstrate irrefutably the determination of the invadingnbsp;English to dwell apart from the Welsh, and theynbsp;enable us to see the very means adopted to securenbsp;this segregation. To give a full description of thenbsp;Wansdyke would take many pages, and only anbsp;short one can be given here.

Speaking roughly, the Wansdyke runs due east and west, from near Inkpen in Berkshire to Port-bury near Bristol. The eastern end of it curvesnbsp;southwards a little from near Marlborough pastnbsp;Bedwyn to Inkpen, and then there is a remarkablenbsp;loop running round on the heights south of Bath.

The only portion of the Wansdyke that has been completed in a continuous line is the partnbsp;which lies north to north-east of Devizes. Herenbsp;for some six or seven miles we find it in an almostnbsp;perfect state.

Here, too, we find evidence as to how it was made, as in front of it, at intervals of about anbsp;mile, we find five square camps of low elevation,nbsp;each about a quarter of a mile north of the dyke,nbsp;and easily seen; from it. It seems quite evidentnbsp;that these camps were the compounds in whichnbsp;the slaves who did the labour of making the greatnbsp;dyke were herded at night.

This suggestion fully accounts for these small camps; it remains to be seen if any one else cannbsp;think of any other explanation of them. Thennbsp;from the western end of this perfect part of the

144 THE ORIGIN OF THE WANSDYKE

Wansdyke, between Bishops� Cannings and Cher-hill, the line of the Wansdyke is taken up by the Roman road to Bath, where signs of the Wansdyke begin again in the Avon Valley. Thus therenbsp;is a gap in the Wansdyke of about fourteen miles,nbsp;marked only by a Roman road. Then the Wansdyke is continued round the heights above Bath,nbsp;and from thence in a fairly straight line to Port-bury near Bristol. But there are many large gapsnbsp;in this line, and it is evident that the Wansdykenbsp;was left in a very unfinished condition. Thenbsp;distance from Bristol to Inkpen is about fiftynbsp;miles.

The first question that naturally arises is� Who first called this splendid patchwork of dykesnbsp;and gaps Woden�s Dyke ?

Who first put together these patches as all parts of one great scheme under the namenbsp;Woden�s Dyke ? Surely it would be rather anbsp;wild guess to suppose that it could have been anynbsp;one else than its founder I Unless the name wasnbsp;thus given, it would be a wild guess indeed for usnbsp;to suppose that the unfinished dyke round Bathnbsp;and to Bristol had anything to do with anothernbsp;dyke fourteen miles away!

It is of course easy now-a-days for us with a map in front of us to notice that these two dykesnbsp;are connected by a Roman road; but whence didnbsp;the universal tradition arise that they were thusnbsp;connected, and that they all marked one frontiernbsp;line, and that the whole, Roman road and all, wasnbsp;called the Wansdyke ?

It is fortunate for us that this tradition has survived, for otherwise he would have been a bold

antiquary who would have ventured to suggest that the Devizes and Bath dykes were parts ofnbsp;one and the same scheme, and connected by anbsp;road.

It is easy to imagine the jeers with which critics would have met such a wild guess as theynbsp;dilated upon the absurdity of connecting twonbsp;dykes by fourteen miles of an open road. Fortunately the tradition is too strong and too instructivenbsp;to be upset.

That this tradition is an English one is absolutely certain. The English worshipped Woden, the Welsh did not, and there were none butnbsp;English left to hand the tradition down.

It follows, therefore, that the founder of this fifty miles of frontier line, marked by dykes and by anbsp;road, must have been an Englishman. There is nonbsp;escape from this conclusion, but let us not leave itnbsp;at that, but as the argument and the story proceedsnbsp;pile as many more proofs upon it as can be discovered.

The probable date of the construction of the Wansdyke is the first point to be considered,nbsp;and since the views that it was made in Romannbsp;times, and even that it may have been madenbsp;during the Roman military occupation of Britain,nbsp;have both found supporters, it may be well tonbsp;show first the absurdity of such ideas. That thenbsp;British tribes could have made long dykes betweennbsp;their different territories is quite absurd. Merenbsp;tribes never make any system of defence but thatnbsp;of central earthworks. Their organization, ornbsp;rather lack of it, precludes them from establishingnbsp;and guarding a long frontier line, and there could

146 THE ORIGIN OF THE WANSDYKE

never have been that difference of social system, laws, language, and nationality between two tribesnbsp;of early Britons, to make a long boundary dykenbsp;between them a desirable object, and certainly thenbsp;Roman road did not exist in those times.

In Roman times a long dyke would have been quite out of harmony with the Roman system ofnbsp;holding Britain in subjection.

Certainly the Romans made the Walls of Hadrian and of Antoninus, but these walls werenbsp;made for the purpose of stopping raids by barbarousnbsp;races beyond territories held by Rome.

Like all long dykes they were made in the interests of a superior race, endeavouring completely to exclude inferior ones. Such a state ofnbsp;affairs never existed in southern Britain in Romannbsp;times. If any district required special treatmentnbsp;owing to its lawlessness, the Romans simply madenbsp;a fort within its borders; and if it was of importance, ran a road to it. Even in the Welshnbsp;mountains this was the system adopted.

It is thus quite inconceivable that the Wans-dyke, or any considerable part of it, could have been made before the Romans left.

These conclusions were corroborated by a few excavations conducted by General Pitt Rivers.nbsp;So far as these went, they showed that, at thenbsp;points excavated, the Wansdyke was post-Roman.

Surely the above considerations are sufficient to demonstrate that the Wansdyke was post-Roman !

The Wansdyke must have taken many years to bring it up even to the unfinished state innbsp;which we find it; but it is very easy to name the

exact year in which work upon it ceased, and ceased for ever, since it could never have been ofnbsp;any use between Englishmen.

This was the year 577, the year of Ceawlin�s great victory over the Welsh at Deorham, followednbsp;by his capture of Bath, Cirencester, and Gloucester,nbsp;and his advance into the Midlands. By that timenbsp;the Wansdyke had fulfilled its object, as will benbsp;seen later. For a backward limit to the date of thenbsp;beginning of the Wansdyke, we must look to thenbsp;year 552, when Cynric defeated the Welsh at Oldnbsp;Sarum. It is quite evident that the Wansdykenbsp;could not have been begun before that.

The most probable date for the beginning of the Wansdyke is the year 556, when Cynric andnbsp;Ceawlin fought the Welsh at Barbury. It isnbsp;Very likely that it was with prisoners taken in thatnbsp;battle that the Wansdyke was begun. At thatnbsp;time the management of the frontier was probablynbsp;handed over to Ceawlin by his old father Cynric.

The above reasons seem to be sufficient to prove that the Wansdyke must have been made bynbsp;Ceawlin. But over and above these, there is thenbsp;fact that the wonderful career of Ceawlin can onlynbsp;he explained by the Wansdyke ; as the Wansdykenbsp;can only be explained by the career of Ceawlin.

But this must be reserved for another chapter, v^hen it will be found that the Wansdyke is thenbsp;key that unlocks Ceawlin�s strategy, and explainsnbsp;his long-prepared scheme of conquest.

In conclusion, a word seems necessary on the methods employed by Ceawlin in making thenbsp;Wansdyke.

means of the forced labour of Welshmen, taken either as prisoners in battle, or by means of raidsnbsp;for collecting labour. It is unnecessary to suggestnbsp;what means were employed for digging such a vastnbsp;ditch, and raising such a high rampart, since wenbsp;know well that the Welsh were great earth-movers; their hill-fortresses in Dorsetshire andnbsp;around Salisbury are enough to prove that.

Then there is the Bokerley Dyke near Down-ton connecting Cranborne Chase with the Valley of the Avon.

There can be little doubt that Bokerley Dyke was made by the Welsh in their own interests, asnbsp;it entirely differs in character from the Wansdyke,nbsp;and is made with bastions following the contoursnbsp;of the rising ground behind it. It looks as if thenbsp;Welsh had realized that their vast earthworknbsp;forts were but death-traps before an enemy thatnbsp;had come to settle around them, and was powerfulnbsp;enough to prevent relief being sent to them.

This seems to be the reason that induced the Welsh to waste their labour over making such anbsp;useless line of defence at Bokerley Dyke. Wenbsp;know for certain, as the result of General Pittnbsp;Rivers� excavations, that Bokerley Dyke is post-Roman.

Ceawlin must have known all about the making of Bokerley Dyke, and have laughed at it, as henbsp;realized how the skill of the Welsh as earth-movers might in due time be used to further hisnbsp;own schemes.

Enough has been said in the previous chapter to show that there is every reason to suppose that,nbsp;when Ceawlin took over from his old father, thenbsp;duty of guarding the now widely extended frontiernbsp;of the invaders, he had a complete knowledge ofnbsp;the position of the affairs of the invaders, not onlynbsp;in Wessex, but also in Kent, in London and thenbsp;Thames Valley, and in Northumbria, as well as innbsp;the continental ports used by the invaders.

It has long been fashionable to begin the study of the rise and spread of the conquest of the Westnbsp;Saxons, with the theory that Cerdic was a tribalnbsp;chieftain, and the West Saxons merely his tribenbsp;in the main, though they may have been joinednbsp;later by other tribes. This theory has, by reiteration, become so deeply planted in people�s mindsnbsp;that it is difficult to eradicate it. Althoughnbsp;directly it is called upon to account for thenbsp;results, its utter inadequacy becomes apparent.

So far the efforts of historians seem to have been confined to vain endeavours to make thisnbsp;false preconceived theory fit the facts. It is farnbsp;better to begin an investigation of a period ofnbsp;history with no theory at all, taking the evidencenbsp;as we find it, and testing it by using it, and seeing

150 CEAWLIN MAKES THE WANSDYKE

whether it helps to produce a coherent story that is reasonable and within the powers of mankind.

Of no institution of the invading English is there more complete evidence than there is aboutnbsp;their monarchy.

As soon as they had brought over enough settlers into a district that was sufficiently self-contained, and detached from other districts tonbsp;form a kingdom, they invariably appointed a kingnbsp;to rule over it. A king was evidently necessarynbsp;to complete their social system.

And another great fact is that these kings were, at first at any rate, all chosen from one royalnbsp;family. They were all descendants of Woden,nbsp;with the sole exception of Aella King of thenbsp;South Saxons, and Aella is shown to have been anbsp;man of such marked ability, and his services tonbsp;the whole body of the invaders were so great, thatnbsp;there is no cause for surprise that he was given anbsp;small kingdom.

We have seen the descendants of Aesc son of Hengist made kings in Kent, a decidedly importantnbsp;and self-contained district; and moreover one thatnbsp;would engross all the attention and energy of itsnbsp;king for the time being, so that he could not givenbsp;any attention to the conquest as a whole, withoutnbsp;neglecting local affairs in Kent, and in the estuarynbsp;of the Thames, and the port of London. Moreover, the Kings of Kent seem to have had muchnbsp;to do with the establishment of Middlesex andnbsp;Essex.

with a well-designed scheme of invasion, to find a scion of the royal dynasty of Woden sent tonbsp;initiate and carry on an invasion beginning on thenbsp;shores of the Solent.

But the task of Cerdic in the Solent was a very different one to that of Hengist in Kent, andnbsp;whereas Hengist assumed the kingdom only sixnbsp;years after landing, Cerdic appears to have waitednbsp;twenty-four years before he made himself king.nbsp;Whether it was ambition, or the force of circumstances, that induced Cerdic to assume kingship,nbsp;we do not know ; but it seems more likely that itnbsp;Was the latter rather than the former. A mannbsp;who had acted loyally under the supreme commandnbsp;of Aella for so many years, does not seem to havenbsp;been one in whom ambition overruled the welfare of his people. Then when Aesc and Aellanbsp;were dead, and the kingdom of Kent had fallen intonbsp;Weaker and less experienced hands, Cerdic, uponnbsp;whom the brunt of the conquest had fallen, maynbsp;Well have found it necessary to make himself anbsp;king. Having done so it soon became evident tonbsp;all that Cerdic and his son Cynric were the royalnbsp;leaders in whom the hopes of all the southernnbsp;invaders were centred. That some jealousy wasnbsp;aroused on the part of the king in Kent, we shallnbsp;soon see, when we come to deal with the ill-advisednbsp;action of the young King Ethelbert, who had to benbsp;sent back to his own proper business by Ceawlin.

These preliminary remarks about the adaptation of their monarchical institutions by the invaders to the practical demands of the conquest, have been partly rendered necessary, in order thatnbsp;'We may be able to understand Ceawlin�s treatment

152 CEAWLIN MAKES THE WANSDYKE

of Ethelbert, when we eome to it; but ehiefly in order that we may be able to understand thenbsp;united character of the conquest as a whole, andnbsp;the commanding position held by the youngnbsp;Ceawlin when he began his career of conquest.

A scion of a leading branch of the royal family of Woden, the son and grandson of conquerorsnbsp;and kings, Ceawlin must, from the very first, havenbsp;held a position that was second to none amongstnbsp;the invaders; and since his abilities must by thisnbsp;time have been recognized in many quarters, somenbsp;as far distant as Northumbria and the continent,nbsp;high hopes of him are sure to have been held, andnbsp;young warriors probably flocked to his standardnbsp;from all parts.

Thus if we pay no heed to the idea that Ceawlin was merely a Saxon chieftain, whosenbsp;grandfather had assumed the royal dignity, annbsp;idea evolved merely to bolster up the theorynbsp;that the various invasions were separate and independent, and simply accept the plain statements of the Chronicle that Ceawlin was a truenbsp;English king of the royal race of Woden, we atnbsp;once surmount a host of difficulties, and find innbsp;Ceawlin a royal leader adequately equippednbsp;for the great tasks which we know that henbsp;accomplished.

We are not surprised to find that, later on, after he had shown himself to be a wielder ofnbsp;Britain, by taking large districts from the Welsh,nbsp;and settling them with Saxon clans brought fromnbsp;the continent in his own fleet of transports; andnbsp;when he had established his rule, so that his wordnbsp;was law throughout the south of Britain, including

CEAWLIN�S ACCESSION

We should not forget to note, by the way, how Ceawlin, the second Bretwalda, thus brings strongnbsp;corroboration to the splendour of the achievements of the first holder of that mysterious title.

This last remark strikes the note which harmonizes the careers of these two great conquerors, and brings them into a true relation tonbsp;one another; for Ceawlin had been brought up innbsp;that school of conquest, accompanied by colonization, established by Aella,and confirmed by disaster,nbsp;when its teachings were neglected. Above all,nbsp;Ceawlin, from the example of Aella, appears tonbsp;have learned the necessity of keeping up goodnbsp;relations with the Saxons on the continent.

If we were not aware that Ceawlin must have heen thus furnished with numerous excellent precedents for his guidance, and with a kingdom andnbsp;a fleet and an army all in the best order, we couldnbsp;not account for all that he did without attributingnbsp;to him an original genius, which we have no reasonnbsp;for supposing that he possessed. Ceawlin mustnbsp;have been able and clever, and with an irresistiblenbsp;Will-power, but for the rest we may attribute hisnbsp;Success chiefly to the excellent training which goodnbsp;fortune provided for him in his youth.

If we are right in assuming that Cynric retired from warfare on the frontier after the battle cf Barbury in 556, and left Ceawlin in command,nbsp;then we may detect the influence of Aella�s teaching in the first step that Ceawlin appears to havenbsp;taken, for at this date the Wansdyke must havenbsp;heen begun, and it is seven miles south of Bar-

bury. This seems to show a determination on Ceawlin�s part not to bite off more than he couldnbsp;chew. It was enough for him to secure the richnbsp;vale of Pewsey.

But more than this, we have already shown how easy it was for Ceawlin at any time to havenbsp;surveyed the country right up to Bath. This henbsp;is the more certain to have done, since Monsnbsp;Badonicus and the line of retreat from it mustnbsp;have had a deep interest for him.

We may, therefore, fairly assume that the general line of the Wansdyke was already plannednbsp;out by him, as the frontier line which he intendednbsp;to adopt, and to conquer and occupy all thenbsp;country south of it to the shore of the Severn Sea.

There is no wild guess in this suggestion as to the actual scheme of conquest devised by Ceawlin,nbsp;We know for certain that this region was settlednbsp;up by clans of Saxons before the battle of Deor-ham in 577�a vast scheme of conquest andnbsp;colonization to have been accomplished in twenty-one years, more especially as we find this territorynbsp;to have been protected by numerous fortresses,nbsp;some of them of vast size and strength. There isnbsp;no other period during which these settlers couldnbsp;have been brought in. Of course we all knownbsp;that the ultimate fate of these fortresses dependednbsp;entirely on whether they could be relieved beforenbsp;they were forced to capitulate from starvation ;nbsp;and we naturally wonder why we hear nothing ofnbsp;Welsh armies issuing from Bath, and from thenbsp;Cotswolds to raise the siege of this or that fortress,nbsp;and to recover the surrounding lands.

SETTLERS BROUGHT IN 155

a minor character going on during the greater part of this period seems certain, but there appearnbsp;to have been no battles of sufficient importance tonbsp;have been worthy of mention in the Chronicle.

The whole of Dorsetshire and the greater part of Wiltshire and of Somersetshire, colonized innbsp;twenty-one years, and apparently with no greatnbsp;battle worthy of being recorded ! The difficultiesnbsp;of providing sufficient naval transport alone wouldnbsp;have seemed insuperable, but for the suggestionsnbsp;made in a previous chapter. Then every port andnbsp;river-mouth and landing-place must have beennbsp;used; and it has been shown how a full knowledge of these had been acquired long before,nbsp;perhaps in some instances by the young Ceawlinnbsp;himself. Even so the trekkings up country tonbsp;some distant valley must have been sufficientlynbsp;arduous.

We are naturally led to ask such pertinent questions as�Who apportioned the land to thenbsp;various gangs of settlers ? Who provided guidesnbsp;to, in many instances, valleys far inland ? Whonbsp;saw to it that there was no quarrelling amongstnbsp;these gangs of warriors brought from differentnbsp;Saxon clans on the continent, and dumped downnbsp;in a strange country ? Who saw to it that, in thenbsp;long process of immigration, the settlers did notnbsp;die of starvation, whatever other hardships theynbsp;may have suffered ?

Everything points to there having been a magnificent scheme of colonization, adequatelynbsp;protected from interference by the enemy. But,nbsp;it may be asked, is there any positive evidence ofnbsp;there having been such a scheme ? The answer is

156 CEAWLIN MAKES THE WANSDYKE

in the affirmative, and although the evidence is not direct, but only by inference, it is worthy of respectnbsp;and cannot be ignored. The region under consideration is the only part of Britain, with certainnbsp;minor and sporadic exceptions, that was colonizednbsp;by Saetas or Settlers�the Dorsaetas, the Wil-tonsaetas, the Somersaetas.

This can only mean that these clans, or parts of clans, of Saxons, were brought from the continentnbsp;with their families and goods, and presumablynbsp;were not required to provide warriors for the hostnbsp;for many years. The whole of their attention andnbsp;of their energies could be devoted to settling down,nbsp;and cultivating the land.

We must of course suppose that in these districts, where the Welsh, trusting to the strengthnbsp;of their fortresses, still clung to the land, annbsp;adequate force of trained warriors would accompany the settlers, and remain with them until thenbsp;fortresses had capitulated; the only conditionnbsp;being that the lives of all should be spared. Thennbsp;the able-bodied men would be taken off to donbsp;their turn at making the Wansdyke, and the restnbsp;would be put across that sacred boundary linenbsp;Ceawlin had dedicated to his god, to return acrossnbsp;which meant death.

We thus see that, granted a certain relentless brutality, which we have no reason to suppose wasnbsp;lacking, the Wansdyke had, as a clearly markednbsp;boundary line, a real practical value, when oncenbsp;the Welsh had been taught to respect it. Thenbsp;ferocity of Ceawlin seems to have even excellednbsp;that of William the Conqueror, since it must havenbsp;extended to all classes of his enemies, whereas

William could at times show a certain amount of geniality towards those of low degree. Any suggestion that Ceawlin may have pursued some lessnbsp;hrutal course would be welcome to Englishmen,nbsp;hut nothing less hrutal would be adequate. Atnbsp;any rate Ceawlin and his followers worshippednbsp;Woden, and may have been acting in consonancenbsp;with the teaching of their religion; whereasnbsp;William and his Normans professed to benbsp;Christians. Of the two conquerors Ceawlinnbsp;appears to have been the less of a hypocrite.

For the rest, the contrast between these two successful conquerors could hardly have beennbsp;greater. Whereas Ceawlin, by a piecemeal conquest, completely ousted another nation with itsnbsp;laws and customs and language, one district afternbsp;another being cleared of the enemy, and settlednbsp;with his friends, William the Conqueror gainednbsp;his ends by winning one great battle, and then bynbsp;seizing the reins of government, and holding downnbsp;the vanquished, by building castles at all importantnbsp;centres, and above all he came, not to destroy, butnbsp;to establish the realm with all its laws and customs,nbsp;and even in the end its language.

In both cases the sufferings of the vanquished can hardly be imagined. And yet if we are evernbsp;to get to understand how one nation could sonbsp;completely oust another as the English did thenbsp;W elsh, we must not allow disgust to place anynbsp;limits on our inquiries; and when we find anbsp;great composite boundary line like the Wansdyke,nbsp;placed at the most crucial point of the secondnbsp;stage of the invasion, and certainly of the timenbsp;cl Ceawlin, we are compelled to inquire why

158 CEAWLIN MAKES THE WANSDYKE

To understand the reasons why Ceawlin made the Wansdyke, we must have in mind the trainingnbsp;and manifold experiences of his youth, as explainednbsp;in the previous chapter. Above all, we mustnbsp;remember that he knew all about the disaster ofnbsp;Mons Badonicus, and must have learned and takennbsp;to heart all the lessons that could be derived fromnbsp;it, by the time he assumed command of the frontiernbsp;forces. He had probably decided in his own mindnbsp;that he would some day take Bath, but in a verynbsp;different way. But we may well suppose thatnbsp;Ceawlin was capable of keeping his own counsel,nbsp;and never revealed his ultimate object in makingnbsp;the Wansdyke, until all his preparations had beennbsp;completed, and the time to strike had come.

For the time being he could point to several successful precedents, and how the Welsh werenbsp;excluded from the scattered settlements of thenbsp;English, by means of boundary dykes made bynbsp;the first Bretwalda, and he would announce thatnbsp;he was going to adopt the same principle. Then,nbsp;after the battle of Barbury, he would begin thenbsp;dyke on the hills north of Devizes.

Ceawlin must have known well that a dyke had no defensive value in itself, but that it wouldnbsp;be respected only if prompt punishment wasnbsp;given to those who dared to cross it from thenbsp;north.

The enormous size of the Wansdyke in this section is more probably accounted for by Ceawlin�snbsp;desire to impress the Welsh, than for any use itnbsp;could have been to the English, except as a

boundary line. Even the compounds in which the workers were herded are north of the dyke.

It seems as if during the actual construction of the dyke the Welsh were taught that it wasnbsp;death to cross a certain line marked on the ground ;nbsp;and the dyke itself when finished was dedicatednbsp;to Woden, the god of the English, and it wasnbsp;therefore sacrilege in their eyes for any Welshmannbsp;to cross it.

By the time the Roman road was reached the Welsh had been sufficiently impressed withnbsp;Ceawlin�s resolve, and his power to execute it;nbsp;and so he said that the line of the road was anbsp;sufficient boundary for his purposes, but that ifnbsp;the Welsh failed to respect it, he would force themnbsp;to bank it up like the rest of the dyke.

Then Ceawlin would be sure to make full use of his knowledge of the Angle invasion in thenbsp;north. His policy would be to assert that thisnbsp;Was no concern of his; but that the Welsh hadnbsp;much better attend to that, and not trouble aboutnbsp;him, as long as he and they respected the boundarynbsp;which he had established. For his part, he hadnbsp;a certain number of settlers coming from thenbsp;continent, and he intended to find room for them,nbsp;by taking all the land south of the Wansdyke, andnbsp;of the river Avon, right up to the sea.

It is, of course, open to critics to prove that Ceawlin did not make the Wansdyke, and did notnbsp;use it as a boundary. If, however, it is oncenbsp;admitted that the Wansdyke was made and usednbsp;as a boundary by Ceawlin, then it follows thatnbsp;it could only have been made as an essentialnbsp;item in a bold and clearly defined scheme of con-

160 CEAWLIN MAKES THE WANSDYKE

quest; and it will be difficult, if not indeed impossible, to suggest any other than that briefly outlined above.

Since there is no other period in which the Wansdyke could have been made, and given thenbsp;name it bears, �Woden�s Dyke,� it is thereforenbsp;taken for granted here, that Ceawlin did make thenbsp;Wansdyke, and for the purposes specified above.

It would be beyond the scope of this work to try and trace out the probable lines by whichnbsp;colonists trekked from their various ports of landing, to the different districts or valleys to whichnbsp;they were allocated, and how this or that Welshnbsp;fortress was dealt with. This must be left tonbsp;local antiquaries, and when they have realized thenbsp;scheme under which this great system of settlement was conducted, it seems probable that withnbsp;the aid of place-names, and especially the Stokes,nbsp;as well as the evidence of other local vestiges ofnbsp;conquest, they may be able, in most districts, tonbsp;explain in detail how each settlement of Saetasnbsp;was established. Wilton seems to have been thenbsp;first and chief centre for the reception of gangsnbsp;of Saetas, and for sending each party on to thenbsp;district to which it had been assigned. The dispersal of Saetas from Wilton would form a verynbsp;interesting and instructive subject for study bynbsp;local antiquaries.

All the difficulties presented by this vast scheme of colonization by settlers with theirnbsp;families, have been obviated by the suggestionsnbsp;in the previous chapter, and notably that chiefnbsp;difficulty of all�namely, how Saxon clans fromnbsp;the interior of the continent of Europe could

have been provided constantly with sufficient marine transport to enable them to fill up suchnbsp;large districts in twenty-one years.

Of no less importance is the suggestion contained in this chapter, as to how these separate gangs of settlers, quite incapable at first of actingnbsp;together, could have been protected from molestation by the armies of the Welsh.

Since we know that this region was filled with settlers at this time, and that, immediately afterwards, Ceawlin had the control of sufficient shipping to bring a large and continuous supply ofnbsp;immigrants to colonize the West Midlands, probably through the ports of Bristol and Gloucester,nbsp;it must be apparent to every inquirer, that therenbsp;must have been, not only a very large scheme ofnbsp;colonization, directed by Ceawlin and his experienced followers, but also that he, by his skilfulnbsp;strategy, contrived to give these settlers adequatenbsp;protection. Since conquest confirmed by colonization had been going on for more than a century, itnbsp;Would indeed be surprising if we did not find thatnbsp;the invaders had introduced some order and systemnbsp;into their methods of using their limited supply ofnbsp;shipping, and also into their methods of embarkation and debarkation of so many colonists, and ofnbsp;their distribution inland. Then when a leader ofnbsp;high training and capacity came to the throne, wenbsp;should expect to find this system of marine transport and colonization developed to its highestnbsp;capacity, and used to the best advantage.

At any rate the wonderful results have to be accounted for, and it does not seem that they havenbsp;ever been fairly grappled with as yet. It is hoped

162 CEAWLIN MAKES THE WANSDYKE

that this attempt to give a reasonable explanation of a very important phase of the conquest may atnbsp;least he a help to other inquirers. At any rate,nbsp;many questions have been raised which demandnbsp;answers. Can they be answered on any othernbsp;lines than those suggested ?

Limpley Stoke near Claverton was evidently made when Ceawlin advanced from Bradford-on-Avon, to take the heights on the south of thenbsp;Avon overlooking Bath. This he probably effectednbsp;with ease, but the movement must have creatednbsp;some perturbation amongst the Welsh in Bath,nbsp;until it was found that he showed no signs ofnbsp;attacking that city, and he probably found meansnbsp;for letting the W elsh know that he had no intention of doing so, but that he intended to adopt thenbsp;Avon as his boundary, or rather a line south of it,nbsp;to be marked by a dyke, with a no-man�s landnbsp;between. Above all, he insisted on completenbsp;separation between his people and the Welsh, asnbsp;had been their custom with many previous dykes.

We now have to follow the line of the Wans-dyke to the sea. In many long lengths it is well marked, in others it is only just traceable, and innbsp;the gaps it is fairly easy to see the line it wouldnbsp;have followed if it had been completed. Thesenbsp;details must be left to local antiquaries.

All we are concerned with is to discover the object Ceawlin had in view in carrying his dykenbsp;so far westward of Bath, and how the dyke fulfilsnbsp;that object.

Ceawlin would have wished to secure a port or landing-place, by means of which he could bringnbsp;in warriors, and settlers, and supplies to this, thenbsp;furthest point of his widely extended frontier;nbsp;and of course we should expect to find the dykenbsp;covering that landing-place, and the approachesnbsp;to it.

At first our thoughts naturally turn to Bristol, until we find that the Wansdyke is traceable somenbsp;miles farther west than that town. And then, ifnbsp;We have not done so before, we begin to realizenbsp;that, at the time we are dealing with, it wouldnbsp;have been impossible for the invaders to have usednbsp;the port of Bristol. Without trained pilots, transports could not be expected to go to and returnnbsp;from Bristol, through some eight or nine miles ofnbsp;the tide-swept gorge of the Avon; and with onenbsp;of its banks in the hands of the enemy.

It was evidently essential for Ceawlin to have a landing-place on the shore of the Severn, andnbsp;We find it at Portishead. The name shows thatnbsp;there was a port there, at the time it was given.nbsp;Covering this port, we find an ancient camp callednbsp;Portbury, which gives its name to one of thenbsp;hundreds of Somersetshire. The Wansdyke isnbsp;Said to be traceable near Portbury, but, howevernbsp;that may be, it certainly seems probable that, ifnbsp;ever the Wansdyke had been completed, it wouldnbsp;have been continued to Portbury.

That the Wansdyke was intended merely to he a boundary line is shown by the fact that somenbsp;fourteen miles of it consisted of a Roman road,nbsp;f hat it was not completed is also evident, therefore something must have suddenly made it

164 CEAWLIN MAKES THE WANSDYKE unnecessary; what that was we shall see clearlynbsp;when we come to the campaign of Deorham, andnbsp;Ceawlin�s advance into the Midlands; and notnbsp;until we understand how that great campaign wasnbsp;begun, shall we fully realize what was Ceawlin�snbsp;ultimate object in making the Wansdyke.

For the present it is sufficient for us to grasp the fact, that the primary object of the Wansdykenbsp;was to make it clear to the Welsh that Ceawlinnbsp;had come to establish himself permanently in anbsp;strong position, guarded by the Avon, and overlooking Bath, and with a small sea-port on his leftnbsp;flank sufficient for his needs. Then by forcing thenbsp;Welsh to make a large dyke for his boundary,nbsp;Ceawlin demonstrated his ascendancy over them,nbsp;and besides, we may be sure that, in every possiblenbsp;manner, he made a display of his constant determination to have his boundary respected.

The position held by Ceawlin thus countered the strong position held by the Welsh along thenbsp;north bank of the Avon, with the fortress of Bathnbsp;covering a bridge over the Avon; and they alsonbsp;had probably another bridge at what was laternbsp;called Brig-stowe or Bristol. These could benbsp;watched with ease. As the English had commandnbsp;of the sea, Ceawlin�s left flank was secure, and asnbsp;for his right flank, Ceawlin knew that the Welshnbsp;would not dare to try to turn it by the opennbsp;country beyond Bathford. If they had done sonbsp;the advantages would have remained with Ceawlin,nbsp;and a pitched battle in the open would have beennbsp;entirely to his liking.

To sum up the main question. We find from numerous vestiges of it, that a boundary dyke was

We know from the relative positions of the Vallum and the ditch, where completed, that thisnbsp;dyke had a victorious nationality on the south, andnbsp;a defeated one on the north of it.

We know that this dyke could not have been begun before the battle of Searobury in 552, andnbsp;that it could not have been continued after thenbsp;battle of Deorham in 577.

It does not seem possible that these two limits (552 to 577) to the period during which thenbsp;Wansdyke must have been made, can ever benbsp;Controverted ; more especially as it is the onlynbsp;period during which it is possible to find anbsp;victorious nationality on the south of the Wansdyke and a defeated nationality on the north ofnbsp;it; and it is the only period during which it couldnbsp;have been called after Woden, the god of thenbsp;English invaders.

These considerations, standing alone, seem to leave no room for doubt as to the origin of thenbsp;Wansdyke; but there are others of hardly lessnbsp;importance.

The Wansdyke, with all its gaps, and with its fourteen miles of Roman road, is a stern factnbsp;that cannot be ignored; any more than thenbsp;English tradition can be ignored that, in spitenbsp;Ilf its unfinished state, it, at one time, constitutednbsp;mie long boundary line.

On facing these facts, the dyke, and the tradition about it, the question that naturallynbsp;irises is. Does the Wansdyke help to explainnbsp;bistory ?

166 CEAWLIN MAKES THE WANSDYKE

The answer is that, not only does the Wans-dyke explain the designs of Ceawlin, and mark the climax of his career, but the history of thisnbsp;period cannot be understood without it.

That the Wansdyke has not been generally recognized as one of the essential factors of thenbsp;conquest, is probably due to the fact that so manynbsp;persons seem to have an ineradicable belief thatnbsp;a long straight dyke has some military value asnbsp;a defence for the people on the rampart side of it.nbsp;As long as some lingering trace of this false notionnbsp;remains, it is difficult to inculcate true ideas intonbsp;minds thus affected, it is difficult to bring themnbsp;to facts.

Of course it is easy to prove logically that a long straight dyke might have a defensive value;nbsp;and in fact, in that land of paradoxes, China, wenbsp;have an instance in the Great Wall, whose massivenbsp;and passive resistance to the inroads of Tartars,nbsp;appears to have been successful for centuries.

The point is, however, that if we start on the assumption that Ceawlin had the Wansdykenbsp;made in order to give some direct increase ofnbsp;security to the settlements of his people, wenbsp;switch ourselves into a false line of reasoning.nbsp;That one of the final results of the Wansdyke maynbsp;have been to increase the security of the settlersnbsp;of the victors on the south side, may be admittednbsp;without question. It may even be admitted thatnbsp;the vast size of parts of the Wansdyke may havenbsp;given some additional security to dwellers protected by those parts, at least it served to protectnbsp;them to some extent from raids.

WANSDYKE MERELY A BOUNDARY 167

that the size of the Wansdyke may have given, Would at once be converted into an element ofnbsp;danger, from the moment it was trusted in to thenbsp;extent of neglecting the real and true systemnbsp;of frontier protection. That of course was tonbsp;promptly retaliate and severely punish the slightestnbsp;infraction of this artificially marked boundary.nbsp;In fact, unless the immigrant settlers up to thenbsp;Roman road were as safe as those north ofnbsp;Devizes, the Wansdyke was a failure, if notnbsp;indeed a farce. The chief object in making thenbsp;Wansdyke so large in places, could only havenbsp;been to impress the vanquished with the powernbsp;of their conquerors.

The dedication of the line of the Wansdyke, whether marked by a greater or smaller dyke, ornbsp;by a road, or perhaps in places, and temporarily,nbsp;by a mere furrow, to Woden the god of thenbsp;English invaders, explains the spirit in which thenbsp;Wansdyke was made, and maintained as long asnbsp;it was a going concern, and a real boundary line.nbsp;The Wansdyke was a sacred line, which it wasnbsp;Sacrilege for any Welshman to cross.

It seems probable that some kind of slight and fragile fence followed the whole line of thenbsp;Wansdyke ; not intended as a serious obstacle,nbsp;but merely to ensure that any one crossing itnbsp;should leave a track. Then for weeks and perhapsnbsp;months together, no Welshman would ever seenbsp;anything but a daily boundary-rider or two ; butnbsp;from bitter experience they would know the forcenbsp;that those solitary riders represented, and so thatnbsp;boundary would be respected. By such reasonablenbsp;surmises we are enabled to realize what a valuable

168 CEAWLIN MAKES THE WANSDYKE factor in the process of conquest the Wansdykenbsp;may have been made, under the guidance of suchnbsp;a ruthless and capable leader as Ceawlin. It hasnbsp;been pointed out that it is practically certain thatnbsp;the Welsh would not have been able to secure thenbsp;services of traitors as spies from any of the ranksnbsp;of the invaders ; whereas, owing to the mixednbsp;character of the population of Britain, it is quitenbsp;likely that Ceawlin could easily get informationnbsp;as to the movements of the Welsh. With regardnbsp;to the latter we are not concerned�but the factnbsp;that Ceawlin possessed the fullest confidence thatnbsp;no traitors could be found amongst his followers,nbsp;must have added enormously to the value of thenbsp;Wansdyke; for it thus became an impenetrablenbsp;screen, behind which he could dispose his forces,nbsp;and distribute his settlers, without the Welshnbsp;having the slightest knowledge of what was goingnbsp;on. We shall see later how Ceawlin made use ofnbsp;this valuable power.

The topographical and archaeological details of the Wansdyke, and the inductions to be derivednbsp;from them, are less likely to appeal to historiansnbsp;than to archeologists, whose verdict they willnbsp;await. It has been necessary, however, to makenbsp;this rough sketch of them, to challenge criticism,nbsp;and to arouse discussion at archeological meetings.

Historians will want a larger view, and to know what part the Wansdyke played in history,nbsp;and whether history is helped, or confused, by thenbsp;explanation of the Wansdyke here offered.

Well, at any rate the Wansdyke fills a very important gap in the dykes and boundary ditchesnbsp;of England.

It has been already shown how the bringing in of such vast numbers of settlers in twenty-onenbsp;years, as those represented by the Dorsaetas, thenbsp;Wilton Saetas, and the greater part of the Somer-saetas, would have been impossible unless Ceawlinnbsp;with his army had taken up the very position stillnbsp;marked by the Wansdyke.

Though the Somersaetas then probably extended only as far westwards as the Mendips, and as far as a line drawn from Wells to Bridport, yetnbsp;the districts between this line and the Hampshirenbsp;Avon, bounded on the north by the Wansdykenbsp;and on the south by the sea, constitute a largenbsp;region to have been settled up in so short a time.nbsp;That this region was settled up at this time, andnbsp;at no other, is proved by two facts.

One, that since it was filled only with settlers, this is the only time during which we can explainnbsp;how those settlers were protected from beingnbsp;swept away by Welsh armies.

The other, that this is the only time during ^hich it is possible to account for the large amountnbsp;of naval transport that must have been required tonbsp;bring such hosts of settlers with their families.

Directly Ceawlin had begun his northward Campaign with the victory of Deorham, ships thatnbsp;had hitherto been bringing settlers to Poole, andnbsp;Weymouth, and Portishead, would all be wantednbsp;f^o land their charges at Bristol, and Gloucester,nbsp;�^nd on the banks of the Severn, to colonize thenbsp;Severn Valley.

It is inconceivable that Ceawlin would have begun his great campaign of Deorham before henbsp;had so settled up the country in his rear that the

settlers would be strong enough to resist any attacks that the Welsh of Cornwall might make.nbsp;Having taken Bath, Cirencester, and Gloucester,nbsp;Ceawlin could himself protect the settlers in Westnbsp;Wessex from attacks coming from Wales.

Enough has been said to prove that Ceawlin made the Wansdyke, and gave it its name, and tonbsp;explain why he made it, and how he used it.

So far only Ceawlin�s primary object in making the Wansdyke has been explained. His ultimatenbsp;object is reserved for the next chapter.

� Here Ceawlin and Cutha, Ceawlin�s brother, fought against Ethelbert and drove him intonbsp;Kent; and they killed two aldormen at Wib-bandun, Oslaf and Cnebba.�

We learn from previous entries that Ethelbert Was born in 552 and succeeded to the Kingdom ofnbsp;Kent in 565, therefore he could only have beennbsp;thirteen years old when he succeeded to the throne,nbsp;and sixteen when he was defeated by Ceawlin andnbsp;driven back to Kent. We can easily detect in thisnbsp;unwise action of this boy king the jealousy of thenbsp;rising power of Wessex, that had long beennbsp;smouldering in Kent, The blame must evidentlynbsp;be put on his two evil counsellors, Oslaf andnbsp;Cnebba, who paid for this first disloyalty to thenbsp;leader of the conquest with their lives.

The lesson seems to have lasted with Ethelbert throughout his long reign, for although he, laternbsp;on, claimed the Bretwaldaship, he yielded it tonbsp;Redwald of East Anglia, without submitting itnbsp;to the test of battle. Perhaps Christianity had bynbsp;that time taught Ethelbert to seek somethingnbsp;higher than a worldly honour, that could only benbsp;retained at the cost of human lives.

With the stern Woden-worshipper Ceawlin the case was far different. He had been the leadernbsp;of the conquest and the colonization of Britain fornbsp;ten or twelve years, and he could not for a momentnbsp;brook this challenge to his supreme authority.

The precedent of the primacy of Kent, dating back to the times of Hengist and Aesc, and evennbsp;then, as regards the invasion, under the solenbsp;military command of Aella the first Bretwalda,nbsp;could not be allowed to reassert itself, afternbsp;having been fifty years in abeyance, or to call innbsp;question the claim of the actual leader of thenbsp;invasion to the obedience of all.

This stern action on the part of Ceawlin was certainly justifiable, as in fact it was justified bynbsp;its results, for without this reassertion of the unitynbsp;of all the invaders in the south of Britain, Ceawlinnbsp;could not possibly have carried out his greatnbsp;campaign in the West Midlands.

This correction by Ceawlin, of Ethelbert�s ill-advised attempt to assert his independence, is very instructive, and worthy of further consideration,nbsp;since it establishes the fact that the invaders ofnbsp;southern Britain were united, and looked uponnbsp;unity of command as essential to their success, atnbsp;least until the triumphal campaigns of Ceawlin innbsp;the West Midlands had put a different complexionnbsp;on the question. The constant guarding of suchnbsp;a frontier as that then won by Ceawlin becamenbsp;impossible; and since he had so utterly crushednbsp;the Welsh, for the time being, became unnecessary. Thus it came about that the widely scatterednbsp;settlers looked to the nearest king for protection,nbsp;and what is known as the Heptarchy began.

CEAWLIN ASSERTS HIS RULE 173

It is clearly evident that a very different state of affairs to that of Heptarchy prevailed whennbsp;Ceawlin marched from Wessex to Wimbledon.nbsp;By that time Ceawlin must have established hisnbsp;frontier, and marked it with the Wansdyke, andnbsp;behind it a constant influx of settlers was pouringnbsp;in. If the invasion of Wessex had been separatenbsp;from that of Kent and of the Thames Valley, andnbsp;conducted by a separate gang of freebooters, whynbsp;should the King of Wessex trouble himself aboutnbsp;the doings of a youthful king in Kent ?

It is evident that Ceawlin took a very different view of Ethelbert�s actions, and was determinednbsp;that the unity of the invaders, which had existednbsp;from the beginning, should not be broken up justnbsp;as he was about to extend his conquests.

Then it is quite evident that Ceawlin had taken care to keep himself informed as to Ethelbert�s doings, and was fully prepared to nip hisnbsp;insubordination in the bud, as he did at Wimbledon.nbsp;Ceawlin was of the same royal family as Ethel-bert, and his proved capacity as a leader and innbsp;the prime of life, constituted a claim to commandnbsp;which had always been recognized by his race.nbsp;Then the unity of the invaders which was thusnbsp;established by Ceawlin, was but a continuation ofnbsp;their pristine unity under Aella the first Bret-Walda; although it seems to have been dormantnbsp;during the reigns of Cerdic and Cynric, sincenbsp;there was no occasion then for any special callsnbsp;upon Kent.

London and Kent was wanted in the Solent. Then every immigrant must be diverted from thenbsp;ports of Essex to the ports of Wessex. The tradenbsp;of London was suffering, the people of Kent werenbsp;grumbling. Many persons beside Ethelbert hadnbsp;to be reminded of the lessons first taught by thenbsp;first Bretwalda.

This brings us to the probable conclusion of this visit of Ceawlin to the Thames Valley. Itnbsp;seems certain that Ceawlin must have chosen thisnbsp;auspicious moment to proclaim himself, and havenbsp;himself acclaimed, as the second Bretwalda. Thisnbsp;he probably did either at Runnymede or atnbsp;Kingston. Perhaps the latter is the more likelynbsp;place, since it is so close to Wimbledon, and as itnbsp;was so often the coronation place of the Anglo-Saxon Kings, it seems likely that Hengist andnbsp;Aesc had been crowned there. At any rate itnbsp;was a place of glorious associations. It was perhaps to prevent Ethelbert proceeding to Kingston,nbsp;to be crowned there as King of all the English,nbsp;that Ceawlin fought him at Wimbledon.

Although by his later career of conquest Ceawlin seems to have become so overbearing asnbsp;to have been cast out by the Angles, as we shallnbsp;see later, we can but recognize in his assumptionnbsp;of the Bretwaldaship an appeal to the highernbsp;aspirations of all the invaders, and to the gloriousnbsp;traditions of those living in the Thames Valleynbsp;whom he had come to rule.

That a descendant of Woden should thus claim a title first won by a Saxon Heretoga, was an actnbsp;of deference to the memory of Aella King of thenbsp;South Saxons; and one eminently acceptable to

CUTHWULF

a people whose forefathers, owing to their unity under Aella�s leadership, had won lands, on whichnbsp;they had been settled in peace for nearly anbsp;century.

It seems quite evident that the aspiration for unity of the English nation throughout Britain,nbsp;was never far from the thoughts of the invaders;nbsp;and any king who by his deeds had brought themnbsp;nearer to its fulfilment, was certainly to arouse it,nbsp;and to be hailed as a wielder of Britain. Duenbsp;credit, however, should be given to Ceawlin fornbsp;having been the first to make an appeal to thisnbsp;glorious tradition.

Ceawlin seems to have returned very soon to Wessex, and to have left affairs in the Thamesnbsp;Valley in charge of his brother Cuthwulf; becausenbsp;in the year 571, we learn from the Chronicle,nbsp;that Cuthwulf fought against the Britons atnbsp;Bedford, and took four towns, Lenbury, Aylesbury,nbsp;Bensington, and Eynsham ; and the same yearnbsp;Cuthwulf died. The old forms of the names ofnbsp;these towns are of course given in the Chronicle,nbsp;but there can be no doubt that they have beennbsp;correctly identified.

A word seems necessary on the name � Cuthwulf.� It, and also the name � Cuthwine,� seem to have been favourite names in Ceawlin�s branchnbsp;of the great family of Woden. Unfortunatelynbsp;they both appear to have had the same diminutivenbsp;form � Cutha,� which is liable to cause confusion.nbsp;There seems no doubt, however, that Ceawlin hadnbsp;a brother named Cuthwulf, and a son namednbsp;Cuthwine or Cuthwulf, and that at times they arenbsp;both spoken of as Cutha.

176 THE CAMPAIGN OF DEORHAM

The Chronicle entry for the year 571 presents a very difficult enigma. We should hardly havenbsp;expected to find Britons living so near the Thamesnbsp;Valley, even as Aylesbury, and certainly not innbsp;towns with English names. The main feet thatnbsp;this Chronicle entry seems to bear witness to is,nbsp;that in the Vale of Aylesbury the English andnbsp;Welsh were on friendly terms, and were beginningnbsp;to amalgamate, and that the four towns mentionednbsp;had been allowed to assume a Welsh characternbsp;although they had English names.

If so, then Cuthwulf would be sure to find that information about Ceawlin�s doings was beginning to leak through to the Welsh ; andnbsp;possibly even that some minor disaster had beennbsp;brought about through this leakage of information.

However this may have been, there can be no doubt that if Ceawlin made the Wansdyke fornbsp;the purposes explained, he would be certain notnbsp;to permit any less drastic treatment of the Welshnbsp;on any part of his widely extended frontier, andnbsp;so doubtless this is why Cuthwulf appears to havenbsp;driven the Welsh out of the Vale of Aylesbury,nbsp;and put a stop to all dealings with them, andnbsp;perhaps he sent many prisoners to make thenbsp;Wansdyke. If this explanation is sound, it enablesnbsp;us to understand the importance that Ceawlinnbsp;attached to his having sole command of all thenbsp;invaders, before he began preparations for hisnbsp;great advance northwards.

The death of his trusted brother Cuthwulf must have been a great blow to Ceawlin, and itnbsp;was perhaps partly due to his loss that we find

And yet this long delay may be fully accounted for otherwise, if we consider the fact that Ceawlinnbsp;had to bring in enough settlers, not only to holdnbsp;and cultivate the lands south of the Wansdyke,nbsp;but as many more as could be rushed in duringnbsp;the last year to hold the lands, and gather thenbsp;harvest left by the Welsh on the Cots wolds, whichnbsp;he intended to take. Moreover, we shall see thatnbsp;during the year of Deorham the bulk of Ceawlin�snbsp;fleet of transports would be required for the armynbsp;he intended to bring to Bristol, and for its supply,

An explanation of the conquest of Britain by the English must be a worthless one, if it ignoresnbsp;the great question of marine transport, and if itnbsp;fails at least to suggest the probable ports of embarkation and debarkation. It must be borne innbsp;mind that the Angles had left the Elbe manynbsp;years before the time we are dealing with, and sonbsp;since that river could no longer be safe for Anglenbsp;shipping and shipbuilding, and since so manynbsp;ships could not possibly find employment innbsp;coastal trade in the North of Britain, the Anglesnbsp;are certain to have transferred many of their shipsnbsp;to the southern ports of Britain. By such reasonable suggestions we are able to account for thenbsp;large amount of shipping that Ceawlin had undernbsp;his control. Then by this time a steady annualnbsp;migration of limited numbers of Saxons, from thenbsp;interior of the continent to the mouths of thenbsp;Rhine, and to the ports of Gaul, must have beennbsp;instituted. The Franks and other races wouldnbsp;have been little likely to interfere with peaceable

178 THE CAMPAIGN OF DEORHAM

emigrants, who only wanted to help to conquer an island which had once been a Roman province.

We know that Picardy is full of Saxon place-names, especially those ending in � ham � or � home,� so this district must have been peoplednbsp;with Saxons about this time, and as they left,nbsp;fresh emigrants from Germany could migratenbsp;here. Then to ferry them across the Channel andnbsp;to London, presents no great difficulties.

The colonization of Wessex and the West Midlands raises, however, further questions ofnbsp;great importance which must be faced if we arenbsp;�ver to make a serious attempt to explain thenbsp;conquest of Britain by the English.

How were these emigrants from inland districts induced to sail down Channel to the Solent, andnbsp;to the ports of Dorsetshire, and even round Land�snbsp;End to the Severn ? It would take too long tonbsp;discuss this question in all its details, but no onenbsp;can doubt that this was the line that emigrationnbsp;took, after the Thames Valley had been filled. Itnbsp;was the reasonable and sensible line, and it isnbsp;for those who think that our forefathers werenbsp;wanting in common sense to urge the contrary.nbsp;The answer presents no difficulties to those whonbsp;believe that the conquest of Southern Britainnbsp;was united under English leadership. Can anynbsp;other explanation be given? No version of thenbsp;conquest can be worthy of respect that shirks thenbsp;question of marine transport and how it was provided, controlled, and maintained.

Before we begin to deal with the campaign of Deorham, it would be well to take stock of the situation created by the strategical genius of Ceawlin.

The five years after the battle at Bedford in 571 were the lull before the storm, which brokenbsp;in all its fury with the lightning flash of Deorham.nbsp;Up to that moment warfare may be said to havenbsp;been static in its character, henceforward Ceawlin,nbsp;with deliberate and long-prepared intention, madenbsp;it dynamic.

A system of piecemeal conquest, confirmed by carefully guarded settlements, had been instituted by Aella; and this, after one lapse, had beennbsp;confirmed by Cerdic and Cynric, and then hadnbsp;been developed up to its highest capacity bynbsp;Ceawlin.

Ceawlin had a strategic vision that ranks him with his great teacher Aella, and therefore withnbsp;the greatest war-leaders known to history. Moreover, Ceawlin�s capacity had been developed by thenbsp;most perfect practical training, in all the branchesnbsp;of his profession as a commander for a transmarinenbsp;invasion.

By many reconnaissances by land and sea (they may be called marauding expeditions if preferred,nbsp;and if the word reconnaissance sounds too modern),nbsp;Ceawlin had acquired a complete knowledge ofnbsp;the whole of Britain, generally speaking, and evennbsp;up to the littoral invaded by the Angles ; and anbsp;special knowledge of the region he was about tonbsp;invade.

Above all, Ceawlin had kept himself informed as to the doings of the Angles, and he knew thatnbsp;their advance into the East Midlands would makenbsp;it safe for him to do things in the W est Midlands,nbsp;which would have been impossible without hisnbsp;right flank having been thus protected.

180 THE CAMPAIGN OF DEORHAM

Ceawlin knew that Aella�s system of specially guarded settlements had had its day, and mustnbsp;cease; and had to be changed to open warfare ofnbsp;such a crushing character that henceforwardnbsp;settlements, if properly constituted and preparednbsp;for local resistance until an army could come tonbsp;their support, would be able to defend themselvesnbsp;against the Welsh thus weakened. Ceawlin knewnbsp;how much depended on the complete success andnbsp;the absolutely crushing effect of his opening campaign. With that end in view he quietly completed all his preparations behind the Wansdykenbsp;before he struck.

Ceawlin�s selection of the year 577 to begin his career of conquest may have been influencednbsp;by his knowledge that the Angles intended tonbsp;make a great advance in the north, perhaps intonbsp;Nottinghamshire, or even perhaps as far as Derbyshire, as this would be certain to draw away allnbsp;the forces of the Welsh in North Wales andnbsp;Shropshire. It is necessary to use modern namesnbsp;to make the position of the invaders clear.

The actual date on which he struck would be decided by local circumstances, but it would benbsp;certain to be as early in the campaign season asnbsp;possible, but not before the days had begun tonbsp;lengthen out. Probably May would be the monthnbsp;chosen.

Then the final fixture of the date would be left until it was decided by the arrival of a fleetnbsp;filled with an army of chosen warriors at Portishead.

There is local evidence of the exact course adopted by Ceawlin in his march on Deorham,nbsp;but before giving it it will be well to realize

exactly what Ceawlin�s objective was, so far as his first campaigning season was concerned. It cannbsp;be stated very briefly.

The entry in the Chronicle for the year 577 confirms what we should have expected. It states,nbsp;� Here Cuthwin and Ceawlin fought against thenbsp;Britons, and they slew three Kings, Coinmail,nbsp;Condidan, and Jarinmail, at a place which is callednbsp;Deorham, and took three cities from them, Gloucester and Cirencester and Bath.�

These captured towns fairly define the position that Ceawlin intended to take up and colonize innbsp;the first campaigning season ; but there is no doubtnbsp;that he would push on further and take the wholenbsp;of the Cotswolds, and as far as Stow-on-the-Wold,nbsp;where he would be joined by a contingent fromnbsp;Oxford. Then the rest of the season would benbsp;occupied in driving out the Welsh south of a line,nbsp;say, from Tewkesbury to Oxford, and bringing innbsp;the many settlers that were waiting for homes, somenbsp;from Bristol and Bath, and more from the Thamesnbsp;Valley. Although Ceawlin had further schemesnbsp;in his mind for future years, it must have beennbsp;essential to get this valuable and easily guardednbsp;district, now that there were English ships innbsp;the Severn to protect it, completely settled up first.

Ceawlin�s first object must have been to take the two bridges over the Avon at Bath andnbsp;Bristol. Two place-names confirm this verynbsp;reasonable conjecture. One is South Stoke nearnbsp;Bath, about which much will have to be said.nbsp;The other is the old form of Bristol, namely, thenbsp;� Brig Stowe � or � Bridge Place.�

�82 THE CAMPAIGN OF DEORHAM yards from the wall of the Roman city. It hadnbsp;probably not been destroyed, or only partially so,nbsp;and could easily be repaired, knowing, as thenbsp;invaders must have done, the exact length ofnbsp;beams required.

At Bristol there must have been the remains of a Roman bridge. But however that may havenbsp;been, there can be no question that the invadersnbsp;either made or repaired a bridge there, since thenbsp;name Brig Stowe could only have been given atnbsp;this time.

Since Ceawlin must have been compelled to time his opening attack on the Welsh by thenbsp;arrival of his fleet at Bristol, it will be best tonbsp;begin with that port.

The arrival of Ceawlin�s fleet at Portishead need not have occasioned any alarm amongst thenbsp;Welsh, since a fleet must have come there everynbsp;summer, only on this; occasion it probably arrivednbsp;earlier than usual. Then the Welsh would hardlynbsp;detect that it was filled with warriors and notnbsp;immigrants. Some of these would be landed atnbsp;Portishead, and ships thus released would be sentnbsp;to patrol the Severn, and prevent the crossing ofnbsp;any Welsh forces from South Wales.

The rest of the fleet would proceed up the Avon with the next tide and would begin to landnbsp;men and stores at the Stowe by the bridge.nbsp;Suitable timber had been brought, and the bridgenbsp;was either promptly repaired or constructed.nbsp;Then a force, that had been waiting behind thenbsp;Wansdyke, would join their friends. It is likelynbsp;that Ceawlin himself attended these operations,nbsp;and then rode ofiF to South Stoke.

The Welsh must by this time have become thoroughly alarmed, and the lighting of beacon-fires to call their friends from across the Severnnbsp;probably showed it.

But it was too late. Moreover, their attention was drawn to Bristol, and they probably littlenbsp;suspected the treacherous war-stroke that wasnbsp;being prepared for them at Bath.

It must have often puzzled soldiers who have studied the battle of Deorham, under the influence of the vague but hitherto orthodox versionnbsp;of the conquest, how Ceawlin would have venturednbsp;to fight a pitched battle at Deorham, with anbsp;fortress-town like Bath, covering a bridge overnbsp;the Avon, in his rear.

Certainly the brief entry in the Chronicle implies that it was in consequence of the victory of Deorham that Bath fell. Perhaps the chroniclernbsp;knew no better. But, even if he did, taking thisnbsp;brief annal as a whole, the statement does, in anbsp;general way, convey the truth, although Ceawlinnbsp;certainly must have taken Bath a day or twonbsp;before the battle. That Bath was taken duringnbsp;the Deorham campaign was all that concernednbsp;the chronicler.

South Stoke is the most remarkable stoke to be found in England, and differs in characternbsp;from all the others. Instead of being placed on anbsp;main road, as, for instance, Radstock on the Fossenbsp;Way, or North Stoke on the Via Julia; or likenbsp;the stokes of the Saetas, the central place in anbsp;valley�South Stoke is stuck into the upper endnbsp;of a deep combe, and the ground towards Bathnbsp;rises from it 140 feet in 300 yards. It is easy

enough to reach South Stoke from the south by deep winding valleys from Bradford-on-Avon, ornbsp;Radstock, or Dunkerton; but northwards it is anbsp;steep climb to reach the high ground above thenbsp;Avon valley with Bath beyond.

Along this high ground, and 700 yards from South Stoke, ran the Wansdyke. This has sincenbsp;been levelled, but traces show that it must havenbsp;been high here.

Only one explanation of this remarkable Stoke seems possible, and it reveals the ultimate objectnbsp;for which Ceawlin made the Wansdyke�namely,nbsp;to make concealed preparations, so as to be ablenbsp;to strike suddenly and powerfully at Bath. Fornbsp;some ten or fifteen years the Welsh had beennbsp;lulled into a sense of peaceful security; they hadnbsp;been taught to dread the coming of the Angles,nbsp;more than that of the Saxons, and that the Wansdyke was to be the permanent boundary of thenbsp;latter. Then their attention was suddenly distracted by the landing of a force at Bristol. Ifnbsp;such were their thoughts over-night, the morningnbsp;revealed the designs of their treacherous foes in allnbsp;their ferocity and cunning.

The remarkable position of South Stoke leads us to suppose that enough supplies had beennbsp;collected there to keep two or three thousand mennbsp;for a fortnight or so, whilst they were waiting thenbsp;arrival of the fleet at Portishead. Perhaps therenbsp;may have been more men, but at least thatnbsp;number would be required to take the bridge,nbsp;and if possible to take Bath by surprise, ifnbsp;not by storm. The invaders must have knownnbsp;with fair accuracy the strength of the garrison

Ceawlin is certain to have retained the right to fish in the Avon, and so his men would havenbsp;often netted salmon under the old Roman bridge,nbsp;and so would know the exact dimensions of thenbsp;timbers required if it had to be repaired. Moreover, these men would act as guides, and wouldnbsp;have boats on the river. Besides this, the no-nian�s land between the Wansdyke and the Avonnbsp;Was doubtless often patrolled by Ceawlin�s men.nbsp;As these practices would have been going onnbsp;regularly for many years they would raise nonbsp;alarm, and Ceawlin had only to substitute thenbsp;members of the patrol, by leaders of his army, tonbsp;take them to Beechen Cliff looking right into Bath.nbsp;Every care would be taken that nothing unusualnbsp;should excite alarm amongst the garrison of Bath.

By such reasonable conjectures, and the sterling evidence of South Stoke, a stoke that could hardlynbsp;have been made for any other purpose than thatnbsp;indicated, we are able to surmount the difficultynbsp;felt by all soldiers, as to how Ceawlin could havenbsp;Ventured to fight a pitched battle at Deorhamnbsp;with a fortress, covering a bridge, in his rear. Henbsp;did nothing of the kind, but took Bath first.

For the rest, the line of action adopted is easily imagined. The force at South Stoke could havenbsp;been assembled behind the Wansdyke by daylight.nbsp;Then when darkness came they would be quietlynbsp;marched, each gang of warriors led by a guide tonbsp;Its own post. A few light punts may have beennbsp;Carried down to assist in the crossing of the Avon,nbsp;and besides, there were the boats of the Saxon

186 THE CAMPAIGN OF DEORHAM

fishermen. The bridge would be easily secured and repaired, and before daylight the whole armynbsp;would be against the walls of Bath. Scaling-ladders would be at once rushed up to the selectednbsp;places, and the invaders would probably overwhelmnbsp;the unprepared garrison with their first rush.

As soon as Bath had been taken, Lansdown Ridge would be occupied, and the main body ofnbsp;Ceawlin�s right wing would begin its march tonbsp;North Stoke'on the Via Julia, there to be joinednbsp;by his left wing from Bristol.

The large army of trained warriors which Ceawlin had now assembled for the first time, hadnbsp;probably already been assigned their places in thenbsp;line of battle; and yet we may well suppose thatnbsp;Ceawlin spent a few days at North Stoke, andnbsp;simulated weakness, since the Welsh could notnbsp;yet have learned his overpowering strength; andnbsp;his object must have been to allow them to drawnbsp;together for a pitched battle, so that he mightnbsp;deal them a crushing blow. If so, Ceawlin gotnbsp;what he wanted.

The Welsh doubtless kept a force in constant readiness on the Cotswolds, with centres atnbsp;Gloucester (Glevum) and Cirencester (Corineum).nbsp;Perhaps the fall of Bath was as yet unknown tonbsp;them, and their wish would be to relieve it. Atnbsp;any rate, the Welsh would wish to strike at once,nbsp;and before Ceawlin could obtain further reinforcements. However this may have been, we knownbsp;that the Welsh did advance to within five milesnbsp;of North Stoke, and took up a position at Deorham,nbsp;now Dyrham Park, seven miles north of Bath.nbsp;The result also we know.

AFTER THE BATTLE

The fact that Ceawlin was able to kill the three leaders of the Welsh seems to show that henbsp;Was able to detach part of his highly trained andnbsp;powerful army, and get in rear of the Welsh, andnbsp;cut off their retreat. However this may havenbsp;been, Ceawlin�s victory was complete, andnbsp;Gloucester and Cirencester quickly fell to hisnbsp;arms, and the Welsh in their farms and settlements to the south-east were cut off from Wales,nbsp;and the advance of a further force from the neighbourhood of Oxford to Stow-on-the-Wold, probably had the effect of completely surroundingnbsp;them. We can only surmise what happened tonbsp;men of fighting age, but the rest were probablynbsp;put across the Severn, to become a burden tonbsp;their friends.

It seems probable that a certain number of men would be retained, to help to gather thenbsp;harvest later on, and to distribute the largenbsp;herds of cattle which must have been taken,nbsp;amongst the settlers who came pouring in duringnbsp;the summer. Then, in the following year, Ceawlinnbsp;required the forced labour of these capable earth-movers to make a fortress for him, as will be seennbsp;later on.

In dealing with the actions of a highly trained strategist like Ceawlin, we must always take thenbsp;largest view, for it is only by thus entering into hisnbsp;mind that we can explain his actions.

The question of marine transport must never be neglected. The fleet at Bristol was probablynbsp;detained for a few days, to revictual and to benbsp;rewarded with a share of the spoils, the very bestnbsp;advertisement of victory that they could take back

188 THE CAMPAIGN OF DEORHAM

to continental ports. To these the fleet of transports doubtless proceeded at once, to bring another consignment of immigrants, to find homes readynbsp;for them before the winter set in.

In this way immigration probably went on merrily for the next three or four years, eachnbsp;vessel doing two voyages to the Severn, andnbsp;perhaps a third to the Thames, before lying upnbsp;for the winter, fl'hen as years went on, andnbsp;Ceawlin neglected Wessex, and devoted his wholenbsp;attention to the Midlands, so soon to becomenbsp;known as Mercia, the transports, with slackeningnbsp;control, and lessening rewards, probably returnednbsp;after a time to trading on their own account, andnbsp;so until the time of Ethelfrith and Edwine, somenbsp;thirty years later, we do not hear of the employment of ships for the purposes of conquest.

Ceawlin is certain to have taken advantage of the Welsh having been so completely crushednbsp;at Deorham, to reconnoitre northwards, with anbsp;view to a campaign in the ensuing year. Thenbsp;only way he could hold his large army togethernbsp;and maintain their discipline was by holding forthnbsp;the prospects of future conquests.

With this object in view Ceawlin probably rode, with a mounted force of some two or threenbsp;hundred men, up the Roman road, the Icknieldnbsp;Street, past Alcester, and at least as far as Wednes-bury. Ceawlin would also be certain to send tonbsp;tell the Angles of his victory, and to prepare themnbsp;for his advance in the ensuing year.

As this work is an effort to explain the conquest of Britain by the English with due regard to the mihtary factors which must have influenced

and moulded the course it took, it is beyond its scope to deal with the multitudinous bits ofnbsp;evidence which archaeology provides, and is addingnbsp;to as time goes on.

In the main archaeology has so far endorsed the military verdict, especially as regards the coursenbsp;the invasion took up the Thames Valley.

Within its own domain the verdict of archaeology must be accepted without question, where it speaks with confidence and certainty about anynbsp;particular find or finds, although its discoveries,nbsp;so far, only yield relative and not positive dates ;nbsp;and although, so far, it appears to be able onlynbsp;to offer vague suggestions as to the sources ofnbsp;supply of any particular object or set of objects.nbsp;It seems evident that at the beginning of thenbsp;invasion, and for long after, the chief sources ofnbsp;supply of jewelry, and also of weapons, must havenbsp;been at the continental ports of embarkation ; andnbsp;that it could only have been after the country hadnbsp;become quite safe, and well settled up, that thenbsp;jewellers and other artificers transferred themselves with their tools, and other requirementsnbsp;of their crafts, to Britain, and then probably onlynbsp;to Kent, or the Thames Valley.

At the ports of embarkation there must have been an annual influx of Saxon families, many ofnbsp;them wealthy; and these would have been gladnbsp;to exchange their heavier goods, for the morenbsp;portable objects of the jewellers� or armourers� arts,nbsp;and the producers of such articles must havenbsp;done a thriving trade, and have received muchnbsp;encouragement.

190 THE CAMPAIGN OF DEORHAM

in mind two factors, affecting the earlier and later dates respectively. Before a given style couldnbsp;have become common enough to suggest a relativenbsp;date at all, it must have been in use for at leastnbsp;a generation, and have been worn by that generation before it could have been deposited in itsnbsp;graves. Thus any particular discovery of a markednbsp;style, if it happened to have been the first of itsnbsp;kind, presented to a great warrior who died a fewnbsp;years afterwards, might have been made quite twonbsp;generations or more before that style becamenbsp;common. However, this consideration does notnbsp;concern us now, except as a general plea fornbsp;reservation of judgment in any particular case.

With regard to discoveries made in localities which we know were not brought under the powernbsp;of the invaders until quite a late date, it is quitenbsp;evident that we need not be surprised to find innbsp;such localities, articles, especially if they consist ofnbsp;jewelry, which are characteristic of a much earliernbsp;period, since they may have been treasured heirlooms for generations.

Only one such discovery can be dealt with here, but it is a remarkable and an important one,nbsp;and fairly typical of the archEcological difficultiesnbsp;which vanish directly we realize the united character of the invasion of Britain by the English,nbsp;and that all three branches of the race. Angles,nbsp;Saxons, and Jutes, played their parts in the conquest of Wessex�the Angles chiefly as leadersnbsp;under Angle kings, the Saxons both as settlersnbsp;and warriors, and the Jutes chiefly as seamen.

It is evident, therefore, that we need not be surprised if we find relics characteristic of each of

The particular discovery alluded to is one made about 1847 at Fairford, which is only some eightnbsp;or nine miles east of Cirencester; it is fullynbsp;described in Professor Baldwin Brown�s � Thenbsp;Arts in Early England.�

It consisted of a cemetery with more than 140 graves, in which a very large number of articlesnbsp;were discovered. Some of these articles were ofnbsp;later date, but the point we have to considernbsp;is, that it is the verdict of competent archaso-logists that a large proportion of them are ofnbsp;patterns characteristic of a much earlier periodnbsp;than 577, the year in which Cirencester was takennbsp;by Ceawlin, and it is rightly argued that Saxonnbsp;immigrants could not have settled within tennbsp;miles of Cirencester many years before Ceawlinnbsp;took it. But why should they? The idea thatnbsp;archseology proves that certain families of invadersnbsp;settled at Fairford before the year 577 is simplynbsp;based upon the fallacious but fashionable theory,nbsp;that the invaders came in independent familynbsp;parties. These are supposed to have dated themselves by their purchases of jewelry and othernbsp;articles, on their way to Britain, and then to havenbsp;promptly dumped themselves into those districtsnbsp;where we find a certain style of ornament predominant. The military version of the conquestnbsp;puts a very different complexion on this notnbsp;unimportant question.

It explains why certain districts were oecupied first, conclusions since confirmed by archaeology.

192 THE CAMPAIGN OF DEORHAM

until the time of Ceawlin, the invaders of southern Britain were united at all times under one leader,nbsp;by whom they were directed to their settlements,nbsp;and protected after they had settled.

It follows of course that, as far as possible, immigrants of one branch of the race would benbsp;kept together, and sent to the same districts.nbsp;These settlers would have to pass through thenbsp;same ports of embarkation, and so would be likelynbsp;to fit themselves out with the same ornamentsnbsp;and other light goods. Thus it has come aboutnbsp;that archeeologists have been able to associatenbsp;certain types of ornaments, etc., with the Jutes, ornbsp;the Saxons, or the Angles, and to give, provisionally, certain relative dates to this or that type ofnbsp;ornament.

The military version of the conquest, however, leads us to suppose that this simple distribution of settlers would not work out to a simple sort of perfection. In practice things never do,nbsp;and we can never attain to more than a generalnbsp;approximation. We begin to realize that largenbsp;classes of the wealthier and more ambitious, andnbsp;more adventurous, of the invaders, would attachnbsp;themselves to the leading king of their race, andnbsp;would not be content to settle down in agriculturalnbsp;communities in the south, as long as there werenbsp;the rich Midlands waiting for conquest. Yetnbsp;these classes would have come over with theirnbsp;fellows, and would presumably have dated themselves by buying on their way the same types ofnbsp;ornaments. Some of these would, of course, benbsp;deposited in southern graves as generations passednbsp;away; but the rest may have been carried at least

ARCHiEOLOGY

as far as such places as Fairford, and it will not be surprising if ornaments of these earlier types arenbsp;discovered much further north.*

The point to be noted is, that invaders passing northwards through Wessex would have had few,nbsp;if any, opportunities of replenishing their suppliesnbsp;of early-dated ornaments with those of later dates ;nbsp;and so their graves, when found, would be mistakenly given a much earlier relative date thannbsp;Was their due.

The Fairford find seems to corrobrate the idea that many of Ceawlin�s veterans clung to theirnbsp;profession as warriors until, after they had tastednbsp;the � Certaminis gaudia � at Deorham, they settlednbsp;down around Cirencester. If there is any truthnbsp;in this view, the Fairford find with its early-datednbsp;ornaments is fully accounted for.

* This was written before the remarkable discovery made at Bidford was known to the writer.

The effects of Ceawlin�s great victory at Deorham must have been felt far and wide throughoutnbsp;Britain.

The Angles probably realized them in the relaxation of Welsh resistance, as Welsh forces,nbsp;drawn from Cheshire, and Shropshire, and Northnbsp;Wales, were recalled to defend their threatenednbsp;homes.

The career of Ceawlin between Deorham 577, and his death in 593, presents a very difficult problem.nbsp;If it is ever to be solved, as it probably will be somenbsp;day, it can only be by the persistent work of investigators who have considerable knowledge ofnbsp;the region that was undoubtedly first overrun, ifnbsp;not indeed finally eonquered, by Ceawlin. For thenbsp;present all that can be offered are reasonable suggestions as to the general principles of Ceawlin�snbsp;strategy, and as to the probable line that hisnbsp;conquests took. It will be found that there arenbsp;many facts to guide us. These will, for the mostnbsp;part, be dealt with as their place in the story isnbsp;reached; but there are certain general facts givingnbsp;us the limitations of Ceawlin�s works, both in timenbsp;and space, which must be dealt with first, but beforenbsp;giving these it will be best to give the Annals from

the Chronicle, which give us almost all the literary evidence we possess about the later career ofnbsp;Ceawlin.

584, Here Ceawlin and Cutha fought against the Britons at the place which is called Fethanleag,nbsp;and Cutha was slain; and Ceawlin took manynbsp;villages and spoils innumerable and in wrathnbsp;returned to his own.

592. nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;Here was a great slaughter at Woddes-beorg (or Wodnesbeorg) and Ceawlin was expelled.

593. nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;Here Ceawlin and Cwicklem and Cridanbsp;perished; and Ethelfrith succeeded to the kingdomnbsp;amongst the Northumbrians.

597. Here Ceolwulf began to reign amongst the West-Saxons ; and he fought and won incessantly against either the race of the Angles, or thenbsp;Welsh, or the Piets, or the Scots. He was thenbsp;son of Cutha, the son of Cynric, etc.

Much use will be made of these entries later on; for the present the following preliminarynbsp;remarks are best made here:

It has long been thought that Guest�s suggestion, that Fethanleag may be identified with Faddiley in Cheshire, may be correct. Furthernbsp;evidence will be adduced in support of this view.nbsp;The resemblance of these names is striking althoughnbsp;etymology denies their identity.

The Woddesbeorg mentioned under 592, and called Wodnesbeorg in one copy of the Chronicle,nbsp;has been thought by many antiquaries to benbsp;Wednesbury near Wolverhampton. Very strong,nbsp;if not indeed conclusive, evidence will be adducednbsp;that this identification is correct. In fact, it will

be shown that Woden�s Beorg played as important a part in the second stage of Ceawlin�s conquests,nbsp;as the Woden�s Dyke did in the first.

Furthermore, the great slaughter which took place at Wednesbury will be shown, with a probability that almost amounts to certainty, to havenbsp;been made by the Angles.

The entry about Ceolwulf, under the year 597, is given because it tells us that Ceolwulf foughtnbsp;incessantly against the Angles, and the Welsh, andnbsp;the Piets, and the Scots.

The value of this entry consists in the fact that, at any rate, the chronicler knew that Ceolwulf fought far north of Wessex, and against thenbsp;Angles and the Welsh,

The addition of Piets and Scots is probably due to the chronicler�s ignorance of their country,nbsp;although it is just possible that the Welsh maynbsp;have brought the Piets and Scots by sea to helpnbsp;them.

The main point that the chronicler bears witness to in no uncertain terms is, that Ceolwulfnbsp;fought in what seemed to him the far north, andnbsp;not in Wessex. How this came about will benbsp;explained.

The region of Ceawlin�s final conquests may be roughly defined as all Worcestershire andnbsp;Warwickshire, and the greater part of Herefordshire and of Shropshire and of Staffordshire, tonbsp;within the border of Cheshire. As regards thenbsp;actual limits of these conquests in space and time,^nbsp;The limits of Ceawlin�s conquests to the eastnbsp;cannot be clearly defined, because there is littlenbsp;doubt that the Angles came pouring in latterly,

and assisted him, by helping to colonize the country, and by contingents of warriors, untilnbsp;Ceawlin�s rule became unbearable, and so theynbsp;quarrelled with him, and eventually drove him out.

The limits of Ceawlin�s conquests to the west are fairly defined by a line on the borders ofnbsp;Wales where Welsh place-names cease, and onlynbsp;English ones are found. This place-name line isnbsp;seldom far from the modern boundary of Wales,nbsp;though it never quite coincides with it, except onnbsp;the eastern and northern boundary of the Hundrednbsp;of Maelor, that remarkable bit of Flintshire whichnbsp;juts out some ten miles east of the River Dee; andnbsp;it follows the line of the Dee as far as Farndonnbsp;and Holt. It is evident that, as long as thenbsp;invaders were heathens, and worshippers of Woden,nbsp;they drove out the Welsh, and would have nothingnbsp;to do with them or their place-names; whereasnbsp;we know that after they had become Christians,nbsp;they mingled readily with the Welsh, and usednbsp;their place-names to a very great extent. Fornbsp;instance, the whole of Flintshire, and part ofnbsp;Denbighshire, up to Wat�s Dyke, was conquerednbsp;and occupied by the English, during, or shortlynbsp;before, the time of OfFa, and we find numbers otnbsp;the old Welsh place-names remaining in thesenbsp;districts, though interspersed with English ones.

The most remarkable and sharply defined contrast is presented by the place-names inside Maelor, and those outside to the north and east. Thenbsp;farthest district of Wales to the east still retainsnbsp;its old Welsh place-name �II y Coed,� thoughnbsp;now slightly Anglicized into � Iscoyd,� and therenbsp;are many other Welsh place-names in that parish.

Outside it, in Cheshire and Shropshire, there are none. The only possible explanation of thisnbsp;contrast is, that whereas Cheshire and Shropshirenbsp;were conquered by heathens, JMaelor was not conquered until the English had become Christians.

However, this question of the precise extent of the conquests by the heathen English cannot benbsp;gone into in detail here ; and it is sufficient for ournbsp;present purpose, if we recognize that the conquestsnbsp;by the English, as long as they were heathens,nbsp;extended very nearly up to the modern boundarynbsp;of Wales.

Now, we know from the Chronicle that the Mercians became Christians on the death of Penda,nbsp;in the year 655. But the limit of time duringnbsp;which conquests of Welsh districts by heathensnbsp;could have taken place, must be very muchnbsp;shortened from this date; because we find thatnbsp;Penda, throughout the whole of his reign, was innbsp;league with the Welsh against Northumbria, sonbsp;we may be qixite certain that Penda left thenbsp;boundary of Wales as he found it, when he begannbsp;his long reign in the year 626.

On the whole it seems certain that the bulk of the conquest up to the Welsh border, as far asnbsp;the north of Shropshire, was due to Ceawlin ;nbsp;except that Ceolwulf, his nephew and successor,nbsp;may have extended those conquests towards Southnbsp;and Mid Wales; and the Angles may have madenbsp;further encroachments in the north. There cannbsp;be no doubt that the greater part of the conquestnbsp;of Cheshire was due to the Angles, and that itnbsp;must have been carried as far as the Bickertonnbsp;Hills, and Peckforton and Beeston, soon after

the angles join the SAXONS 199

Ceawlin�s great victory at Fethenleag (Faddiley) had broken the resistance of the Welsh. Thatnbsp;the Angles could not have planted their settlements with safety beyond these hills is due tonbsp;the fact that the Welsh still held the great fortressnbsp;of Chester.

This was taken by Ethelfrith about the year 613 ; but that campaign from Northumbria,nbsp;assisted by local forces, is beyond the scope ofnbsp;this work. We can only note here that there isnbsp;clear evidence that the same methods were adopted,nbsp;at this late date, to invest Chester, as those whichnbsp;led to the taking of Silchester, in the first stagenbsp;of the invasion.

To return to Ceawlin. We find the greater part of our difficulties in explaining his campaignsnbsp;in the West Midlands obviated, directly we realizenbsp;that he must, throughout his career of conquest,nbsp;have been acting in unison with the Anglesnbsp;coming from the east. To those critics whonbsp;delight in dubbing every reasonable suggestion asnbsp;guess-work, it may be pointed out that it wouldnbsp;be a wild guess to assume that these two greatnbsp;branches of the English race, each ruled by kingsnbsp;of the same dynasty, remained all the time in anbsp;state of abysmal ignorance of each other�s doings.

Surely it is more reasonable to suppose that there was a mutual exchange of information, andnbsp;that every victory and every advance, as well asnbsp;every approaching difficulty, was duly reported;nbsp;and that one branch of the invaders timed itsnbsp;attacks, and selected its lines of advance, to suitnbsp;the exigencies of the other.

lished his kingdom in Northumbria, so we may well suppose that the Angles had pressed forwardsnbsp;at least as far as Derbyshire. Then Redwaldnbsp;in East Anglia must have been doing something to enable him later to claim the title ofnbsp;Bretwalda, then held by Ethelbert. And evennbsp;Ethelbert, in the south, must have made somenbsp;conquests to enable him to qualify for thatnbsp;glorious title. In fact, Deorham seems to havenbsp;sounded the advance on all the different frontiersnbsp;of the invaders. It was an epoch-markingnbsp;victory, and at one blow changed the characternbsp;of the invasion from piecemeal conquest to opennbsp;warfare and strategic combinations.

Hitherto the actions of the Angles had been confined to costly frontal attacks on a widelynbsp;extended frontier, from which they could notnbsp;advance far without leaving their settlementsnbsp;unprotected. Ceawlin was to change all this, bynbsp;getting in rear of the Welsh, and challengingnbsp;them to battles in the open, a challenge theynbsp;were compelled to accept, in the forlorn hope thatnbsp;they might be able to retain at least some portionnbsp;of the lowlands and open country, and not benbsp;driven back into the mountains of Wales.

There are some, and they are many, who think that Ceawlin was little more than a tribal leader,nbsp;who by his courage and ability had perhaps gainednbsp;followers from other tribes and sections of thenbsp;invaders, and that when he advanced to Deorhamnbsp;he was merely making an effort to extend his ownnbsp;conquests, an effort which only differed in degreenbsp;from previous ones, inasmuch as it was larger,nbsp;and in that it attacked the chief source of Welsh

resistance in the south, namely, the Cotswolds, guarded by the fortresses of Bath, Cirencester, andnbsp;Gloucester.

The chief objection to this view is its utter inadequacy to explain, not only the conquestnbsp;itself, but also how such numbers of invadersnbsp;could have been transported from the continentnbsp;and landed in the ports of Britain. The onlynbsp;consideration that supports such an inadequatenbsp;version of the conquest is that it is fashionable,nbsp;and it will gain for students who hold it full marksnbsp;in examinations. And yet when we analyse thisnbsp;view of the conquest we must realize that there isnbsp;no real evidence to support it, and that it is merelynbsp;based on a preconceived theory.

It is in fact nothing but a guess to suppose that a leader, who must by this time have assumed thenbsp;title and have been accepted with acclamation as thenbsp;Bretwalda, or Wielder, of Britain did not havenbsp;the power and unquestioned authority to demandnbsp;allegiance, and control the actions, of at least allnbsp;the invaders in southern Britain, and as for thenbsp;rest, where are we to draw the line? Certainlynbsp;it must be admitted that Ceawlin�s authority andnbsp;power to control the actions of the Angles in thenbsp;east and in the north, cannot possibly be claimed,nbsp;as it is over the southern invaders. And yet,nbsp;unless we are to assume, as a guess, for it is nothingnbsp;Uiore, that the Angles and Saxons remained in anbsp;sort of stupid ignorance of each other�s doings,nbsp;the influence of a leader like Ceawlin must havenbsp;served to control, or at least to inspire, the actionsnbsp;of the Angles, although it was not supported bynbsp;any direct authority.

In this way it is no guess, but a very reasonable conjecture, that when Ceawlin advanced, the yearnbsp;after Deorham, on his career of conquest in thenbsp;West Midlands, he could do so with supremenbsp;confidence that, in accordance with his wishes,nbsp;certain actions, at certain times, in certain districts,nbsp;woiild be taken by the Angles. Thus it becomesnbsp;possible to explain how it was that Ceawlin wasnbsp;able to advance to Wednesbury in the heart of thenbsp;enemy�s country, with his left flank exposed tonbsp;attacks from Wales; because he knew, not onlynbsp;that his right flank was protected, but that he wasnbsp;certain of support, sooner or later, from thatnbsp;direction.

In this way also it becomes possible to explain not only the vast extent of Ceawlin�s conquests,nbsp;but also the numberless districts that must havenbsp;been colonized in his time. It is quite evidentnbsp;that large numbers of Angles must have settlednbsp;under Ceawlin�s rule in the east and north, and thatnbsp;it was only when that iron rule became insupportable that they rebelled against him.

Since the Monarchy of the Angles had been transferred to Northumbria for more than thirtynbsp;years, we may expect to find that the Angles hadnbsp;made considerable advances by this time, and werenbsp;probably holding the eastern parts of Leicestershirenbsp;and Northamptonshire, and that the westernnbsp;boundaries of those shires roughly mark the pushnbsp;forward that they were able to make on hearingnbsp;of the victory of Deorham.

Then Redwald of East Anglia probably took part in this great advance, thereby qualifying himself for the Bretwaldaship, which he took later on

CENTRAL POSITION OF OXFORD 203 from Ethelbert. Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonnbsp;perhaps mark his conquests. Ethelbert may havenbsp;helped to extend Essex northwards to its presentnbsp;boundary.

Then, on the eastern border of Wessex, it was probably at this time that the men of Oxfordnbsp;pushed northwards, and founded Banbury; andnbsp;the northern boundary of Oxfordshire marks thenbsp;settlements which they were then able to establishnbsp;in security. The principle of never making settlements without a fair prospect of security stillnbsp;held good, but it does not follow that the men ofnbsp;Oxford were doing nothing all this time to advancenbsp;the conquest, and that they confined their peregrinations to a walk up Headington Hill, or to thenbsp;top of Shotover.

Far otherwise. It must have been easy and safe for chiefs at Oxford to ride, with an armednbsp;escort, to many of the districts occupied by thenbsp;Angles; and thus Oxford was probably a centrenbsp;of information about the doings of the Englishnbsp;race in the north and in the south. We cannotnbsp;bring ourselves to believe that, in those stirringnbsp;times, the men of Oxford would be content tonbsp;remain in ignorance of the world beyond theirnbsp;own favoured centre, and thus it may have comenbsp;about that the rest of the English race looked tonbsp;them for information. At Banbury, we see thenbsp;Saxons checking the advance of the Angles innbsp;Northamptonshire, not in a hostile sense, butnbsp;merely by previous occupation. In many suchnbsp;ways the shires seem to explain themselves asnbsp;owing their pristine boundaries largely to the firstnbsp;invasions.

The limits of Berkshire, near Faringdon, must have been nearly reached before the battle ofnbsp;Deorham ; and after that battle Wiltshire was ablenbsp;to come up alongside, and nearly to Cirencester.

Gloucestershire, containing as it does the Cots-wold Hills, represents roughly the immediate results of Deorham, and this doubtless was fillednbsp;up with the settlers that Ceawlin had in waitingnbsp;behind the Wansdyke; and perhaps many a warworn veteran, who had waited to take part in thenbsp;great victory Ceawlin had promised them, herenbsp;found a home.

We have now roughly defined the arena into which Ceawlin was about to step early in thenbsp;campaigning season of the year 578. It was anbsp;region crowded with the retreating Welsh, but itnbsp;was beleaguered by victorious foes. It was probably the wealthiest region yet unconquered, andnbsp;had been filled with the cattle the Welsh drovenbsp;before them. Thus Ceawlin would feel certainnbsp;that for some time his army would be able to livenbsp;on the country.

We know that the whole of this region had been conquered by the English, and the Welshnbsp;driven from it, by the year 626, and that in thatnbsp;year Penda succeeded to the kingdom, not ofnbsp;the West Saxons, but of the Mercians. Thoughnbsp;the Chronicle only says that Penda succeeded to thenbsp;kingdom, and does not mention Mercia, yet wenbsp;know with absolute certainty that the kingdomnbsp;which Penda succeeded to was Mercia.

Therefore we know that in the year 626 Mercia was already established as a kingdom, althoughnbsp;we do not know the name of the previous king.

though it was probably Penda�s father, Pybba. They were of the royal family of Woden, and,nbsp;therefore, were Angles. Penda was already fiftynbsp;years of age, and so must have been acting fornbsp;his father for some time in all matters, such asnbsp;warfare, demanding activity; and so we may benbsp;certain that the Mercians, under Penda�s influence,nbsp;had long been cultivating friendly relations withnbsp;the Welsh.

The last serious conquest made by the Angles of JMercia was probably about the year 613, when,nbsp;with the assistance of Ethelfrith of Northumbria,nbsp;they were able to take and destroy Chester, andnbsp;push their settlements right up to the Dee, andnbsp;even beyond it at one point, and to take andnbsp;occupy the peninsula of Wirral.

We know from the later events of his life, that Penda possessed a strategic vision equal to thatnbsp;of Ceawlin, a talent seldom lacking in princes ofnbsp;the family of Woden, worthy rulers of a greatnbsp;race. Penda would early realize that the kingdomnbsp;established by his father stood in a perilousnbsp;position between Wessex and Northumbria, eachnbsp;claiming the over-lordship, unless it was living innbsp;harmony with its Welsh neighbours.

It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude that no fresh districts in the Midlands were taken fromnbsp;the Welsh after the year 613, and, therefore, thatnbsp;practically all the conquests made by the heathennbsp;English were made under the leadership of eithernbsp;Ceawlin or Ceolwulf.

WEDNESBURY

is necessary to form some conception by glancing forward to known events, not only of the eventsnbsp;we are leading up to, but also the time limit ofnbsp;the period of the unknown conquests we are goingnbsp;to try and explain.

Since from the year 578, the earliest in which Ceawlin could have advanced from the Cotswolds,nbsp;to 591, when he was expelled from Wednesbury,nbsp;is only thirteen years, we realize at once thatnbsp;Ceawlin must have struck boldly as well as victoriously at first, so as to have been able to conquernbsp;and colonize such a large region in such a short time.

But there are other reasons for supposing that he took such a bold course as to advance at oncenbsp;to Wednesbury.

A spirit of emulation of the Angles would make Ceawlin wish to be first in the field alongnbsp;the whole Welsh frontier; and, besides, it hadnbsp;probably been arranged beforehand that what henbsp;conquered he should rule. His line of advancenbsp;was protected by the Severn, and it would benbsp;some years before enough emigrants could benbsp;transported from the continent to colonize thenbsp;lands beyond the Severn�in fact, these werenbsp;probably filled in the time of Ceolwulf.

Ceawlin had nothing to detain him, but he had one of the strongest of reasons for going on, andnbsp;one that would specially appeal to an experiencednbsp;warrior like himself. His army was in the verynbsp;highest state of training and discipline that wasnbsp;possible in those days�in fact, its moral was perfect ; but Ceawlin knew how quickly deteriorationnbsp;sets in in these matters amongst men, especiallynbsp;ignorant men, who are kept waiting for long.

On such grounds it is held that, early in 578, Ceawlin marched straight to Wednesbury, thenbsp;Wodnesbeorg of the Chronicle, which he hadnbsp;chosen as the central base of his future operations.

It was very certain that the South Welsh would not cross the Severn to attack him where he was,nbsp;so he must go where circumstances were morenbsp;favourable to the Welsh, and challenge them tonbsp;battle, and the northern Welsh had not yet felt hisnbsp;sword.

Wednesbury holds a remarkable position and one particularly well suited for a base for Ceawlin�snbsp;last campaigns. It stands high on the edge ofnbsp;a broad plateau, which it overlooks for miles, andnbsp;yet it is not so high as to be inconvenient. Thenbsp;lines of circumvallation of a large camp are stillnbsp;fairly traceable there.

Wednesbury stands on the edge of the Black Country, as this mining district is called, and thenbsp;surface is so defaced by coal-mines and their refusenbsp;heaps that it is difficult to imagine it in its pristinenbsp;state. Then it was probably as open as it is now,nbsp;since no large timber trees could have grownnbsp;there, and this upland plateau, with the arms fromnbsp;it which extend eastwards into the lower andnbsp;richer country, must have been covered with fernnbsp;and broom and gorse and stunted trees where itnbsp;was not cultivated.

Though not surrounded by rich lands, yet quot;Wednesbury was admirably suited for an armynbsp;that had come to live by plunder, and herds ofnbsp;cattle could have been kept in the plain belownbsp;within view of the higher grounds. No largenbsp;force could approach Wednesbury unobserved.

Towards the north-west the ground rises gradually to Wolverhampton, which is five miles away.

Beyond Wolverhampton is Tettenhall (ancient form, Teotanheale), or the � look-out place,� fromnbsp;which an extensive view can be obtained. To thenbsp;north-east of Wolverhampton is Wednesfield,nbsp;about which more will have to be said. It unquestionably means �Woden�s Field.� Wednes-bury well deserves a visit by antiquaries.

Only two remarkable coincidences to be found in the neighbourhood can be mentioned here.

One of the hundreds of Staffordshire, namely, the one just north of Wednesbury, that has thenbsp;town of Penkridge at its eentre, is called Cuttle-stone. And the bridge at Penkridge is callednbsp;Cuttlestone Bridge.

In the thirteenth century this was called � Cuthulfestan,� and there can be no doubt thatnbsp;it means � Cuthwulf�s Stone.�

Then about seven miles north-east of Wednes-bury we find Catshill. Duignan, in his � Staffordshire Place-Names,� tells us that, in; the thirteenth century, this was called � Cutteslowe,� and thatnbsp;there is a tumulus there, and the mound marksnbsp;the boundary of three manors. It certainly looksnbsp;as if the earliest form of this name, � Cutteslowe,�nbsp;has been derived from � Cutha�s lowe.� If so,nbsp;then it is a very remarkable coincidence, that innbsp;the neighbourhood of W ednesbury we should findnbsp;two important place-names derived from favouritenbsp;names in � Ceawlin�s � family, and both namesnbsp;having every probability in favour of their antiquity,nbsp;and of their dating back to heathen times. Thenbsp;Hundreds must have had their origin in the first

conquest, however much they may have been modified later, and a tumulus must certainly datenbsp;back to these times. And yet it must be admittednbsp;that it may be merely a coincidence that we findnbsp;the names �Cuthwulf� and � Cutha � establishednbsp;as parts of place-names near Wednesbury. Thenbsp;names were not uncommon, and we know fromnbsp;the Chronicle that they were used in Northumbria.nbsp;It would be a mistake to lay too much stress onnbsp;the fact of their existence near Wednesbury,nbsp;though it is a striking coincidence.

The chief fact that cannot be gainsaid is that the name Wednesbury is the exact modern equivalent of the Woddesbeorg or Wodnesbeorg of thenbsp;Chronicle; and when we examine the place, wenbsp;find that it entirely fulfils the requirements for anbsp;central base for the conquest of the West Midlands. There is nothing to be urged against it.nbsp;It is far otherwise with other localities that havenbsp;been suggested. The only one worth considering,nbsp;since it has been supported, if not indeed accepted,nbsp;by some authorities, is Wanborough, an earthworknbsp;near Swindon. The absurdity of the idea, that anbsp;great conqueror like Ceawlin could have wastednbsp;his time round Wanborough, should alone havenbsp;been sufficient to condemn its claims to have beennbsp;the Woden�s beorg of the Chronicle. Fortunately,nbsp;however, it has been discovered that the early formnbsp;of the name precludes the derivation of it fromnbsp;W oden.

A word seems necessary about a central base from which campaigns might be conducted.

It must be borne in mind that Ceawlin had established a complete ascendancy over the Welsh ;

morever, he knew their ways and their methods of fighting. He knew exactly what powers they stillnbsp;possessed, and that they could still put a powerfulnbsp;army in the field for short campaigns in thenbsp;north; but he also knew their intrinsic weaknessnbsp;and utter inability to organize and combine, ornbsp;maintain any fixed policy for long. He knew thatnbsp;he must expect one bold bid for victory, and thatnbsp;attempt having failed, that he could do pretty wellnbsp;what he liked with them.

Of course Ceawlin�s wish must have been that the Welsh would come to him, and save him thenbsp;trouble of seeking them out far from his base;nbsp;and in this he seems to have been satisfied if therenbsp;is any significance in the name � Woden�s Field.�

It is evident that the central base which Ceawlin established at Wednesbury was not intended to contain his army. When his men wentnbsp;into winter quarters they merely settled in boothsnbsp;near Wednesbury to await the next campaigningnbsp;season.

The central base at Wednesbury was merely intended to contain Ceawlin�s own personal followers during the winter season, and chiefly as anbsp;centre for the collection of spoils and stores, and anbsp;place where these could be left in safety under thenbsp;charge of a strong garrison whilst he was awaynbsp;campaigning.

Then every spring a proportion of the spoils would be sent under convoy to Winchester, or tonbsp;Gloucester and Bristol, to reward the mariners andnbsp;help them to revictual their ships. At first campaigning would easily be made to pay its way.nbsp;Latterly times seem to have got harder, and the

large quotas demanded of settlers to maintain the army and the sailors was probably one of the chiefnbsp;causes that led eventually to the great slaughternbsp;at Wednesbury.

On arriving at Wednesbury, Ceawlin would be sure to fortify it. Perhaps there was already anbsp;Welsh village there surrounded by an earthennbsp;rampart; if so, Ceawlin�s work would have been allnbsp;the easier. Welsh prisoners taken at Deorhamnbsp;would be employed in making the earthworks,nbsp;whilst part of the army marauded the country,nbsp;and the rest began making shelters for the winternbsp;with materials brought in from Welsh settlementsnbsp;and farms.

Of course a constant look-out would be kept at Tettenhall, thus giving it the name it already borenbsp;in 909 when, according to the Chronicle, thenbsp;West Saxons and Mercians defeated the Danesnbsp;there.

And now we have to account for the name Wednesfield, four miles north-west of Wednesbury. A good deal of confused thought has beennbsp;bestowed upon this remarkable name, because itnbsp;has been assumed that it marks the site of thenbsp;Mercian victory over the Danes in 909. Of coursenbsp;this is absurd. Firstly, because Tettenhall is fournbsp;miles away; and secondly, because the Christiannbsp;English would never have named the site of theirnbsp;victory after the heathen god Woden, and thenbsp;heathen Danes could not have given the name,nbsp;since they were routed and driven from the site ofnbsp;the battle.

The name Woden�s Field can only have been given by the English whilst they still worshipped

Woden; and, moreover, the name indicates that it was given in celebration of a victory over a foreignnbsp;foe, as it could never have been given to celebrate thenbsp;victory of one branch of Woden-worshippers overnbsp;another. In fact, we may gather, with hardly anynbsp;doubt at all, that the name Wednesfield bearsnbsp;witness to the fact that here the heathen Englishnbsp;gained a great victory over the Welsh.

It may be fairly urged that a great victory by Ceawlin would have been certain to have beennbsp;recorded by the Chronicle, as Fethanleag was aboutnbsp;five or six years later.

This is easily accounted for. Ceawlin must have won several victories, and doubtless, afternbsp;the custom of his family, had taken care to havenbsp;them recorded; but his annalist probably lost hisnbsp;life in the slaughter at Wednesbury in 592, andnbsp;his records were used as firewood by the Angles.nbsp;Fethanleag was probably recorded because perhapsnbsp;Ceolwulf took part in that hard-won victory, whichnbsp;was the turning-point in Ceawlin�s career; at anynbsp;rate, some one who had witnessed Ceawhn�s wrathful return to his own, must have given thenbsp;information to the chronicler.

It is easy to surmise how a battle with the Welsh may have been brought about by Ceawlin,nbsp;at a spot so convenient for his purposes as W ednes-field. We have to account for that remarkablenbsp;place-name, and so it is necessary to make reasonable suggestions as to how it could have beennbsp;acquired.

To begin with, we have to realize what must have been the dominating idea in Ceawlin�s mind,nbsp;and that can only have been a wish to induce

the Welsh to charge home in open battle, done, the result could not be doubtful.

With this object in view we can only suppose that Ceawlin kept a large proportion of his forcesnbsp;behind the eastern slopes of the Wednesburynbsp;plateau, where they need not have remained idle;nbsp;there was plenty for them to do in preparation fornbsp;the winter. Then with the most active part ofnbsp;his army he would scour the country northwards,nbsp;doing everything he could to aggravate the Welsh ;nbsp;and then when they made any display of force, tonbsp;make timorous retirements towards a position nearnbsp;Wednesfield.

Perhaps even the ground there favoured the Welsh. What did that matter so long as Ceawlinnbsp;attained the desired result, a pitched battle ? W ithnbsp;a strong reserve at hand, the result could not benbsp;doubtful.

In some such manner, it must have come about that this spot was named, like Ceawlin�snbsp;great dyke, and his great camp, after his god,nbsp;Woden. Thus, and at this time only, can wenbsp;account for the name Wednesfield. If a battlenbsp;took place at Wednesfield, as has been suggested,nbsp;in order to explain this remarkable place-name,nbsp;there can be no doubt that a strong contingent ofnbsp;Angles took part in it, and thus acquired confidencenbsp;in the leadership of Ceawlin.

It is remarkable how the survival of the name Wednesfield enables us to fill in a very importantnbsp;gap in our knowledge of the victorious career ofnbsp;Ceawlin, with a reasonable suggestion which explains both.

WiTH regard to the last campaigns of Ceawlin, it may be fairly asked, what positive evidence isnbsp;there that Ceawlin conquered any districts beyondnbsp;the immediate neighbourhood of Wednesbury ?

The answer is that the whole of Staffordshire, and nearly all of Shropshire, and the greater partnbsp;of Cheshire, were undoubtedly conquered andnbsp;occupied by the English, before Ethelfrith ofnbsp;Northumbria took and destroyed Chester aboutnbsp;the year 613; and unless the conquest andnbsp;colonization of such a large region were carriednbsp;out by such a great and experienced leader asnbsp;Ceawlin, with the assistance of his Angle allies,nbsp;and very promptly too, we are at a loss to explainnbsp;how such great conquests could have been effected,nbsp;and the various districts settled up in so short anbsp;time.

There is not much local evidence, except that which is to be derived from the position of thenbsp;Stokes, but such as there is, all harmonizes perfectlynbsp;with a view that these wide districts were invadednbsp;and conquered from Wednesbury.

It almost goes without saying that if this was so, Ceawlin must have been acting throughoutnbsp;with the full support of the Angles, loyal and

That the support of the Angles must have been not only willing but even enthusiastic isnbsp;evident, when we consider the fact that Ceawlinnbsp;must all the time have been winning this northernnbsp;end of his conquests for the Angles. It wouldnbsp;have been impossible for him to settle up all thesenbsp;districts with any one but Angles, and he hadnbsp;more than enough country for the Hwiccas, andnbsp;later the Magesaetas, which were probably established by Ceolwulf, Ceawlin�s nephew andnbsp;successor.

The Angles would readily give loyal allegiance to a descendant of Woden who had proved hisnbsp;capacity to lead. There must have been numerousnbsp;Angles with Ceawlin before he left Wessex. Hisnbsp;gesiths and house-carls were probably all Angles,nbsp;as well as many of his chieftains. At any rate,nbsp;the Angles and Saxons were all of the same race;nbsp;they were all English. They all spoke the samenbsp;language, although since the Angles and Saxonsnbsp;had lived apart for so long, in some instances fornbsp;centuries, they probably spoke very differentnbsp;dialects, as different as the Lowland Scottishnbsp;dialect from that of Dorsetshire. Nevertheless,nbsp;there is no reason for supposing that, when thenbsp;two different branches of these jealous invaders firstnbsp;met near Wednesbury, that it was otherwise thannbsp;a perfectly harmonious meeting�in fact, there isnbsp;every reason to suppose that it was joyful andnbsp;enthusiastic.

The renown which Ceawlin had already won as a great and constantly successful conqueror.

and one who had not only overcome his enemies, but had also established vast numbers of immigrants on lands in Britain, was sufficient to ensurenbsp;that there could have been no question as tonbsp;leadership, and the independent chieftains of thenbsp;Angles would have been, one and all, ready tonbsp;serve under Ceawlin. Moreover, the Angle leadersnbsp;who composed Ceawlin�s staff (if such a modernnbsp;expression may be permitted) were able to speaknbsp;on terms of perfect familiarity vdth the Angles ofnbsp;the north and east, and their rank and precedencenbsp;as gesiths of a great king of the Angle royal familynbsp;of Woden, would be accepted without demur;nbsp;though doubtless many Angle chieftains from thenbsp;east would be welcomed to places of equalnbsp;authority in Ceawlin�s retinue.

Then we must not omit to notice that Ceawlin had a son named Cuthwine, or Cutha, who since,nbsp;when he was killed in 584, had already had atnbsp;least one son, may be presumed to have beennbsp;about thirty years of age, and therefore thatnbsp;Ceawlin�s age must have been at least sixty. Wenbsp;know how Ceawlin valued the help that his sonnbsp;gave him, by the manner in which he felt his loss.

A man could not have done aU that Ceawlin did without developing a certain harshness ofnbsp;character by the time he was approaching sixtynbsp;years of age, and this harshness may often havenbsp;been tempered to the Angles by means of the helpnbsp;and advice of Cuthwine ; and so his loss may havenbsp;made all the difference to Ceawlin�s rule withnbsp;reference to the Angles.

The point that it is desired to make clear is, that although the massacre which took place at

Wednesbury in the year 592, can, with hardly any doubt at all, be attributed to the Angles, it doesnbsp;not follow that their relations with the Saxonsnbsp;may not have been perfectly harmonious for manynbsp;years.

One thing is quite certain, namely, that Ceawlin in the course of his later conquests must oftennbsp;have come in contact with the Angles. Thenbsp;question is, therefore, did these two branches ofnbsp;the English race remain neutral spectators of eachnbsp;other�s doings ? or did they coalesce ?

The first idea is absurd, whereas the idea that they coalesced is reasonable, and explains everything ; and in spite of the fact that the coalitionnbsp;ended in massacre, there need be no reason tonbsp;doubt that great conquests were effected by it,nbsp;before the inevitable rupture came.

Of course it would have been an understanding, though possibly only a tacit one, that whatevernbsp;districts Ceawlin conquered he should rule. It isnbsp;easy for us now to realize that, in the state thenbsp;invaders were then in, and for more than twonbsp;centuries later, it was impossible for one king tonbsp;reign over both Wessex and the Midlands, andnbsp;that they were bound to split asunder sooner ornbsp;later. But in the days of Ceawlin the invadersnbsp;had yet to learn this, and none suspected that thenbsp;lesson was to come in his lifetime, as the naturalnbsp;result that followed from his having made suchnbsp;distant conquests.

In fact, the great slaughter at Wednesbury may have been said to have been the act whichnbsp;constituted the founding of Mercia, and the completion of the Heptarchy.

218 LAST CAMPAIGNS OF CEAWLIN

Since the campaign which ended with the battle of Fethanleag occurred in 584, we have fivenbsp;campaigning seasons to account for, if the battlenbsp;at Wednesfield took place in 578.

Since presumably the W elsh had been crushed, Ceawlin must have been able to advance in a verynbsp;different fashion, and with considerably less caution,nbsp;in fact, his operations would have consisted innbsp;driving out the Welsh, and bringing in the Anglesnbsp;to take their places and harvest their crops.

It should be noted that no other settlers than Angles could have been available so far northnbsp;at this time. It is, therefore, no mere surmise, itnbsp;is indeed a certainty, that the Angles must havenbsp;colonized all Staffordshire, and all Shropshire eastnbsp;of the Severn, and all Cheshire east of the Bickertonnbsp;Hills, in Ceawlin�s time, or so soon afterwards asnbsp;to have been directly due to his conquests.

Good reasons have been given for believing that the relations between the Angles and Ceawlin, andnbsp;his son Cuthwine, were perfectly cordial, at leastnbsp;up to the time of the battle of Fethanleag. Ceawlinnbsp;with his experienced staff, long accustomed tonbsp;placing settlers on freshly won territories, wouldnbsp;have been of great assistance in teaching the Anglesnbsp;how to occupy any given district, and apportionnbsp;the lands, and appoint a post at which to rally fornbsp;its defence, a post that in many instances wouldnbsp;be likely to become its centre of administration.

The chieftains of the Angles would quickly realize the value to them of an over-lord, who notnbsp;only knew his business, but was unbiased so farnbsp;as they only were concerned, to compose theirnbsp;mutual jealousies. Doubtless Ceawlin may have

RELATIONS WITH THE WELSH 219

favoured a few of his chief followers in particular instances, but there was more than enough landnbsp;for all, and so such favouritism, if there was any,nbsp;would be accepted as only natural and reasonable.

With regard to the Welsh, the whole tenor of Ceawlin�s life impresses on us the conviction thatnbsp;he was excessively brutal towards them, and innbsp;fact would not allow their presence, even as thralls,nbsp;amongst any of the communities he established.nbsp;We must bear in mind that previous to Deorhamnbsp;the total exclusion of the Welsh was a matter ofnbsp;military importance, to prevent information of thenbsp;preparations of the invaders reaching Wales.

Now, owing to the changed character of the invasion, from strictly defined and carefuUy guardednbsp;settlements, to warfare in the open, such carefulnbsp;exclusion of the Welsh from English communitiesnbsp;was no longer essential, and was indeed scarcelynbsp;possible, except perhaps in the immediate neighbourhood of Wednesbury.

Then the value of willing Welsh labour must have been increasing every year, as the conquestnbsp;extended, and the overworked colonists were lessnbsp;and less able to get any assistance in tilling theirnbsp;lands and tending their cattle. We cannot doubtnbsp;that as the conquest extended towards Wales,nbsp;more and more Welshmen were employed by thenbsp;Angles.

The Welsh are good servants and almost always loyal to good masters, and, owing to their numerousnbsp;tribal divisions, had learned quickly to transfernbsp;their allegiance to the strongest side. Welshnbsp;nationalism has almost always been an artificialnbsp;production. The chief division in the Welsh

220 LAST CAMPAIGNS OF CEAWLIN border has always been, the Men of the Hillsnbsp;versus the Men of the Plains.

Thus a Welshman who had settled down peaceably in the service of an Angle settler, wouldnbsp;be likely to give him warning if he knew that anbsp;raid was to be expected from the mountains; henbsp;did not want the home that fed him broken up, ornbsp;the cattle he tended taken away. In these waysnbsp;a large admixture of Welsh blood must have comenbsp;about near the borders of Wales.

These remarks have been made, not only to explain what probably occurred, but also to suggest one of the probable causes of friction betweennbsp;Ceawlin and his Angle subjects, for there can benbsp;little doubt that he made the mistake of lookingnbsp;at them as his subjects. In fact, Ceawlin was toonbsp;old to be able to change his ideas.

All his life he had been an autocrat, and had driven out the Welsh, and he could not brook anynbsp;change. He made the mistake of trying to sew anbsp;bit of new cloth into an old garment, and the rentnbsp;when it came was in the old garment.

The taxes he levied at first were light, owing to the immense amount of spoils that werenbsp;taken, but as years went on, and the tributenbsp;demanded became heavier, we can detect manynbsp;causes for friction between Ceawlin and his newlynbsp;acquired subjects.

Why should they provide ship-money to bring in a lot of Saxons from the continent ? we cannbsp;fancy them asking.

As regards the actual course that Ceawlin�s campaigns probably took, little can be said here;nbsp;even to make suggestions would demand a greater

TOWNSHIPS AND HUNDREDS 221

knowledge of the country than that to be derived from maps. It is natural to suppose that Ceawlinnbsp;began with Staffordshire, as that would be mostnbsp;convenient for Angles arriving from the east.nbsp;Since Tamworth later became the capital ofnbsp;Mercia, it was probably one of the most importantnbsp;centres of distribution now, and thus the Anglesnbsp;began to look to it for administration.

We may with complete confidence assume that it was during the first stage of the conquestnbsp;of each district that the Townships and Hundredsnbsp;were established. There is no other period atnbsp;which we can by any means explain their origin.nbsp;It does not follow that they were originally exactlynbsp;the same as we find them now. And yet, knowingnbsp;the extraordinary respect that Englishmen havenbsp;always shown to ancient boundaries, we may withnbsp;equal confidence assume that there was seldomnbsp;any direct change of boundaries, and that suchnbsp;changes as have taken place have almost alwaysnbsp;consisted merely of throwing together certainnbsp;Hundreds or Townships of minor importance, tonbsp;make larger ones. In this way it is quite likelynbsp;that some of the less important Hundreds andnbsp;Townships have disappeared, having been absorbednbsp;to make larger ones. Fortunately in this part ofnbsp;England the ancient Townships still remain asnbsp;civil parishes, and some large ecclesiastical parishesnbsp;have several of these civil parishes within theirnbsp;borders. Then another fortunate circumstancenbsp;lies in the fact that the 25-inch Ordnance Surveynbsp;was based on these civil parishes, and so we havenbsp;excellent coloured maps of them. All localnbsp;museums should possess copies of these maps of

These Townships are so small that we can hardly suppose that there were many instances ofnbsp;two or more of them having been amalgamated;nbsp;and that therefore they do truly represent thenbsp;pristine territorial divisions established when thenbsp;district was first conquered.

The Hundreds, on the contrary, are so large, that it seems probable that there may have beennbsp;some amalgamation of the smaller and less important Hundreds, with more important ones innbsp;later times. If the Hundreds had remained thenbsp;same, and if we accept the supposition that anbsp;Hundred was the district apportioned to onenbsp;hundred warriors with their families, we should,nbsp;of course, be able to make a rough estimate of thenbsp;numbers of the pristine settlers.

The number of Hundreds stiU existing are as follows : Shropshire, 14 ; Staffordshire, 5 ; Cheshire,nbsp;7; which would only give us a total of 2600 warriors.nbsp;And that number multiplied by five, to give theirnbsp;families, only amounts to 13,000 persons, a smallnbsp;number to people such a large region. And yet,nbsp;apart from the fact that there were probably morenbsp;Hundreds in Staffordshire and Cheshire, it isnbsp;easy to account for a larger population, if we bearnbsp;in mind that the invaders, when they came, recognized a status not only of birth but also of wealth ;nbsp;and the hundred warriors that presumably wentnbsp;to occupy a territorial Hundred, were all eorls, andnbsp;that each of them probably brought in severalnbsp;families of ceorls.

we may with confidence treble our original number of warriors, and it seems evident thatnbsp;there must have been a great many more than thatnbsp;sum produces. Even so the help of the Welshnbsp;labour in cultivating such large districts must havenbsp;been very welcome�in fact, the invaders couldnbsp;hardly have managed without it; and we can seenbsp;how it gradually came about that the Merciansnbsp;made friends with the Welsh, and for years werenbsp;in league with them, against both Northumbrianbsp;and Wessex. It would probably take Ceawlinnbsp;two years to occupy Staffordshire, and then henbsp;would in 581 have begun to conquer Shropshirenbsp;east of the Severn.

It seems likely at any rate that about this time, having secured Staffordshire for his Angle friends,nbsp;he would turn his attention to the Severn, andnbsp;perhaps begin by taking and completing thenbsp;destruction of Uriconium. Archeeologists tell usnbsp;that there is evidence that the chief destruction ofnbsp;the Uriconium must have occurred before thisnbsp;time. However that may be, it is unlikely thatnbsp;it has been quite deserted, and the very namenbsp;� Wroxeter,� which the invaders gave it, seems tonbsp;bear witness to the fact that they found a Romannbsp;city there, and something more than vacant ruins.nbsp;Having thus made his northern frontier safe,nbsp;Ceawlin probably turned his attention to that partnbsp;of Worcestershire which lies east of the Severn.nbsp;He must by this time have had many Saxonnbsp;settlers ready to come in, either by sea and thenbsp;Severn, or overland through Gloucestershire.nbsp;Warwickshire also may have been peopled bynbsp;these, as well as by the Angles in its northern

224 LAST CAMPAIGNS OF CEAWLIN

districts. Perhaps archeology as well as etymology may yet have something to say on this distribution of settlers.

All this time, with rich spoils coming in, Ceawlin could have found no difficulty in keepingnbsp;a large army together, and maintaining its discipline. And yet, as time went on, many of thenbsp;older warriors would desire to settle down in peacenbsp;on some chosen spot, and so we may be sure thatnbsp;Ceawlin would desire to strike northwards beforenbsp;such elements of disintegration had begun tonbsp;weaken his control.

It would be hopeless, in the present state of our knowledge, to attempt to work out his northernnbsp;career of conquest in detail. The most that cannbsp;be attempted is to give a broad sketch, with duenbsp;eonsideration of the ehief difficulties that had tonbsp;be faced.

We find north of Newport a small stoke, Piekstock. Its objeetive was probably the Ches-wardine district up to Hales and Market Drayton.

Then, about six miles north-west of Newport, we find Hinstock, which was probably made withnbsp;a view to elearing out and settling up the countrynbsp;up to the River Tern. All this must have beennbsp;comparatively easy work, but, at Stoke-on-Tern,nbsp;we see Ceawlin starting on a campaign that, innbsp;the end, involved more diffieult problems.

Stoke-upon-Tern was evidently made with a view to taking Hodnet and the Hawkstone Hills.nbsp;This would present no great difficulty to annbsp;army like Ceawlin�s, although there is a great earthwork ealled Bury Walls amongst those hills, andnbsp;the Welsh probably still elung to such fortresses.

useful as they had been in the tribal warfare of the past, but useless against an enemy who hadnbsp;come to stop, unless they could be relieved. Thenbsp;Hawkstone Hills were but an incident in thisnbsp;campaign, and its main object probably was tonbsp;take and colonize all the land up to the rivernbsp;Roden.

The river Roden runs out of a vast morass between Whitchurch and Ellesmere, and knownnbsp;generally as the Fenns Moss, though it is sometimes also called Whixall Moss on the Shropshirenbsp;side.

The Fenns Moss has had more to do with the shaping of the northern Welsh border than anynbsp;other single natural feature, although its importance is accentuated by the meres and deepnbsp;dingles near Ellesmere, and by the deep Wychnbsp;valley on the Cheshire side.

The Fenns Moss is on the water-shed, and from it the Roden carries its waters to the Severn,nbsp;and the Wych brook to the Dee.

High as the Fenns Moss stands, one remarkable feature of it is, that it cannot be seen from anynbsp;point more than half a mile from its borders. Itnbsp;comes upon the traveller as a surprise, as doubtless it did upon Ceawlin and his followers.

The Fenns Moss, with its adjuncts, the Mere country and the Wych Valley, was undoubtedlynbsp;the originating cause of the Hundred of Maelornbsp;Saesneg, that remarkable bit of Wales which jutsnbsp;out some ten miles east of the Dee into the richestnbsp;pastures of Cheshire and Shropshire. It is stillnbsp;full of Welsh place-names. The furthest districtnbsp;being the ancient township, now parish of Iscoyd,

226 LAST CAMPAIGNS OF CEAWLIN and the furthest bank which slopes down tonbsp;Shropshire on one side, and to Cheshire on thenbsp;other, is called Brynowen, and hard by is the farmnbsp;of Maes y Groes.

Outside Maelor there are practically no Welsh place-names. There is, indeed, an interestingnbsp;lake fortress near Whitchurch called Pan Castle.nbsp;But the Welsh household word �Pan� was sonbsp;early adopted by the English that they may havenbsp;given the name.

A � Caidee � exists in a dingle in Cheshire about half a mile from Maelor, and an old title-deed even shows that there was, not so long ago,nbsp;a Welsh place-name in the rough country beyondnbsp;Malpas, near the foot of the Cheshire Hills. Butnbsp;such sporadic exceptions do but serve to makenbsp;the general contrast of place-names more remarkable. Nowhere else, on the Welsh border, is thisnbsp;contrast of place-names so clearly defined, andnbsp;nowhere else does it so exactly coincide with thenbsp;modern boundary of Wales.

Then, again, certain English place-names bear witness to the fact that here the English werenbsp;up against the Welsh. We find Welshampton,nbsp;and Whixall Welsh End, and Cumberland Farm,nbsp;and Combermere.

We naturally ask how it came about that this exposed inland promontory of Wales preservednbsp;its integrity amidst the storm of war, whilstnbsp;the great Welsh fortress of Chester remained anbsp;ruin for centuries, and has no Welsh place-namenbsp;around it ?

The Hundred of Maelor is the lock to many secrets of Welsh border warfare, and military

science is the key, but it is beyond the scope of this work to deal with this particular branch ofnbsp;the conquest, and it must be reserved for the finalnbsp;stage of the invasion, and the conquests of Ethel-frith and Edwine. All that concerns us now is tonbsp;realize that the flow of the tide of Ceawlin�s conquests was turned aside by the morass-guardednbsp;INIaelor-Saesneg, to what is now W^hitchurch, andnbsp;to the rich pastures round Nantwich.

In order to drive the Welsh back into the Fenns Moss, and to hold the lands right up tonbsp;that morass, Ceawlin appears to have made anbsp;stoke, now called Tilstock. After all, the districtnbsp;was a safe one to settle in, except, perhaps, fornbsp;minor raids by the Welsh, because if the Fennsnbsp;Moss was an impassable obstacle to an Englishnbsp;army, it was also to a Welsh army, and Ceawlinnbsp;could turn his attention to his advance northwardsnbsp;towards Chester without any serious fears as to hisnbsp;line of communication with Wednesbury. Henbsp;knew that the Welsh in mid-Wales were incapablenbsp;of combined action, and that their most seriousnbsp;concentration was in Cheshire.

A word must be said about Chester. Ceawlin�s relations with the Angles had probably been perfectly amicable up to this point, and their conductnbsp;consistently loyal. It was the nearly lost, andnbsp;dearly won, victory of Fethanleag that was tonbsp;change all that. He would, therefore, have nonbsp;reasons for doubting that, with their assistance, henbsp;could take Chester. It has been pointed out thatnbsp;Ceawlin, in his youth, had probably sailed up thenbsp;estuary of the Dee, and, perhaps, even up to thenbsp;walls of Chester. He well knew, as Ethelfrith did

ADVANCE TOWARDS FADDILEl 229 later, that the seaport fortress of Chester couldnbsp;not be invested without a fleet. We know thatnbsp;Ethelfrith had a fleet, because it was used, shortlynbsp;after his death, by Edwine to take Anglesey andnbsp;the Isle of Man. But Ceawlin could easily arrangenbsp;to send a fleet by the time he had concentratednbsp;his forces near Chester. We know now that thisnbsp;was not to be. The loss of Cutha and the bestnbsp;leaders of the Saxons at Fethanleag, made furthernbsp;conquests in the north impossible to Ceawlin, andnbsp;he had to leave the conquest of the rest ofnbsp;Cheshire to the Angles.

We may fairly conclude that the conquest of the Tilstock district, and the driving of the Welshnbsp;into Maelor, took the whole of the campaigningnbsp;season of 583, and that Ceawlin did not begin hisnbsp;great advance into Cheshire before 584. Therefore we must suppose that it was early in thatnbsp;year that he - made a stoke at Chorley Stock,nbsp;about six miles north of Whitchurch, or Doding-ton, as it was then called; for the Weston, whichnbsp;is the old name of Whitchurch, could hardly havenbsp;been made as yet. Dodington must have beennbsp;an Angle settlement, since places with that formnbsp;of name are found, nearly all of them, in Anglenbsp;districts.

Faddiley, which has been identified as the Fethanleag of the Chronicle, and with everynbsp;probability in its favour, is only between one andnbsp;two miles north of Chorley Stock.

Faddiley is a township of Cheshire, and so there can be no doubt that it is a conquest name,nbsp;and the name too of a fairly extensive district.nbsp;At Chorley Stock Ceawlin appears to have waited

230 LAST CAMPAIGNS OF CEAWLIN

for a strong contingent of Angles from the east before he advanced. He well knew that it wouldnbsp;be a very different affair fighting these Northernnbsp;Welsh to fighting the cowed and oft-defeated andnbsp;ill-trained Welsh of South and Mid-Wales.

These Northern Welsh were descendants of the Cymru, brought in about two centuries beforenbsp;from the north by Cunedda Gwledig, and they hadnbsp;themselves conquered the old Goidelic Wales, andnbsp;almost all the later leaders of the Welsh werenbsp;descended from them.

We know from Bede how nearly they defeated Ethelfrith, a generation later, at Chester. In faet,nbsp;Fethanleag and Chester appear to have been thenbsp;hardest fought battles of the whole conquest, butnbsp;unfortunately for the Welsh all the skill, andnbsp;discipline, and experience was on the side ofnbsp;the English, and the Welsh tribal levies had nonbsp;chance against them.

Philologists tell us that aecording to the laws of etymology there is no case for the identificationnbsp;of Fethanleah with Faddiley. If we grant theirnbsp;premises, those who have no knowledge of theirnbsp;scienee must accept their conclusions, but theynbsp;seem in this case to have built on very shakynbsp;foundations. The question seems to be whethernbsp;the sound �eth� of Fethanleah eould beeomenbsp;changed into the sound � ad � of Faddiley. Withnbsp;regard to the consonant � th � philologists do notnbsp;appear to raise any great difficulty, since there is anbsp;Smedley derived from �smethe.�

Moreover, the large township of Baddiley is contiguous to Faddiley, and the propensity ofnbsp;local rustics to assimilate place-names, more

THE PLACE-NAME FADDILEY 231

especially when it produces a jingle between the names, would be very likely to cause them tonbsp;change Fathiley to Faddiley.

However, we are told that the real difficulty is with the root vowel � a ��and it is with regardnbsp;to this difficulty that it is hoped that further considerations may induce philologists to speak withnbsp;less confidence and less dogmatically.

No one will question the fact that Faddiley was an Angle settlement. It may even have beennbsp;formed before the battle, or assuming the battlenbsp;to have taken place at Faddiley, the settlementnbsp;may have been formed immediately afterwards,nbsp;and have taken its name from it, � the Field ofnbsp;troops � or � Troops Field.�

Again assuming this to have been the case, then the name Fethanleah would have been pronouncednbsp;locally according to the dialect of the particularnbsp;branch of the Angles that settled at that spot.

But the chronicler must have derived his information about Fethanleah from a man or men from Wessex, possibly from King Ceolwulf himself, andnbsp;their pronunciation must have differed from that ofnbsp;the Angles of Cheshire even more than the dialectnbsp;of Dorsetshire differs from that of Yorkshire at thenbsp;present day. Whilst for the present it must benbsp;admitted that the verdict of etymology is adversenbsp;to the claims of Faddiley, assuming the localnbsp;pronunciation of that name to have been correctlynbsp;rendered by the chronicler, yet there is such anbsp;decided general resemblance between the namesnbsp;�Fethanleah� and �Faddiley� that it is hopednbsp;that philologists will reserve their final judgmentnbsp;for the reasons above given, and be prepared to

give a generous consideration to the claims of Faddiley to have been the Fethanleah of thenbsp;Chronicle as viewed from the military standpoint.*

* The claims oi Faddiley to have been Fethanleah were pronounced untenable from the etymological standpoint by Mr. W. H. Stevenson in an article on � Dr. Guest and the English Conquestnbsp;of South Britain,� in the English Historical Beview, Vol. XVII,nbsp;pp. 637 and 688, footnote 55. The wild suggestions by whichnbsp;Dr. Guest got Ceawlin to Faddiley there receive the trenchantnbsp;criticism they deserve, but since, for all that, it is contended thatnbsp;Ceawlin did fight at Faddiley, a few remarks pleading for a reconsideration of the etymology of that name are necessary.

With regard to the identification of Fethanleah with Faddiley we are told that �there is no case for it. We have no indicationnbsp;whatever of the site of this battle.� Then, to sum up the rest of thenbsp;remarks, it appears that the difficulty is to get the � eth � ofnbsp;Fethanleah into the � ad �of Faddiley.

Little need be said about the �th� sound, since a �Smedley� from � smethe � is quoted, and in Doomsday Book for Cheshire, wenbsp;find almost all the names that now have � th � in them spelt with anbsp;� d � or sometimes a � t,� such as Burdworth�Budewrde, Dyserth�nbsp;Dissard, Bostherne�Eodestorne. The Normans seem to have disliked the � th � sound, though it survived where local pronunciationnbsp;was too strong for them.

Then we are told that � the real difficulty is with the root vowel.� That there should be any difficulty in allowing that the root vowelnbsp;� e � could become changed to � a � is what is so surprising, sincenbsp;it is easy to find more than two dozen place-names in Cheshire thatnbsp;have done this, even since the time that Doomsday Book wasnbsp;written, and the name Fethanleah was given five centuries beforenbsp;that.

Let two instances suffice. The township of Baddiley is even larger than the large township of Faddiley, and their boundariesnbsp;march together for a mile.

Unfortunately, Faddiley is not mentioned, but it cannot be unreasonable to suppose that if it had been, it might have been spelt � Fedelei,� and that the sound change in the vowel took place innbsp;the interval between 1084 and 1271 when Faddiley is first mentionednbsp;in an ancient deed as � Fadile.� It would be interesting to knownbsp;how soon Bedelei became Baddiley.

The other name selected for consideration is Marbury, partly because it is only five miles south of Faddiley, but chiefly becausenbsp;there can be no doubt at all as to the origin of this name. Innbsp;Doomsday Book Marbury is spelt � Mereberie,� and that that is thenbsp;correct original form of the name there can be no question, since itnbsp;is derived from the beautiful mere beside which Marbury is situated.nbsp;Again, we should like to learn when and where Mereberie is firstnbsp;recorded as Marbury.

Of course everything depends upon the identification of Wednesbury with the Wodnesbeorg of the Chronicle, but this being granted, or at leastnbsp;accepted as a working hypothesis, then we cannbsp;hardly bring ourselves to believe that such a boldnbsp;strategist as Ceawlin would be content until* henbsp;had at least tried to take Chester, and it has beennbsp;shown that by the year 584 he may easily havenbsp;reached South Cheshire. This being granted, thenbsp;Welsh of Cheshire and North Wales must havenbsp;become thoroughly alarmed by Ceawlin�s advancenbsp;and have called up all the men they could musternbsp;to resist it.

Without going into details, such a general levy would inevitably result in the collection of a largenbsp;Welsh army from Cheshire at or near Tarporleynbsp;and of another and perhaps larger one from Northnbsp;Wales at Farndon on the Dee.

The Welsh were compelled to strike quickly since it must have been very difficult for them tonbsp;hold a large army together. They could not livenbsp;on the country without robbing their own people,nbsp;and even if they won, the prospect of spoils wouldnbsp;have been meagre. Their capacity to keep thenbsp;field in full strength must have been limited tonbsp;about a month at most, their object must havenbsp;been to strike at once, and if possible before thenbsp;Saxons were fully prepared.

Tarporley is on the main north-and-south road which runs from Warrington past Whitchurch,

observer like the writer, that there is a strong tendency in English to convert the � e � in place-names into an � a.� We see it prevailingnbsp;even at the present day, as we know that most people speak ofnbsp;Berkshire as Barkshire, and of our great horse-race as the Darby.nbsp;May not Fethanleah have changed its root vowel in a similar manner ?

234 LAST CAMPAIGNS OF CEAWLIN and it must always have been an important track,nbsp;if not indeed a road.

From Farndon a road, which must always have been an important one, runs due east pastnbsp;Broxton through the best pass in the Bickertonnbsp;Hills to Bulkeley, and joins the Tarporley roadnbsp;at Ridley, and thence runs past Faddiley tonbsp;Nantwich.

The name Bulkeley seems to indicate that the first Angle settlers here learned that the Welshnbsp;called this pass � the Bwlch,� but however thatnbsp;may have been, it must always have been recognized as the best place to cross the Bickertonnbsp;Hills; at this day it is called the Gap,

Tarporley is five miles and Farndon nine miles from Ridley, where the roads join, and this undernbsp;the above circumstances would unquestionablynbsp;have been the place at which the northern andnbsp;western Welsh forces would have met.

From Ridley, if they learned that Ceawlin was at Chorley Stock, they would certainly havenbsp;advanced about a mile and a half to take up thenbsp;strong position offered by Faddiley, about twonbsp;miles north of Chorley Stock,

Thus military considerations do in a very remarkable manner seem to indicate that the greatnbsp;battle of Fethanleah must have taken place atnbsp;Faddiley; there is no other place in Cheshire tonbsp;compete with its claims, if indeed Ceawlin, innbsp;league with the Angles, did attack Cheshire.

When faced with the apparent solution of a problem of this kind by means of simple deductions from military science, the usual attitude ofnbsp;the literary critic is to decline to look at the

ETYMOLOGY v. STRATEGY 235

It should be pointed out, however, that there is no diabolical ingenuity about this explanationnbsp;of the site of the battle of Fethanleag.

The writer, like so many before him, was in the first instance attracted by a general resemblance of the name Faddiley to Fethanleah, andnbsp;by the unquestionable fact that if Ceawlin�snbsp;ultimate design was to take Chester, it would benbsp;extremely likely that a great battle would benbsp;fought somewhere in this part of Cheshire.

Although the verdict of etymology is adverse to the positive identification of Faddiley withnbsp;Fethanleah, it does not and cannot positivelynbsp;condemn it, since the general resemblance of thenbsp;two names is so striking.

We must be mindful of the aphorism of Bishop Stubbs, that no theory or principle works in isolation, and the most logical conclusion from thenbsp;truest principles (in this case of etymology) arenbsp;practically false, unless in drawing them allowancenbsp;is made for the counter-working of other principlesnbsp;equally true in theory, and equally dependent fornbsp;practical truth on co-ordination with them.

Since the principles of etymology have failed to help us to identify Fethanleah, it is time tonbsp;turn to the principles of strategy and see whatnbsp;they tell us, and we find that Faddiley is decidedlynbsp;the most likely spot in Cheshire at which the armynbsp;of Ceawlin would have met the army of the Welsh,nbsp;assuming (and a very reasonable assumption) thatnbsp;Ceawlin with his training and undoubted strategicnbsp;ability, knew about Chester and the important

236 LAST CAMPAIGNS OF CEAWLIN

position held by that port-guarding fortress, and decided to take it in order to complete the greatnbsp;work of his life.

It should be borne in mind that it is no more guesswork to suppose that a great leader was wisenbsp;and far-seeing, than it is to follow the fashion innbsp;assuming that he must have been stupid andnbsp;narrow-minded because forsooth he and his havenbsp;been dubbed barbarians.

The first thing to be demanded of an explanation of an unknown period of history is that it shall be coherent, the second that it shall benbsp;adequate; it can hardly be denied that the explanation offered here is both, and it points tonbsp;the fact that Fethanleah was Faddiley.

Faddiley as we see it to-day is situated in a country of broad pastures, famous for dairy-farmingnbsp;and fox-hunting, which extend for miles to thenbsp;east beyond Nantwich, and to the west to thenbsp;Bickerton Hills, which begin to rise about threenbsp;miles away. That this was always a district ofnbsp;pastures is indicated by the many place-namesnbsp;ending in � ley � broadcast over the country, andnbsp;all of them the names of pasture farms.

To the north-west the ground rises slightly from Faddiley to Ridley woods, but only aboutnbsp;fifty feet in a mile.

To the south the land sinks about forty feet to a small muddy stream, a tributary of thenbsp;Weaver.

The centre of the position is now marked by a farm called Holly well House on the Nantwichnbsp;road, which is here joined by a country lane fromnbsp;the direction of Baddiley. Everywhere the land

238 LAST CAMPAIGNS OF CEAWLIN

is spread in broad and gentle undulations, so slight in fact as nowhere to offer any serious advantagenbsp;in hand-to-hand fighting, although such slopes asnbsp;there are are in favour of the defenders of thenbsp;position, and moreover, they are sufficient to givenbsp;the defenders an extended view of an enemynbsp;advancing to the attack.

But it must be borne in mind that so far we have only been deahng with Faddiley as we seenbsp;it to-day, and its condition thirteen centuries agonbsp;must have been very different�due chiefly to twonbsp;causes: firstly, the clearance of all trees and brushwood ; and secondly, drainage. Of these thenbsp;second is the most important.

The name �Faddiley,� whether it was Fethan-leah or not, indicates that it was pasture land when it was first given, and therefore that it wasnbsp;reasonably open and clear of trees, although therenbsp;may have been, and probably were, some, andnbsp;bushes too, and these may have been distributednbsp;in a manner that favoured the defenders andnbsp;enabled them to conceal their numbers.

That the front to the south-east must have been open, we may fairly assume, or the positionnbsp;would hardly have been chosen.

If Faddiley was Fethanleah, then it is easy to see how it gained its name, since if the W elshnbsp;took up this position a day or more before thenbsp;English attacked, many troops or bands of themnbsp;would have been seen from the south and east,nbsp;and so it would, for lack of a name, be called thenbsp;� ley of troops.�

And now, writing on the assumption that Faddiley was Fethanleag, we have to account for

the confidence the Welsh must have had that Ceawlin would have to fight them there on theirnbsp;own chosen and partly prepared position, and bynbsp;means of a frontal attack, and that no manoeuvringnbsp;to a flank was possible.

This is easily explained if we take into consideration the enormous difference that drainage, constantly going on and being perfected fornbsp;centuries, makes in a country.

The little muddy stream on the right flank of the position at Faddiley, that now could be jumpednbsp;by an active man, would then have been a morassnbsp;with here and there stagnant pools on its course,nbsp;and filled with reeds and rushes and tangled brushwood, and there is a similar stream on the leftnbsp;flank of Faddiley, but with that we need notnbsp;concern ourselves, beyond noting the fact that itnbsp;would add to the assurance of the Welsh that theynbsp;must be engaged by a frontal attack if theynbsp;remained at Faddiley.

We have seen Ceawlin advancing from Marbury in a direct line for the Gap in the Bickerton Hills,nbsp;and forming a small stoke at Chorley Stock tonbsp;cover his crossing of the Weaver by the existingnbsp;ford ; its position is extremely well chosen.

By this time he would have become aware of the presence of the Welsh in force at Faddiley,nbsp;and if necessary would delay his advance until henbsp;was sure that the Angles had reached Baddiley,nbsp;about two miles away to the east, since he couldnbsp;not cross a morass and attack the Welsh innbsp;position without their assistance.

This delay may have been of some duration since Ceawlin knew his opponents well, and their

240 LAST CAMPAIGNS OF CEAWLIN

utter incapacity to manoeuvre, and their tendency to cling to a strong and well-chosen position.

He knew that they would not venture to advance into the difficult country between Chorleynbsp;Stock and Baddiley, indicated by Baddiley Merenbsp;and the place-name Blackhurst, and attack hisnbsp;separated forces in detail, as more capable opponents would have done; he could thus arrangenbsp;for a simultaneous advance on a chosen daynbsp;towards the Fethanleah or field of troops.

If this was the case, then on that morning Ceawlin and his Saxons would advance fromnbsp;Chorley Stock towards the north-east, and thenbsp;line of the present road to Larden Green, a milenbsp;from Faddiley, probably indicates the spot wherenbsp;he crossed the muddy valley with its tanglednbsp;brake, which protected the right flank and frontnbsp;of the Welsh at Faddiley, and he would thusnbsp;come in touch with the Angles who had timednbsp;their advance to join him, and protect his crossingnbsp;of the morass.

If these reasonable surmises are correct, they enable us to realize that the Welsh had a capablenbsp;commander, since he had taken up a positionnbsp;which forced his opponents to commit themselvesnbsp;to a frontal attack on a position from which henbsp;could see everything, whilst he could make hisnbsp;own dispositions to meet that attack unseen.

They would also lead us to suppose that the advance of Ceawlin�s army with the Saxons onnbsp;the left and the Angles on the right must havenbsp;been on both sides of the road from Larden Green.nbsp;As the Saxons would thus have their flank protected by a morass, their advance may have been

quicker than that of the Angles, whose right flank was more exposed. At any rate, if Henry ofnbsp;Huntingdon is correct, they appear to have givennbsp;the Welsh an opportunity to crush them with anbsp;well-delivered attack, whilst the Angles lookednbsp;on, not altogether displeased that allies, of whomnbsp;they were becoming jealous, should thus suffer.

Every one must admit that, if Ceawlin, in alliance with the Angles, did attack Cheshire, itnbsp;is a remarkable coincidence that, not only wouldnbsp;he be likely to come into collision with the Welshnbsp;somewhere in the neighbourhood of Faddiley, butnbsp;also that Faddiley itself fulfils all the requirements of the very best position the Welsh couldnbsp;take up.

On the one hand, Faddiley was a strong position where the local features compelled the English tonbsp;deliver a frontal attack in full view of the Welsh,nbsp;with the slope of the ground favouring thenbsp;defence.

On the other hand, Faddiley guarded the junction of the two roads which led to the valleynbsp;of the Dee.

Much more might be said in favour of Ceawlin having advanced from Marbury, and why the linenbsp;of the modern road from Whitchurch to Tarporleynbsp;was then impossible, owing to Willeymoor, whichnbsp;it crosses, having then been a great marsh.

Perhaps the most interesting detail to be noted is Wicksted, the only Stead in this neighbourhood ;nbsp;it is on the highest cultivated ground in thisnbsp;part of the country (500 feet).

The modern name � Belvidere � indicates the probable site of the original Stead. The farm

Wicksted is a mile south of Marbury, and commands a complete view of the Cheshire Hills,nbsp;and of the whole line of Ceawlin�s advance towardsnbsp;them.

The remarkable point about the entry in the Chronicle relating to the battle of Feathenleag isnbsp;that it states that, although Ceawlin took manynbsp;villages and spoils innumerable, yet � in wrath henbsp;returned to his own.�

It would, of course, be quite absurd to suppose that a veteran leader like Ceawlin could havenbsp;been enraged with the Welsh for killing his son innbsp;fair fight; he understood, as well as any man, thatnbsp;the fortune of war must be accepted. Sorrow wenbsp;might expect but not anger, unless the death ofnbsp;Cutha was due to the fact that he had not beennbsp;properly supported in battle, and so his valuablenbsp;life had been needlessly sacrificed. That onlynbsp;could be an adequate cause for great and continuing anger on the part of Ceawlin, none othernbsp;can be suggested.

If this reasoning is sound, then we can hardly escape from the conclusion that it was the Anglesnbsp;who failed to rush to the help of Cutha and hisnbsp;Saxons, at the crisis of the battle.

Henry of Huntingdon tells us that the battle was of that character, and that the Welsh achievednbsp;an initial success, and killed Cutha; but thatnbsp;Ceawlin, by a final charge, changed the fortune ofnbsp;the day from defeat to a great victory, after whichnbsp;he took spoils innumerable. Whether Henry ofnbsp;Huntingdon possessed information which has since

TREACHERY OF THE ANGLES 243

been lost, we do not know, but his account of the battle bears the impress of truth.

We can well imagine that if the Welsh attacked the Saxons first, with an overwhelming charge,nbsp;that the jealous Angles may not have been altogether displeased to see the Saxons suffer, andnbsp;have failed, for a few fatal minutes, to come tonbsp;their support, knowing that in the end they couldnbsp;achieve the victory.

If so, this failure in true loyalty on the part of the Angles would have been certain not tonbsp;escape the keen eye of Ceawlin, and we can wellnbsp;understand his anger. Although from necessitynbsp;Ceawlin may have been compelled to pass thenbsp;matter over and smother his indignation in thenbsp;rejoicings over the victory, we can see that hisnbsp;relations with the Angles would ever afterwardsnbsp;become embittered. By the loss of Cutha, andnbsp;some of the ablest of the leaders of the Saxons,nbsp;who we may be sure died fighting round the sonnbsp;of their great king, Ceawlin, after securing hisnbsp;share of the large spoils gained by the victory,nbsp;probably left Cheshire never to return, and wentnbsp;back to his own Wednesbury, for we cannot for anbsp;moment suppose that he returned to Wessex.nbsp;Henceforward he probably devoted himself tonbsp;the rule, and administration, of the lands he hadnbsp;won ; and to the collection of taxes, which becamenbsp;more and more necessary as years went on, ifnbsp;immigration was to continue on anything like thenbsp;scale of former years.

Ceawlin was the last man in the world to yield anything he had won, or to allow the complaintsnbsp;and expostulations of his Angle subjects to modify

his schemes of conquest and eolonization. We must bear in mind that Northumbria was far toonbsp;weak as yet to take a hand in the conquest of thenbsp;Midlands, and Ethelfrith, who eventually confirmednbsp;those eonquests by the taking of Chester, did notnbsp;begin to reign until the year Ceawlin died.

The Angles, therefore, had no other eourse open to them but to obey Ceawlin for the sakenbsp;of his proteetion, until his rule became unbearable,nbsp;and they beeame stronger.

Ceawlin had yet seven more eampaigning seasons before the great slaughter at Wednesburynbsp;in the year 592. Those he doubtless filled upnbsp;with further small acquisitions of territory, chieflynbsp;across the Severn, and these districts he appearsnbsp;to have settled with Saxons, but his losses atnbsp;Fethanleag probably prevented his doing anythingnbsp;in the first year or two.

He probably visited Wessex every winter, but in 591 he appears to have found affairs in thenbsp;Midlands becoming critical, and demanding hisnbsp;eonstant presence, for he appointed his nephewnbsp;Ceolric as local king in Wessex. The Chroniclenbsp;announces the faet with the brief statement thatnbsp;� Here Ceol reigned six years,� and it does notnbsp;make use of the usual expression that he sueceedednbsp;to the kingdom.

It seems evident that the social and legal business in Wessex could not go on without thenbsp;constant presence of a king. It must be admittednbsp;that of Ceolwulf the brother of Ceolric, it is alsonbsp;said in the Chroniele, under the year 597, that henbsp;began to reign among the West Saxons, andnbsp;not that he suceeeded to the kingdom; but this

only seems to show that the West Saxons were still loyal to the memory of Ceawlin, and sincenbsp;his grandson Ceolwald was living, though as yetnbsp;a mere youth, they hoped he would in time becomenbsp;fitted to reign over them; but in this they appearnbsp;to have been disappointed, since we are told thatnbsp;in 611 Cynegils succeeded to the kingdom.

It seems evident that there was no lack of loyalty on the part of the West Saxons to Ceawlinnbsp;and his family, and we must look elsewhere fornbsp;the authors of the massacre at Wednesbury whichnbsp;drove Ceawlin thence in 592.

Enough has already been said to show that this must be attributed to the Angles. The briefnbsp;but terrible entry in the Chronicle tells almost asnbsp;much by its omissions as by its statement.

� Here was a great slaughter at Wodnesbeorg and Ceawlin was outdriven.� No mention isnbsp;made of any battle, the very names of thenbsp;murderers are not recorded, a sense of shamenbsp;for the English race seems to check the pen ofnbsp;the chronicler, though it is possible that theirnbsp;names were not known. There need not havenbsp;been a pre-arranged massacre, the Angles maynbsp;simply have come to Wednesbury in an angrynbsp;mood, perhaps bringing their tribute to Ceawlin.nbsp;Then harsh words may have arisen, and so the fellnbsp;deed was done.

However the great slaughter came about, it is evident that after it the Angles would have tonbsp;prepare to defend themselves from attacks fromnbsp;Wessex, and so the kingdom began which wasnbsp;soon after known as Mercia.

army, with the assistance of the two chieftains named Cwichelm and Crida, and probably hisnbsp;nephew Ceowulf brought the greater part of itnbsp;from Wessex. But Ceawlin�s best leaders hadnbsp;been slaughtered at Wednesbury, and the Anglesnbsp;appear to have found no difficulty in dealing withnbsp;his hastily raised army, since we learn from thenbsp;Chronicle that in 593 Ceawlin, Cwichelm, andnbsp;Crida perished.

Again the silence of the Chronicle as to the place of the battle and the names of the opponentsnbsp;is remarkable. If the battle had been with thenbsp;Saxons in Wessex we should surely have beennbsp;told more. Perhaps the victors concealed theirnbsp;names in shame, for having killed the greatnbsp;descendant of Woden, who had done more thannbsp;any other man to win their homes for them. Atnbsp;any rate the conquerors of Ceawlin have not hadnbsp;their names recorded.

It is inconceivable that Ceawlin�s nephews Ceolric and Ceolwulf, the sons of his trustednbsp;brother Cuthwulf, turned against their uncle innbsp;his old age, or that they could have found anynbsp;considerable party in Wessex to follow them ifnbsp;they had done so. There appear to be only twonbsp;reasons for such an idea having arisen, and to havenbsp;been generally adopted by historians. One is thatnbsp;Ceolric reigned in Wessex during Ceawlin�s lifetime. This has been explained. It is quitenbsp;reasonable to suppose that the reigning king andnbsp;Bretwalda would appoint a local king to carry onnbsp;the government in Wessex, during his enforcednbsp;absence in the Midlands.

THE SLAUGHTER NOT IN WESSEX 247 have been expelled, and it has been assumed thatnbsp;he was driven into exile, and that he was thereforenbsp;an outlaw from Wessex. This is an immensenbsp;assumption to build on the statement that � Herenbsp;was a great slaughter at Wodnesbeorg and Ceawlinnbsp;was outdriven.� Surely the natural explanationnbsp;is the right one, namely, that Ceawlin was drivennbsp;out of Wednesbury.

The originating cause of this false version of history seems to have been, that historians havenbsp;jumped to the false conclusion that the Wodnes-beorg of the Chronicle was an earthwork innbsp;Wessex near Swindon. If it was, then it followsnbsp;that Ceawlin was indeed expelled from Wessex.nbsp;We know now, however, that that Wanboroughnbsp;could not possibly have been the Wodnesbeorg ofnbsp;the Chronicle. The early form of the name � Wem-burge � alone proves it, though such an idea mightnbsp;well perish from its own intrinsic absurdity.

If, on the other hand, we may identify the AVodnesbeorg of the Chronicle with the greatnbsp;town of Wednesbury near Wolverhampton, sonbsp;perfectly suited as it is for a central base fornbsp;Ceawlin�s campaigns, a totally different explanationnbsp;of the expulsion of Ceawlin is given, and one thatnbsp;is adequate, since it explains everything.

In fact, the only way to controvert the conclusion that it was the Angles who were guilty of the massacre at Wodnesbeorg and drove outnbsp;Ceawlin, is first to prove that Wodnesbeorg wasnbsp;not Wednesbury, but that it was some place innbsp;W essex.

As for Ceolric and Ceolwulf, it is quite absurd to suppose that these sons of Ceawlin�s trusted

248 LAST CAMPAIGNS OF CEAWLIN

and (according to William of Malmesbury) beloved brother Cuthwulf, could have rebelled againstnbsp;their uncle, and have raised a mutinous factionnbsp;against him in Wessex, and the loyalty of thenbsp;men of Wessex to their great king, who had sonbsp;often led them to victory, cannot be questioned.

Since it had been suggested by competent historians, the writer has to admit that he was atnbsp;one time captured, though not captivated, by thenbsp;idea that the explosion of Ceawlin must have beennbsp;due to Ceolric, but it ever went against the grain,nbsp;and above all it was inadequate, since it raisednbsp;more difficulties than it explained. On the othernbsp;hand, the version that the slaughter at Wodnes-beorg was at Wednesbury, and was due to thenbsp;Angles, not only explains every difficulty at thenbsp;time, but also it has a far-reaching effect, andnbsp;helps to explain many later problems that arosenbsp;in the long struggle between Mercia and Wessex.

It will be seen that this minor difficulty about Ceawlin�s end has been solved by first of all facingnbsp;and explaining a greater one. One of the gi-eatestnbsp;questions of the conquest of Britain by the Englishnbsp;has always seemed to the writer to be, what werenbsp;the relations between the southern and northernnbsp;invaders of Britain ? These have been largelynbsp;dealt with as occasions arose, and it has been shownnbsp;that, whereas the southern invasion was alwaysnbsp;united under a leader, until the time of Ceawlin,nbsp;the northern invasion, or invasions, were lessnbsp;united; partly because unity was there hardlynbsp;possible, but chiefly because it was not so necessary, owing to the overwhelming success of thenbsp;southern invasion. Then it has further been shown

that the two sets of invaders eannot be supposed to have remained in ignorance of each other�snbsp;doings, but that they may often have correlatednbsp;their actions, and have rendered mutual assistance,nbsp;more especially as regards the supply and controlnbsp;of marine transport.

However, all these points are open to discussion, and different persons may hold different views about them; but there is one about which therenbsp;can be no doubt at all, though it raises a question of the utmost importance.

No one can deny that at some place, on some particular date, the armed forces of these twonbsp;invasions, the southern and the northern, mustnbsp;have met.

The question that arises is. What did these jealous and long separated invaders do when theynbsp;met ?

This question gives rise to several subsidiary ones, the chief of which is. Was this first meetingnbsp;made by previous arrangement or by chance ?

The way in which these questions will be answered, as well as other questions that maynbsp;suggest themselves in this connection, dependsnbsp;upon the answer that must be given to anothernbsp;question, the most important and dominating of all.

Was there on one side or the other a leader of surpassing ability, experience, and renown, andnbsp;of such rank, and of precedence by birth, as tonbsp;have been likely to command the willing allegiancenbsp;of the jealous chieftains and warriors of both setsnbsp;of invaders ?

This answer enables us to assume, with a probability that almost amounts to certainty, that the first meeting of the armies of the Saxons andnbsp;Angles took place in the year 578, the year afternbsp;the battle of Deorham, and near Wednesbury,nbsp;and that this meeting took place by previousnbsp;arrangement.

And with equal certainty we may assume that that meeting was not only amicable, but evennbsp;cordial and enthusiastic, and that no questions asnbsp;to leadership cast a cloud upon it. It has beennbsp;shown that these cordial relations probably continued without any signs of jealousy for sevennbsp;years, until at the battle of Fethanleag, in thenbsp;year 584, something was done which aroused thenbsp;wrath of Ceawlin, and it has been further shownnbsp;that the anger of such a veteran leader as Ceawlinnbsp;could only have been excited by some failure, ornbsp;some hanging back at a critical moment of thenbsp;battle, on the part of the Angles.

If this reasoning is sound, then we can only admire the supreme greatness of Ceawlin, sincenbsp;his character shines brighter in adversity. Henbsp;appears to have so far smothered his anger, andnbsp;controlled his sorrow for the loss of a beloved son,nbsp;and many of his best followers, that he was ablenbsp;to continue to rule the Angles settled in thenbsp;districts he had won for eight years more. Doubtless he had foreseen that a rupture was inevitablenbsp;before very long, and yet as he was responsiblenbsp;for the incoming [of hosts of Saxons, arriving asnbsp;quickly as the exigencies of marine transportnbsp;made possible, and as their distribution and safenbsp;settlement depended on him, he stuck to his post

at VVednesbury, from which place alone it was possible for him to guard and guide them, andnbsp;prevent any friction between them and their Anglenbsp;neighbours. If this, or something like it, was thenbsp;case, and it seems hardly possible to doubt it, wenbsp;can but admire the firmness and courage of thenbsp;aged conqueror.

Tact and diplomacy were probably impossible to Ceawlin, and his only policy could have beennbsp;to select wise courses, and stick to them againstnbsp;all opposition, trusting that when the inevitablenbsp;storm arose he would be able to control it. Ifnbsp;so, he appears to have reckoned without the truculence of those ignorant northern warriors whonbsp;were incapable of appreciating Ceawlin�s greatnbsp;schemes for the good of the whole race of thenbsp;English. Treachery he did not suspect, least ofnbsp;all in the form of a massacre in his own citadel,nbsp;and so he was outdriven.

A year later Ceawlin made one vain attempt to win back his supremacy, and doubtless tonbsp;execute vengeance on the murderers of his friends,nbsp;but he was slain in battle by the very men fornbsp;whom he had won homes.

Ceawlin�s end was one of the greatest tragedies known to history, but the military version of itnbsp;seems to show that he did not go down in shame,nbsp;but in honour, overwhelmed not only by misfortunes in the loss of friends, but also by circumstances which were beyond his own vast experiencenbsp;and capacity, but which were the natural fruits ofnbsp;his great achievements.

Thus the story ends. And yet we cannot refrain from glancing once more at the Chronicle

252 LAST CAMPAIGNS OF CEAWLIN

under the year 827, if only to remind ourselves how the memory of Ceawlin was cherished by thenbsp;men of Wessex, by whom some have supposednbsp;that he was driven into exile and slain. It statesnbsp;that this year King Egbert conquered the kingdom of the Mercians and all that was south ofnbsp;the Humber; and he was the eighth king whonbsp;was Bretwalda. Aella King of the South Saxonsnbsp;was the first who had thus much dominion; thenbsp;second Ceawlin King of the West Saxons, etc., etc.nbsp;Moreover, elsewhere direct descent from Ceawlinnbsp;is claimed for King Egbert.

This seems to be positive evidence that Ceawlin died as King of Wessex, and that when his descendant claimed that title, he also claimed thenbsp;glorious title of Bretwalda, once held by his greatnbsp;ancestor ; only Egbert succeeded in giving complete effect to it, whereas Ceawlin, through hisnbsp;misfortunes, had failed. It was indeed fittingnbsp;that a king of Wessex, and a descendant ofnbsp;Ceawlin, should be the first to unite England.

INDEX

THE STORMING OF LONDON AND THE THAMESnbsp;VALLEY CAMPAIGN

A Military Study of the Conquest of Britain by the Angles

By Major P. T. GODSAL With Maps. ros. 6d. net

In this book the Conquest of Britain by the Anglo-Saxons is for the first time treated as a military question, and it is shown that all the evidencenbsp;indicates that they took London first, and settled round it, and that they thennbsp;fought up the Valley of the Thames.

I ncoherent guessw'ork is all that our historians can offer to the solution of the problem as to how one nation could so completely supplant another, andnbsp;the difficulties of marine transport and of colonization in the face of annbsp;exasperated enemy are totally ignored by them.

A definite explanation which co-ordinates all the evidence, whether derived from writings or vestiges, is given in this book. No one has yet ventured tonbsp;traverse this, or attempted to offer a better.

Spectator.�� The first thing to say of the intricate and carefully pursued hypothesis which is unfolded in this book is that it commands respect. . . .nbsp;We have certainly found it very interesting.�

Standard.�� His (Major Godsal�s) description of the storming of London and the campaign in the Thames Valley is more than vivid and picturesque :nbsp;it is a page of real history, faithfully pieced together after profound research.nbsp;His excellent book is for all to read.quot;

In the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution for November, 1917, this book is reviewed. It is spoken of as � this very interesting, and,nbsp;indeed, fascinating work.� The review concludes as follows :

� The study of the Thames Valley campaign, the operations of Cerdic, and the account we are given of the personality of the several leaders, makenbsp;up a deeply interesting story, one, moreover, which is coherent, reasonable,nbsp;and impressive. It will certainly satisfy those soldier-readers who study itsnbsp;main features, and who will probably be found to agree that it presents a mostnbsp;plausible narrative of what happened in the way in which alone success couldnbsp;have been anticipated and achieved. This book has now been for some timenbsp;before the public; its contentions do not appear to have been seriouslynbsp;que.stioned by those historians who have dealt with the period and events asnbsp;antiquarians, and so it may be perhaps accepted that Major Godsal has writtennbsp;history, and history which will endure.�

FROM MR MURRAY�S LIST

On Secret Patrol in High Asia. By Capt L. V. s.

Blacker, Q.V.O., Corps of Guides (Frontier Force). � It is admirable : the best thing of its kind since the recent account of the Mountnbsp;Everest Expedition ... a striking record of that adventurous dare-allnbsp;spirit which has made England the Pioneer of Pioneers.��

London News, � Captain Blacker writes with great zest of his many adventures among a barbaric people, leading us on from episode tonbsp;episode with a skill denied to most professional writers. He has realnbsp;pride in his soldiering, and his enthusiasm is soon conveyed to thenbsp;reader of his fascinating pages.��Daily Chronicle. With Illustrationsnbsp;and Maps. i8s. net.

Out of the World North of Nigeria: Exploration

of Air. By Captain Angus Buchanan, M.C., Author of �Wild Life in Canada,� etc. With an Introduction by Lord Rothschild. � It isnbsp;a graphic account of long, weary months of travel and hardship in anbsp;desert country, and it embodies scientific results which are of greatnbsp;importance to zoological students. . . . The author has an easy stylenbsp;and excellent descriptive powers which make his narrative delightfulnbsp;reading.��Glasgow herald. With Illustrations and a Map. i6s.net.

The^Heart of Nature; or, The Quest for Natural

Beauty. By Sir Francis Younghusband, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., President of the Royal Geographical Society. �To read Sir Francis Younghusband�s book is a stirring and refreshing experience, for itnbsp;springs, one feels, from an enthusiasm, an ecstasy so intense that thenbsp;writer is driven irresistibly to express it, to communicate it to others.nbsp;And to say that he succeeds in communicating it is, for such a book,nbsp;the highest praise it is possible to give.��Outlook. 12s. net.

People and Places. �The volume is full of stories about people of all kinds and conditions, from the ex-Kaiser and great ladiesnbsp;of a bygone generation to naked inhabitants of Fiji. The stories arenbsp;all good natured, very wittily told, and give us lively glimpses into thenbsp;manners and customs of both the new and the old world.��Dailynbsp;Graphic. i6s. net.

Days and Ways of an Old Bohemian. By Major

Fitzroy Gardner, O.B.E. �This is a very amusing account of a rolling stone who has contrived in his lifetime to gather a great dealnbsp;of moss. ... It is crammed with good stories.��Spectator. Withnbsp;Illustrations. 16s. net.

Mosquito or Man? The Conquest of the Tropical

World. By Sir Hubert W. Boyce, F.R.S. � Sir Rubert, writing with much lucidity and not a little spirit, follows the course of medicalnbsp;research in the tropics from strength to strength, accompanying hisnbsp;narrative wdth many elucidatory statistics and a number of striking

Ehotographs. Altogether this is a book of first-rate importance, to oth the medical man and the public servant.��Daily Telegraph,nbsp;Second Edition. With Illustrations. los. 6d. net.

TRAVEL AND ADVENTURES.

A. Wayfarer�s Caravan. By A. Alexander. With a Foreword by Viscount Gladstone, G.G.B., G.G.M.G. � Innbsp;Mr. Alexander we have another George Borrow. He takes a caravannbsp;and wanders through England, mixes among gipsies and has manynbsp;strange adventures ... a most stimulating book.��Sphere.

A Wayfarer�s Log. By A. Alexander, F.R.G.S.

� It is a book that reminds one of George Borrow. There is fighting in it, there is plenty of open air, and a jolly enjoyment of life whichnbsp;makes Mr. Alexander a stimulating companion.��Daily Mail,

Account of the Norwegian Antarctic Expedition in the � Fram,� 1911-1912. Translated from the Norwegian by A. G. Chater. 2 Voir With Illustrations and Maps.

The Naturalist on the River Amazons. By H. \V.

Bates. A Record of Adventures, Habits of Animals, Sketches 0} Brazilian and Indian Life, and Aspects of Nature under the Equator,nbsp;during Eleven Years of Travel.

Out of the World North of Nigeria : Exploration

of Air. By Captain Angus Buchanan, M.C. With an Introduction by Lord Rothschild. � A graphic account of long, weary months of travel and hardship in a desert country. . . . The authornbsp;has an easy style and excellent descriptive powers which make hisnbsp;narrative delightful reading.��Glasgow Herald. With Illustrationsnbsp;and a Map.

M.C. �There can be no question as to the popularity of this book. Naturalists, sportsmen, and all lovers of adventure will find the booknbsp;profitable and entertaining.��Pall Mall Gazette. With Illustrations.

Three Years of War in East Africa. By Captain

Angus Buchanan, M.C. With a Foreword by Lord Cranworth. � It forms a valuable contribution to the literature of the campaign, andnbsp;incidentally provides a fine record of the work of the splendid corps tonbsp;which he belonged.��Army and Navy Gazette. With Illustrations.

The Cruise of the � Cachalot� Round the World

Journal of a Naturalist during a Voyage Round

the World. By Charles Darwin. A record of observations made by a naturalist during a voyage round the world.

THE ALLIANCE OF HANOVER

A Study of British Foreign Policy in the Last Years of George I. By James Frederick Chance, M.A., F.R.Hist.S., Author of �George Inbsp;and the Northern War.**nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;2is. net.

�An exhaustive work ... the amount of labour and research that the author must have put into it is prodigious.��Truth.

�This large and important volume is a study of English policy in the years from 1725 to 1727. . . . Mr. Chance tells a fascinating story, in which such figures asnbsp;Catherine of Russia, Ripperda, Fleury, and the Old Pretender play their part, . . .nbsp;He has made no attempt to capture the general reader by flashy writing or gaudynbsp;characterisation; he has been content to seek the approval of scholars by a realnbsp;contribution to the history of Europe in a singularly obscure and generally sacrificednbsp;period.��Daily News.

A CHAPTER OF MEDIyEVAL HISTORY

The Fathers of the Literature of Field Sport and Horses. By the Rt Hon. D. H, Madden, M.A., Hon. LL.D,, sometime Vice-Chancellornbsp;of the University of Dublin.nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;los. 6d. net,

� Readers of ' The Diary of Master William Silence � will scarcely need to be recommended to this enchanting collection of essays on sport and horsemanship in Old England. Here we see our ancestors at play and can trace our own lovenbsp;of the open air and the chase back through countless generations.��Daily Graphic.

EDWARD BRUCE�S INVASION OF IRELAND

By Olive Armstrong, late Helen BUke National History Scholar. Dublin University.nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;With Maps. 6s. net.

� Miss Olive Armstrong, a Dublin scholar, has made a notable contribution to Irish history in her well-written and thoroughly documented study of one of the mostnbsp;important turning-points in the fortunes of our island. ... No student can afford tonbsp;miss this interesting and valuable volume. . . . Miss Armstrong is particularlynbsp;interesting in her account of the medieval towns of Ireland and the first stirringsnbsp;of an Irish middle class.��Irish Times.

BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS BY DIRECTION OF THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE

SEABORNE TRADE

By C. Ernest Fayle. Volume I.�The Cruiser Period. � His first volume,^relating to the first eight months of the war, is profoundly interesting.��Spectator. Maps in Case. 2is. net. Volume H.�From thenbsp;Opening of the Submarine Campaign to the Appointment of the Shippingnbsp;Controller. � The writer has again explored the intricate problems withnbsp;the skill of a well-tried pioneer.��Financial Times. Maps. 2is.net.nbsp;Volume HI.�The Period of Unrestricted Submarine Warfare. � Thenbsp;concluding volume of Mr. Fayle�s work surpasses its predecessors innbsp;interest and is a valuable contribution to the history of the war. Henbsp;has performed his task with growing skill and judgment, so that eachnbsp;instalment has been better than the last.quot;�Saturday Review. Mapnbsp;and Diagrams. 2ls. net.

THE MERCHANT NAVY

By Archibald Hurd. Volume I.�The public will be able to appreciate the great debt it owes to the Merchant Navy.��Morningnbsp;Post. With Illustrations and Maps. 2is. net. Volume II.�Thisnbsp;volume deals with the period from early 1915 to February, 1917, ofnbsp;�Unrestricted Submarine Warfare.� With Illustrations and Maps.nbsp;2 IS. net.

MEMORIES OF THE XX� CENTURY

By the Earl of Meath, K.P., G.C.V.O., G.B.E. The cordial welcome accorded to Lord Meath�s �Memories of the 19th Century� has encouraged him to offer the reading public this further volume covering thenbsp;period down to 19J2.nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;Frontispiece Portrait, los. 6d. net.

JOHN VISCOUNT MORLEY

An Appreciation and Some Reminiscences. By Brig.-Gen. J. H. Morgan. This volume is in no sense a biography�but is a collectionnbsp;of personal reminiscences by one who knew him intimately. With anbsp;Photogravure Frontispiece.nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;los. 6d. net.

SIXTY-THREE YEARS OF ENGINEERING

By Sir Francis Fox, M.I.C.E., Hon. A.R.I.B.A. Sir Francis Fox has been intimately connected with most of the great engineering feats ofnbsp;of the last half-century.nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;Plans and Photographs.

THE ROYAL NAVY AS I SAW IT

By Captain G. H. R. Willis, C.B., R.N. Captain Willis writes of the days when masts and yards and smooth-bore ordnance were relied on.nbsp;His book is full of good stories.nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;Illustrated.

REMINISCENCES, 1848-1890

By Major-Gen. Sir Francis Howard, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. �Sir Francis has the knack of writing on all kinds of subjects and writing well.nbsp;This is indeed a book that people with very different tastes can readnbsp;with pleasure.��Field.nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;Portrait. 15s. net.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY Gen. GEORGE GREAVES,

G.C.B., K.C.M.G. Edited by Colonel F. Spratt Bowring, late R.E., C.B. With a Foreword by Field-Marshal Earl Haig, K.T., G.C.M.,nbsp;O.M.nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;With Illustrations and Mlt;ips.

REMINISCENCES OF AN OLD PHYSICIAN

By Robert Bell, M.D., F.R.F.P.S. The author is a man of many interests�fisherman, scientist, gardener, sportsman, traveller�but is bestnbsp;known from his long study of Cancer.nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;Illastrated. l6s. net.

IN SOUTHERN SEAS

By W. Ramsay Smith, M.D., D.Sc., F.R.S. Edin. This book combines pleasant gossip, anecdotes and personal experiences with sound scientific knowledge and observation.nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;Illustrations.

DAYS GONE BY

Some Account of Past Years, Chiefly in Central Africa. By Rt. Rev. J. E. Hine, M.A. Oxon., M.D. Lond., Hon. D.D. Oxon., Hon. D.C.L.nbsp;Durham, M.R.C.S., sometime Bishop (in the Universities Mission tonbsp;Central Africa) of Likoma, of Zanzibar, and of N. Rhodesia ; Rector ofnbsp;Stoke ; Prebendary of Longford in Lincoln Cathedral; and Bishopnbsp;Suffragan of Grantham. Bishop Hine holds a position possibly uniquenbsp;in having presided over three Dioceses in Central Africa extending over anbsp;period of 18 years. His reminiscences should especially appeal to thenbsp;missionary, the traveller, and to the student.nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;Illustrated. 16s. Bet.

THE WAR DIARY OF THE MASTER OF BELLHAVENnbsp;1914-1918

This is the diary of Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. Ralph Gerard Alexander Hamilton, Master of Bellhaven, who served throughout the War in Francenbsp;and Flanders, and was killed during the defence of the Arne, near Amiens,nbsp;in 1918, whilst commanding the io6th Brigade of the Royal Field Artillery.nbsp;These notes were written up continuously, day and night as opportunitynbsp;offered, and often under great difficulties. With Portrait. los. 6d. net.

AN INTRODUCTORY HISTORY OF ENGLAND

II� From Henry VII to the Restoration. Ill�From Charles IInbsp;to the Beginning of the Great War, 1792. IV�The Greatnbsp;European War, 1792-1815. V�The Victorian Age.

This book is an attempt to place before boys who will think for themselves, and not metely learn by rote, a somewhat unconventional view of the leading events and personages in English History, unfettered by traditional judgments, and yet resting uponnbsp;nothing beyond the ordinarily received authorities. The form and scope of it has t^ennbsp;suggested by many years� practical experience of teaching history.

THE MAKING OF WESTERN EUROPE

BEING AN ATTEMPT TO TRACE THE FORTUNES OF THE CHILDREN OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE. In 2 Volumes. I�The Dark Agesnbsp;A.D. 300-1000. II�The First Renaissance, a.d. 1000-1190.

� It is written in his highly individual, informal, and airy manner, which has already won a large following of delighted readers. ... If ever there was a period which requiresnbsp;a process of simplification in order to make history intelligible or readable for ordinarynbsp;brains, that period is the dark ages in Europe. The way in which Mr. Fletcher threadsnbsp;his way through the mazes of the divided and continually decaying Empire is masterly.nbsp;. . . We must repeat that what Mr. Fletcher has actually done is a wonder of lucidity.�nbsp;�Spectator,

THE GREAT WAR, 1914-1918

quot;It is the work of a scholar and a patriot; it bears, on almost every page, the impress of gentleness and nobility. . . . We shall treasure and re-read his book long afternbsp;more elaborate treatises on the same subject have been forgotten.��Times,

THE ALUANCE OF HANOVER

By JAMES FREDERICK CHANCE, M.A.,

The purpose of the present work is to expose in detail British foreign policy during the time of Europeannbsp;turmoil begun in the spring of 1725 with the treaties ofnbsp;Vienna and ended by the signature of preliminaries ofnbsp;peace with Austria and Spain in the earlynbsp;summer of 1727, just before the deathnbsp;of the protagonist in the combat, thenbsp;experienced and strong-willed George I.

The information is gathered mainly from original sources and although the periodnbsp;is short it will be found full of incident.

i|i�

iiip

By the Same Author

All rights reserved

PREFACE

PREFACE

LIST OF MAFS

CHEONOLOaiCAL TABLE

CONQUESTS OF CEAWLIN

GUARDED SETTLEMENTS 3

THE BRETWALDASHIP nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;9

CHAPTER II

38 THE JUTES AND WEST SAXONS

48 THE JUTES AND WEST SAXONS

50 THE JUTES AND WEST SAXONS

56 THE BATTLE OF MONS BADONICUS

62 THE BATTLE OF MONS BADONICUS

70 THE BATTLE OF MONS BADONICUS

GEOFFREY OF MONMOUTH 73

80 THE BATTLE OF MONS BADONICUS

82 THE BATTLE OF MONS BADONICUS

84 THE BATTLE OF MONS BADONICUS

90 THE BATTLE OF MONS BADONICUS

94 THE BATTLE OF MONS BADONICUS

98 REIGNS OF CERDIC AND CYNRIC

104 REIGNS OF CERDIC AND CYNRIC

108 REIGNS OF CERDIC AND CYNRIC

CERDICES-LEA

114 REIGNS OF CERDIC AND CYNRIC

126 REIGNS OF CERDIC AND CYNRIC

128 REIGNS OF CEDRIC AND CYNRIC

130 REIGNS OF CERDIC AND CYNRIC

132 THE ORIGIN OF THE WANSDYKE learned all about Aella from his father and grandfather, and probably required no urging from themnbsp;to decide, from his earliest youth, to try to emulatenbsp;the deeds of Aella.

134 THE ORIGIN OF THE WANSDYKE

138 THE ORIGIN OF THE WANSDYKE

140 THE ORIGIN OF THE WANSDYKE

OFFA�S AND WAT�S DYKES 141

142 THE ORIGIN OF THE WANSDYKE

144 THE ORIGIN OF THE WANSDYKE

146 THE ORIGIN OF THE WANSDYKE

150 CEAWLIN MAKES THE WANSDYKE

152 CEAWLIN MAKES THE WANSDYKE

CEAWLIN�S ACCESSION

SETTLERS BROUGHT IN 155

156 CEAWLIN MAKES THE WANSDYKE

158 CEAWLIN MAKES THE WANSDYKE

160 CEAWLIN MAKES THE WANSDYKE

162 CEAWLIN MAKES THE WANSDYKE

166 CEAWLIN MAKES THE WANSDYKE

WANSDYKE MERELY A BOUNDARY 167

CEAWLIN ASSERTS HIS RULE 173

CUTHWULF

176 THE CAMPAIGN OF DEORHAM

178 THE CAMPAIGN OF DEORHAM

180 THE CAMPAIGN OF DEORHAM

186 THE CAMPAIGN OF DEORHAM

AFTER THE BATTLE

188 THE CAMPAIGN OF DEORHAM

190 THE CAMPAIGN OF DEORHAM

192 THE CAMPAIGN OF DEORHAM

ARCHiEOLOGY

the angles join the SAXONS 199

CENTRAL POSITION OF OXFORD 203 from Ethelbert. Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonnbsp;perhaps mark his conquests. Ethelbert may havenbsp;helped to extend Essex northwards to its presentnbsp;boundary.

WEDNESBURY

218 LAST CAMPAIGNS OF CEAWLIN

RELATIONS WITH THE WELSH 219

TOWNSHIPS AND HUNDREDS 221

224 LAST CAMPAIGNS OF CEAWLIN

226 LAST CAMPAIGNS OF CEAWLIN and the furthest bank which slopes down tonbsp;Shropshire on one side, and to Cheshire on thenbsp;other, is called Brynowen, and hard by is the farmnbsp;of Maes y Groes.

230 LAST CAMPAIGNS OF CEAWLIN

THE PLACE-NAME FADDILEY 231

ETYMOLOGY v. STRATEGY 235

236 LAST CAMPAIGNS OF CEAWLIN

238 LAST CAMPAIGNS OF CEAWLIN

240 LAST CAMPAIGNS OF CEAWLIN

TREACHERY OF THE ANGLES 243

248 LAST CAMPAIGNS OF CEAWLIN

252 LAST CAMPAIGNS OF CEAWLIN

INDEX

INDEX